Dignity is traditionally thought to apply to almost all and almost only humans. However, I argue that an account of a distinctly human dignity cannot achieve a coherent and non-arbitrary justification; either it must exclude some humans or include some nonhumans. This conclusion is not as worrying as might be first thought. Rather than attempting to vindicate human dignity, dignity should extend beyond the human, to include a range of nonhuman animals. Not only can we develop a widely inclusive account (...) of dignity by pursuing this route, but we can still defend the three core principles that lie at the heart of contemporary thinking about dignity: that bearers of dignity possess dignity to an equal degree, in virtue of possessing the same intrinsic worth, and that this generates direct and claimable rights. I thus develop an account of dignity that includes nonhuman animals. I argue that the capacity to value most plausibly grounds dignity. This capacity arises from valenced sentience: a being values insofar as they have experiences that matter to them. I then characterise what follows from this. First, I contend that it is only the capacity to value grounds dignity because this produces the most plausible, simplest, and most explanatorily powerful account of dignity. We ought to reject pluralist accounts which assert a sharp distinction between bearers and non-bearers of rational agency, and biocentric accounts which include non-sentient organic entities. Second, I argue this property grounds an account of dignity that is non-hierarchical. There are no degrees of dignity. Instead, all possessors of the capacity to value have the same kind of intrinsic value, and the same equal fundamental right: to consideration of their interest in leading a life of value. Finally, I argue that since the fundamental right is to consideration, moral agents have claimable duties to engage in a deliberative procedure with actionable requirements. Specific rights are instantiations of this general procedure. Certain revisionist conclusions follow on my view, for instance, that nonhumans should be given greater weight and inclusion in a far wider range of cases, but my account is sensitive to the range of different things different beings value, so it does not generate counterintuitive implications. I conclude that dignity extends beyond the human. (shrink)

Many approaches to dignity endorse the Human Scope Thesis (HST), according to which almost all humans and almost only humans have dignity. I argue that justifications for this thesis are doomed to fail. Proponents of the HST can be broadly divided into two camps, according to how they defend this thesis against the Scope Challenge. This challenge states that there is no non-arbitrary way of restricting the scope of dignity that includes almost all and almost only humans. Naturalistic Accounts attempt (...) to find a property which roughly matches the HST, while Conventionalist Accounts attempt to explain why endorsing the HST is necessary to achieve coherence with the human rights project. I argue that neither strategy overcomes the Scope Challenge. I then draw out the important implications of this. Even as dignity retains relevance to all humans, it must move beyond the mere human, so as to include nonhuman animals. (shrink)

Like the ‘thoughts and prayers’ so commonly offered by politicians in the aftermath of disaster, it is incredibly common to hear ‘autonomy and dignity’ invoked together in response to some threat to human wellbeing. As such, it seems natural to assume they must bear some kind of relation to one another. But are they merely two core human interests, that happen to be vulnerable to the same kinds of threat? Or are they interrelated in a deeper way? What I aim (...) to do in this chapter is draw on the philosophical literature on both concepts to consider how they might be connected, and explore whether certain ways of connecting them are more fruitful than others. I argue that the two most prominent connections drawn in the philosophical literature – that dignity is grounded in autonomy, and that respect for dignity is synonymous with respect for autonomy – are both highly problematic. Instead, I suggest we see autonomy and dignity as mutually supportive. Doing so has both practical and theoretical benefits: it can help us identify threats to both autonomy and dignity; and it exposes theoretical lacunae, especially within the autonomy literature. (shrink)

This collection features comprehensive overviews of the various ethical challenges in organ transplantation. International readings well-grounded in the latest developments in the life sciences are organized into systematic sections and engage with one another, offering complementary views. All core issues in the global ethical debate are covered: donating and procuring organs, allocating and receiving organs, as well as considering alternatives. Due to its systematic structure, the volume provides an excellent orientation for researchers, students, and practitioners alike to enable a deeper (...) understanding of some of the most controversial issues in modern medicine. (shrink)

Why does institutional police brutality continue so brazenly? Criminologists and other social scientists typically theorize about the causes of such violence, but less attention is given to normative questions regarding the demands of justice. Some philosophers have taken a teleological approach, arguing that social institutions such as the police exist to realize collective ends and goods based upon the idea of collective moral responsibility. Others have approached normative questions in policing from a more explicit social-contract perspective, suggesting that legitimacy is (...) derived by adhering to (limited) authority. This article examines methodologies within political philosophy for analyzing police injustice. The methodological inquiry leads to an account of how justice constrains the police through both special (or positional) moral requirements that officers assume voluntarily, as well as general moral requirements in virtue of a polity’s commitment to moral, political and legal values beyond law enforcement and crime reduction. The upshot is a conception of a police role that is constrained by justice from multiple foundational stances. (shrink)

In this volume Paul Formosa sets out a novel approach to Kantian ethics as an ethics of dignity by focusing on the Formula of Humanity as a normative principle distinct from the Formula of Universal Law. By situating the Kantian conception of dignity within the wider literature on dignity, he develops an important distinction between status dignity, which all rational agents have, and achievement dignity, which all rational agents should aspire to. He then explores constructivist and realist views on the (...) foundation of the dignity of rational agents, before developing a compelling account of who does and does not have status dignity and of what kind of achievement dignity or virtue we, as vulnerable rational agents, can and should strive for. His study will be highly valuable for those interested in Kant's ethical, moral and political philosophies. (shrink)

This paper explores the relationship between dignity and robot care for older people. It highlights the disquiet that is often expressed about failures to maintain the dignity of vulnerable older people, but points out some of the contradictory uses of the word ‘dignity’. Certain authors have resolved these contradictions by identifying different senses of dignity; contrasting the inviolable dignity inherent in human life to other forms of dignity which can be present to varying degrees. The Capability Approach (CA) is introduced (...) as a different but tangible account of what it means to live a life worthy of human dignity. It is used here as a framework for the assessment of the possible effects of eldercare robots on human dignity. The CA enables the identification of circumstances in which robots could enhance dignity by expanding the set of capabilities that are accessible to frail older people. At the same time, it is also possible within its framework to identify ways in which robots could have a negative impact, by impeding the access of older people to essential capabilities. It is concluded that the CA has some advantages over other accounts of dignity, but that further work and empirical study is needed in order to adapt it to the particular circumstances and concerns of those in the latter part of their lives. (shrink)

The concept of dignity plays a foundational role in the more recent versions of Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities theory. However, despite its centrality to her theory, Nussbaum’s conception of dignity remains under-theorised. In this paper we critically examine the role that dignity plays in Nussbaum’s theory by, first, developing an account of the concept of dignity and introducing a distinction between two types of dignity, status dignity and achievement dignity. Next, drawing on this account, we analyse Nussbaum’s conception of dignity and (...) contrast it with Kant’s conception of dignity. On the basis of this comparison between Nussbaum and Kant, we highlight tensions between Nussbaum’s Aristotelianism, which is central to her conception of dignity, and her commitment to political liberalism. This leads us to conclude that Nussbaum’s claim that her conception of dignity is only a partial political conception is implausible and that her conception of dignity seems to commit her to a satisficing form of perfectionist liberalism. (shrink)

The practice of placing men and women in the same hospital room (mixed gender rooms) has been prohibited in the UK National Health Service for over a decade. However, recent research demonstrates that the practice is common and increasing in a major New Zealand public hospital. Reports and complaints show that the practice also occurs in Australia. We argue that mixed gender rooms violate the fundamental human rights of personal security and dignity. The high rates of cognitive impairment, sensory impairment (...) and frailty in hospital wards exacerbates the risk for these violations and subsequent harm. We argue for the adoption of specific national policies prohibiting mixed gender rooms and public reporting of breaches. Importantly, these guidelines can be adopted without compromising the rights of gender minorities. In the long term, hospitals should be built with single occupancy rooms. (shrink)

In this article I provide an analysis of some salient concepts of dignity. The text is a development of a work which was initiated in the year 2000 in the research programme Dignity and Older Europeans supported by the European Union. The programme was both theoretical and empirical. The empirical part, which was the most comprehensive, consisted of focus-group interviews with health care and social care personnel, elderly persons within health care or social care, and representatives from the general public. (...) The interviews concerned the care of the elderly and attitudes towards the elderly. Some questions concerned how the interviewees conceived the concept of dignity and what they meant by behaviour respectful of dignity in the care of the elderly. Altogether around 1000 focus-group interviews were conducted in seven of the countries involved. The theoretical part of the programme consisted of an analysis of the concepts of dignity based on studies of dictionary entries in six languages as well as previous philosophical analyses of the concept. In the theoretical part of the study there emerged four different concepts of dignity: dignity of merit, dignity of moral standing, dignity of identity and human dignity. Characterizations of these concepts have been presented and developed in several publications, for example Nordenfelt and. In the present article this analysis is taken a step further. I take as a starting point some previous studies, including Schroeder, Sulmasy and my earlier ones, and propose an improvement and clarification of my earlier classification of dignities. At the same time I enlarge the analysis to concern worths in general and how these are attached to entities in general, not just human beings. The four kinds of dignities which I now propose are called: attributed dignity, dignity of inflorescence, dignity of identity and human dignity. (shrink)

Dignity is often invoked as the basis of human rights. The precise relation between dignity and human rights remains objectionably obscure, however, and many appeals to dignity seem little more than hand-waving, as critics have pointed out. This vagueness is potentially damning for contemporary human rights accounts, as it calls into question whether dignity can truly serve as the foundation of human rights. In order to defend the view that human rights are grounded in human dignity, this paper presents a (...) novel analysis of dignity that elucidates how human rights can be derived from dignity. Arguing that neither contingent nor inherent conceptions of dignity can, on their own, account for human rights, it develops a conceptualisation of dignity that combines inherent and contingent features in a coherent fashion. This, in turn, is shown to provide us with the means to explain how human rights are both grounded in and protective of dignity. Showing that the inherent features of dignity always generate a claim to the contingent features of dignity, the paper demonstrates that human rights derive directly from the inherent features of dignity, whilst what they protect are the contingent features of dignity. The paper closes with a discussion of the advantages of conceptualising dignity in the manner proposed, explicating the connection between dignity and nobility. (shrink)

The goal of this paper is to sketch and defend a novel conception of dignity. I begin by offering three desiderata that a theory of dignity should be able to satisfy: it should be able to explain why all human beings are owed respect, and what kind of respect we are owed; it should be able to explain how acts such as torture damage dignity, and what kinds of harms this brings about; and finally, it should be able to explain (...) why dignity is held to a higher degree by certain individuals. After demonstrating that the dominant, Kantian-inspired conception of dignity cannot fulfill these desiderata, I develop a novel conception of dignity that centers around the role of normative standards. Dignity, on this conception, involves being subject to, and then upholding, relevant normative standards; to violate someone’s dignity is to prevent them from upholding those standards. Importantly, these standards can have either a subjective or a communal source, which in turn explains both the agential and social harms that accompany dignity violations. I then draw on the idea of social dignity to explain human dignity. Unlike the dominant philosophical conception, I take human dignity to be a status that is conferred, rather than a status that is inherent. (shrink)

I examine the standard view of dignity in Western literature and Metz’s African community view of dignity as a capacity for communal harmonious living. I argue that moral dignity is not just having a capacity for harmonious communal living, but the moral use of such capacity for the promotion of love, friendship, positive identity and active solidarity, which involves normatively prescriptive and evaluative elements. Thus, a plausible African communal conception of moral dignity, which is founded on a moral conception of (...) personhood and community, involves a combination of capacity and agency that is conceptually tied to communal responsibility and respect for self and others. This indicates that human capacities do not have an inherent moral worth. Capacities are instrumentally good and their worth depends on how they are used to promote the moral good of communal well-being, on which individual well-being or dignity depends. This view captures the various use-senses of dignity, addresses many of the problems with many of the analyses of dignity in the literature, and also indicates its relevance. (shrink)

In her 2003 article in the British Medical Journal, Ruth Macklin provocatively declared dignity to be a useless concept: either a vague restatement of other more precise values, such as autonomy or respect for persons, or an empty slogan. A recent response to Macklin has challenged this claim. Doris Schroeder attempts to rescue dignity by positing four distinct concepts that fall under the one umbrella term. She argues that much of the confusion surrounding dignity is due to the lack of (...) disambiguation among these four concepts, but that once we understand the different values in question dignity becomes a powerful tool in the fields of human rights and bioethics. It is the goal of this paper to build upon Schroeder's insights by reconnecting the multiple strands of dignity she identifies. It will be argued that the usefulness of dignity as a guiding principle in medical ethics can be much improved by identifying the single conceptual link that ties together the various values flying under its banner. That conceptual link is provided by understanding dignity as the capacity to live by one's standards and principles.



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ZusammenfassungNicht erst seit Ruth Macklins einflussreichem Aufsatz „Dignity is a useless concept“ ist eine breite Debatte um Sinn und Unsinn des Begriffs der Menschenwürde in der Medizinethik entbrannt. In diesem Beitrag möchte ich mein Augenmerk auf die von Macklin prominent gemachte Substitutionsthese richten. In ihrer einflussreich gewordenen Fassung propagiert diese eine Ersetzung des Menschenwürdebegriffs durch denjenigen der Autonomie. Doch was ist damit genau gemeint? – Ausgehend von einer Analyse von Macklins Argumenten möchte ich zeigen, unter welchen Bedingungen die Substitutionsthese die (...) von ihren Vertretern häufig in den Vordergrund gestellten eleminativen Ergebnisse zeitigt – die Rede von einem eigenständigen begrifflichen Gehalt von „Würde“ sollte aufgegeben werden. Im Verlauf der Untersuchung werden auch die Vorzüge einer solchen Position gegenüber stärker eliminativ auftretenden Standpunkten und Positionen deutlich, die den Ausdruck als berechtigt, aber unanalysierbar betrachten. (shrink)

The discussion around dignity in nursing philosophy has been underway for many years. The literature still lacks philosophical arguments that would justify the thesis that all people have dignity. Scholars who defend dignity as an intrinsic value most often refer to Kant. However, Kant does not seem to be the most suitable candidate to defend the thesis that all human beings possess dignity. In this paper, I attempt to show that Aristotle's and Aquinas's views can help justify this thesis. To (...) this end, I distinguish between actual dignity, potential dignity, and existential dignity. I state that all human beings have existential dignity or potential dignity. (shrink)

This article investigates the capacity of artificial intelligence (AI) systems to claim the right to self-determination while exploring the prerequisites for individuals or entities to exercise control over their own destinies. The paper delves into the concept of autonomy as a fundamental aspect of self-determination, drawing a distinction between moral and legal autonomy and emphasizing the pivotal role of dignity in establishing legal autonomy. The analysis examines various theories of dignity, with a particular focus on Hannah Arendt’s perspective. Additionally, the (...) article discusses the influence of societal perceptions on AI, illustrating how AI's interactions in social contexts can shape public attitudes and compliance with legal rights. Ultimately, the article emphasizes the necessity of a comprehensive understanding of the relationship between AI, dignity, and the legal framework governing human rights, stressing the significance of recognizing dignity and societal acceptance in determining AI’s right to self-determination. (shrink)

This symposium contributes to the broader discussion about humanism in management and organizational well-being. Dignity plays a crucial role as both a fundamental value and as an end state in the process of humanizing organizational cultures, workplaces and relationships. However, despite its significance, it has yet to be addressed properly in the growing discourse on humanistic capitalism and management, and indeed in business ethics as a whole. This symposium seeks to inform and inspire emerging research and approaches towards human dignity (...) through the lens of artistic expression and explores how arts may promote human dignity in organizational life. (shrink)

The discussion of the nature and value of dignity in and for bioethics concerns not only the importance of the concept but also the aims of bioethics itself. Here, I challenge the claim that the concept of dignity is useless by challenging the implicit conception of usefulness involved. I argue that the conception of usefulness that both opponents and proponents of dignity in bioethics adopt is rooted in a narrow understanding of the role of normative theory in practical ethical thinking. (...) I then offer an alternate understanding of the nature and value of dignity. I begin by recognizing that claims that one’s dignity has been violated point to an important difference between “respect for autonomy” and “respect for persons.” I then suggest three different conceptions of how dignity can be normatively guiding for bioethics, and conclude that, ultimately, understanding dignity as the cornerstone of a reflective perspective that frames moral reflection and deliberation is valuable for doing bioethics well. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis report on end‐of‐life decision‐making in Canada was produced by an international expert panel and commissioned by the Royal Society of Canada. It consists of five chapters.Chapter 1 reviews what is known about end‐of‐life care and opinions about assisted dying in Canada.Chapter 2 reviews the legal status quo in Canada with regard to various forms of assisted death.Chapter 3 reviews ethical issues pertaining to assisted death. The analysis is grounded in core values central to Canada's constitutional order.Chapter 4 reviews the (...) experiences had in a number of jurisdictions that have decriminalized or recently reviewed assisted dying in some shape or form.Chapter 5 provides recommendations with regard to the provision of palliative care in Canada, as well as recommendations for reform with respect to the various forms of assisted death covered in this document. (shrink)

Philosophers and bioethicists are typically sceptical about invocations of dignity in ethical debates. Many believe that dignity is essentially devoid of meaning: either a mere rhetorical gesture used in the absence of good argument or a faddish term for existing values like autonomy and respect. On the other hand, the patient experience of dignity is a substantial area of research in healthcare fields like nursing and palliative care. In this paper, it is argued that philosophers have much to learn from (...) the concrete patient experiences described in healthcare literature. Dignity is conferred on people when they are treated as having equal status, something the sick and frail are often denied in healthcare settings. The importance of equal status as a unique value has been forcefully argued and widely recognised in political philosophy in the last 15 years. This paper brings medical ethics up to date with philosophical discussion about the value of equal status by developing an equal status conception of dignity. (shrink)

Property-based models of the ownership of body parts are common. They are inadequate. They fail to deal satisfactorily with many important problems, and even when they do work, they rely on ideas that have to be derived from deeper, usually unacknowledged principles. This article proposes that the parent principle is always human dignity, and that one will get more satisfactory answers if one interrogates the older, wiser parent instead of the younger, callow offspring. But human dignity has a credibility problem. (...) It is often seen as hopelessly amorphous or incurably theological. These accusations are often just. But a more thorough exegesis exculpates dignity and gives it its proper place at the fountainhead of bioethics. Dignity is objective human thriving. Thriving considerations can and should be applied to dead people as well as live ones. To use dignity properly, the unit of bioethical analysis needs to be the whole transaction rather than the doctor-patient relationship. The dignity interests of all the stakeholders are assessed in a sort of utilitarianism. Its use in relation to body part ownership is demonstrated. Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights endorses and mandates this approach. (shrink)

This response addresses criticisms in this journal of an Editorial written by Willem Landman and Udo Schuklenk. I demonstrate that the UNESCO Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights is in crucial aspects deficient, despite attempts in this journal to defend the Declaration against its critics. I focus on individual versus societal interests, research ethics, informed consent and the use of “human dignity” to illustrate the weaknesses of the UNESCO Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights. This article concludes with reflections on (...) what documents such as the UNESCO Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights ought to be called to avoid the mislabelling of what essentially are policy documents. (shrink)

Nicht erst seit Ruth Macklins einflussreichem Aufsatz „Dignity is a useless concept“ ist eine breite Debatte um Sinn und Unsinn des Begriffs der Menschenwürde in der Medizinethik entbrannt. In diesem Beitrag möchte ich mein Augenmerk auf die von Macklin prominent gemachte Substitutionsthese richten. In ihrer einflussreich gewordenen Fassung propagiert diese eine Ersetzung des Menschenwürdebegriffs durch denjenigen der Autonomie. Doch was ist damit genau gemeint? – Ausgehend von einer Analyse von Macklins Argumenten möchte ich zeigen, unter welchen Bedingungen die Substitutionsthese die (...) von ihren Vertretern häufig in den Vordergrund gestellten eleminativen Ergebnisse zeitigt – die Rede von einem eigenständigen begrifflichen Gehalt von „Würde“ sollte aufgegeben werden. Im Verlauf der Untersuchung werden auch die Vorzüge einer solchen Position gegenüber stärker eliminativ auftretenden Standpunkten und Positionen deutlich, die den Ausdruck als berechtigt, aber unanalysierbar betrachten. (shrink)

Emergency care research sometimes involves incapacitated adults as research participants. The ethical principle of respect for autonomy may not necessarily apply to an incapacitated person unable to act in an autonomous manner, although it can be argued that researchers still have a duty of respect towards such people because they have moral status despite being incapacitated. Sharing some common ground with theories of moral status based on ‘humanness’ and the ability for rational thought is the notion of human dignity, which (...) features in arguments regarding researcher conduct with incapacitated patients. However, human dignity premised upon the unique ability of humans for rational thought and moral self-regulation is contingent upon these capabilities – a limitation that possibly makes dignity a less useful framework for research conduct in emergency care research. In this article, I will discuss the different conceptions of human dignity – as equality, status and virtue – and then draw on more recent literature that explains human dignity as a social constraint and as a factor influencing the conduct of healthcare professionals and researchers. I will address questions of whether dignity as a principle ought to apply only to those who have the ability to think rationally, or to all humans regardless of their condition or mental status. I will argue that, in relation to offering protection to research participants in emergency conditions, it is immaterial which view is taken. (shrink)

Social science research, whether observational or interventional, is confronted with situations where the dignity of participants and respect for cultural practices can be seriously affected. The aim of this article is twofold. Firstly, we will reflect on the ethical challenges facing social science research with special consideration of research in contexts of vulnerability. Secondly, we will propose the Kantian sense of respect as a normative framework to guide social science research.