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‘That’ Response doesn't Work: Against a Demonstrative Defense of Conceptualism.Adina L. Roskies - 2010 - Noûs 44 (1):112-134.details
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Simulation theory and interpersonal utility comparisons reconsidered.Mauro Rossi - 2014 - Synthese 191 (6):1185-1210.details
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Information and teleosemantics.Don Ross & Tadeusz W. Zawidzki - 1994 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 32 (4):393-419.details
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Causes with material continuity.Lauren N. Ross - 2021 - Biology and Philosophy 36 (6):1-17.details
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Understanding Freshness Perception from the Cognitive Mechanisms of Flavor: The Case of Beverages.Jérémy Roque, Malika Auvray & Jérémie Lafraire - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 8.details
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How to build a mind.H. L. Roitblat - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):525.details
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To structure, or not to structure?Philip Robbins - 2004 - Synthese 139 (1):55-80.details
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Qualities and relations in folk theories of mind.Lance J. Rips - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):75-76.details
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Dennett's intentions and Darwin's legacy.Jon Ringen - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):386-389.details
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Two Myths of Psychophysical Reductionism.Restrepo Ricardo - 2012 - Open Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):75.details
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Responsible agents and the “truth” about their future states.Jason Richardson - 1997 - Philosophical Psychology 10 (4):507 – 516.details
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Why presume analyses are on-line?Georges Rey - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):74-75.details
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We Are Not All ‘Self-Blind’: A Defense of a Modest Introspectionism.Georges Rey - 2013 - Mind and Language 28 (3):259-285.details
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We Are Not All ‘Self-Blind’: A Defense of a Modest Introspectionism.R. E. Y. Georges - 2013 - Mind and Language 28 (3):259-285.details
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Problems with Dreyfus' dialectic.Georges Rey - 2002 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1 (4):403-408.details
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Remembering Emotions.Urim Retkoceri - 2022 - Biology and Philosophy 37 (5):1-26.details
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The Causal Relevance of Content to Computation.Michael Rescorla - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1):173-208.details
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Content, Consciousness, and Cambridge Change.Matthew Rellihan - 2015 - Acta Analytica 30 (4):325-345.details
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Omitting the second person in social understanding.Vasudevi Reddy - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):140-141.details
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From psychopharmacology to neuropsychopharmacology: Adapting behavioral terminology to neural events.George V. Rebec - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):287-288.details
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Probabilistic causation and the explanatory role of natural selection.Pablo Razeto-Barry & Ramiro Frick - 2011 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 42 (3):344-355.details
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The Causal Structure of Evolutionary Theory.Grant Ramsey - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (3):421-434.details
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Naturalizing idealizations: Pragmatism and the interpretivist strategy.Bjørn Ramberg - 2004 - Contemporary Pragmatism 1 (2):1-63.details
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Do connectionist representations earn their explanatory keep?William Ramsey - 1997 - Mind and Language 12 (1):34-66.details
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Do Connectionist Representations Earn Their Explanatory Keep?William Ramsey - 1997 - Mind and Language 12 (1):34-66.details
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Theories of mind: Some methodological/conceptual problems and an alternative approach.Sam S. Rakover - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):73-74.details
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Crane and the mark of the mental.Andrea Raimondi - 2022 - Analysis 81 (4):683-693.details
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Theory-theory theory.Howard Rachlin - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):72-73.details
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Against dispositionalism: belief in cognitive science.Jake Quilty-Dunn & Eric Mandelbaum - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (9):2353-2372.details
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XIII-Epistemic Agency and Metacognition: An Externalist View.Joëlle Proust - 2008 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1pt3):241-268.details
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Why Evolution Has to Matter to Cognitive Psychology and to Philosophy of Mind.Joëlle Proust - 2006 - Biological Theory 1 (4):346-348.details
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Epistemic agency and metacognition: An externalist view.Joëlle Proust - 2008 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1pt3):241-268.details
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Replies to Langland‐Hassan, Nagel, and Smith.Joëlle Proust - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (3):736-755.details
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The emotional basis of moral judgments.Jesse Prinz - 2006 - Philosophical Explorations 9 (1):29-43.details
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Rationality, biology and optimality.Carolyn Price - 2002 - Biology and Philosophy 17 (5):613-634.details
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Is Emotion a Form of Perception?Jesse J. Prinz - 2006 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (sup1):137-160.details
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Emotions, psychosemantics, and embodied appraisals.Jesse Prinz - 2003 - In A. Hatimoysis (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge University Press. pp. 69-86.details
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Intentional schema will not do the work of a theory of mind.David Premack & Ann James Premack - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):138-140.details
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Intentionality: How to tell Mae West from a crocodile.David Premack - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):522.details
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Matching and mental-state ascription.Ian Pratt - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):71-72.details
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Testing for controlled variables.William T. Powers - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):286-287.details
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Information and explanation: an inconsistent triad and solution.Mark Povich - 2021 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 11 (2):1-17.details
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Ontogeny, evolution, and folk psychology.Daniel J. Povinelli, Mia C. Zebouni & Christopher G. Prince - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):137-138.details
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Et pourquoi pas une explication non représentationnelle de l'action motrice? Considérations neurophénoménologiques.Pierre Poirier - 2007 - Dialogue 46 (2):353-360.details
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Representational development and theory-of-mind computations.David C. Plaut & Annette Karmiloff-Smith - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):70-71.details
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Limitations on first-person experience: Implications of the “extent”.Bradford H. Pillow - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):69-69.details
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First-person authority and beliefs as representations.Paul M. Pietroski - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):67-69.details
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