This paper aims to provide a philosophical and theoretical account of biological communication grounded in the notion of organisation. The organisational approach characterises living systems as organised in such a way that they are capable to self-produce and self-maintain while in constant interaction with the environment. To apply this theoretical framework to the study of biological communication, we focus on a specific approach, based on the notion of influence, according to which communication takes place when a signal emitted by a (...) sender triggers a change in the behaviour of the receiver that is functional for the sender itself. We critically analyse the current formulations of this account, that interpret what is functional for the sender in terms of evolutionary adaptations. Specifically, the adoption of this etiological functional framework may lead to the exclusion of several phenomena usually studied as instances of communication, and possibly even of entire fields of investigation such as synthetic biology. As an alternative, we reframe the influence approach in organisational terms, characterising functions in terms of contributions to the current organisation of a biological system. We develop a theoretical account of biological communication in which communicative functions are distinguished from other types of biological functions described by the organisational account (e.g. metabolic, ecological, etc.). The resulting organisational-influence approach allows to carry out causal analyses of current instances of phenomena of communication, without the need to provide etiological explanations. In such a way it makes it possible to understand in terms of communication those phenomena which realise interactive patterns typical of signalling interactions – and are usually studied as such in scientific practice – despite not being the result of evolutionary adaptations. Moreover, this approach provides operational tools to design and study communicative interactions in experimental fields such as synthetic biology. (shrink)

The explanatory role of natural selection is one of the long-term debates in evolutionary biology. Nevertheless, the consensus has been slippery because conceptual confusions and the absence of a unified, formal causal model that integrates different explanatory scopes of natural selection. In this study we attempt to examine two questions: (i) What can the theory of natural selection explain? and (ii) Is there a causal or explanatory model that integrates all natural selection explananda? For the first question, we argue that (...) five explananda have been assigned to the theory of natural selection and that four of them may be actually considered explananda of natural selection. For the second question, we claim that a probabilistic conception of causality and the statistical relevance concept of explanation are both good models for understanding the explanatory role of natural selection. We review the biological and philosophical disputes about the explanatory role of natural selection and formalize some explananda in probabilistic terms using classical results from population genetics. Most of these explananda have been discussed in philosophical terms but some of them have been mixed up and confused. We analyze and set the limits of these problems. (shrink)

This dialogue between Achilles and the Tortoise – in the spirit of those of Carroll and Hofstadter – argues against the idea, identified with the “traditional” interpretation of Aristotle’s “sea battle argument”, that future contingents are an exception to the Principle of Bivalence. It presents examples of correct everyday predictions, without which one would not be able to decide and to act; however, doing this is incompatible with the belief that the content of these predictions lacks a truth-value. The cost (...) of using a non-classical logic to cope with that may be too high for Stagirite’s defenders, and they would still need to explain why our ordinary predictions seem to have a binary truth-value. In the end, the paper suggests that the problem of future contingents – and of free will – is not a logical problem at all, but rather a limit on what an agent can believe before taking a decision. (shrink)

Abstract: Using a critical review of the literature, we study a challenge from philosophical anarchism to J. Raz's theory of legal authority: it would be irrational to follow an order with which one disagrees, since it would mean acting against what is considered more justified. Through references from decision theory and epistemology, and deploying examples about tools for assisting in routine decision-making, we sketch two possible answers: first, it may be justifiable to put yourself in a situation that leads to (...) irrationally acting; second, according to the “blindspots” theory, we outline some restrictions from a theory of rationality to the authority. (shrink)

Determinism which denies freedom of action is a common philosophical view. Is the action of such determinists incompatible with Kant’s claim that a rationally willed being “cannot act otherwise than under the idea of freedom” [G 4, 448]? In my paper, I examine Kant’s argument for this claim at the beginning of the Third Section of the Groundwork and argue that it amounts to the assertion that one cannot act while being aware of being guided by invalid principles. Belief in (...) determinism does not necessarily amount to such awareness. A structurally similar argument based on the contrast between deliberation and prediction is examined and similarly found wanting. (shrink)

From a critical review of the literature, we analyze the incompatibility between the possibility of incorporating moral principles to the law and its authoritative nature, as argued by exclusive positivists, such as J. Raz. After presenting his argument in second section, we argue in the third section that it is incompatible with commonly accepted (even by Raz) premises of the theory of legal interpretation, or else it would lead to contradiction - unless one presupposes, within the premises, a strong version (...) of the sources thesis (which is what Raz intends to prove). In conclusion, we return to the arguments presented, concluding with a possible difficulty for the adoption of exclusive positivism by people inside a legal practice. (shrink)

Translation into Portuguese of SEP entries on Philosophy of Economics.

Abstract: We face objections against punishing financial firms and managers for producing risks for the financial system – that it’s either paternalistic or inefficient. Against the first: financial crises are so damaging that governments and deposit insurance funds have to intervene – an implicit guarantee to creditors. This is controversial from the perspective of political morality: it implies using resources from the public for the benefit of better-off people who willingly incur risks. So, we begin by studying a possible justification (...) for this arrangement from the ‘incentives argument’ derived from the Rawls difference principle, in the light of G. Cohen’s criticisms. Against the second: we cannot completely dispense with coercive instruments - mainly for the moral hazard entailed by the implicit guarantee. Therefore, we conclude the threat of liability must have a punitive and a preventive character, extending to non-compliance with norms on risk even before generating major economic effects. Keywords: Incentives, Responsibility, Moral Hazard, Justice, Finances JEL Classification: D63, G28, K42 -/- Resumo: Enfrentamos duas objeções à punição de instituições financeiras e gestores pela produção de riscos ao sistema financeiro – que seria paternalista e ineficiente. Contra a primeira: crises financeiras prejudicam tanto a economia que governos e fundos garantidores são obrigados a intervir – uma garantia implícita aos credores. Isso é polêmico da perspectiva da moralidade política: implica utilizar recursos do público em benefício de pessoas em melhor situação que voluntariamente incorrem em riscos. Na primeira seção, estudamos justificar esse arranjo a partir do “argumento do incentivo”, decorrente do princípio da diferença de Rawls, à luz das críticas de G. Cohen. Contra (b), arguimos que não podemos prescindir completamente de instrumentos coercitivos – mormente pelo risco moral decorrente da garantia implícita. Logo, é preciso que a ameaça de responsabilização tenha um caráter punitivo e preventivo, se estendendo ao descumprimento de normas sobre risco mesmo sem gerar efeitos econômicos maiores. Palavras-chave: Incentivos, Responsabilidade, Risco Moral, Justiça, Finanças JEL Classification: D63, G28, K42 -/- (This is a translation of the working paper "Equality and Responsibility"). (shrink)

O escritor A. J. Jacobs (2018) decidiu agradecer todas os envolvidas na preparação de seu cafezinho diário; isso o levou a uma jornada épica para contatar milhares de pessoas, desde a barista que lhe vendia o expresso matinal, passando por designers e inventores, até os agricultores que plantaram e colheram o grão em outro continente. Não existe um único indivíduo ou grupo responsável pelo seu café: é preciso um mundo para produzi-lo; é resultado de uma cadeia produtiva, uma rede decentralizada (...) que envolve diversos serviços espalhados internacionalmente – e todas essas pessoas, por sua vez, consomem outros produtos, com outras cadeias. Como este livro. Contraste esse exemplo com a anedota do diplomata soviético que, visitando Londres, fica maravilhado com as padarias – e então pergunta pelo encarregado da distribuição de pães na cidade (Harari, 2016, p. 372). Para seu espanto, os economistas ingleses respondem que ninguém tem esse cargo: o fornecimento de pães é resultado de um agregado de decisões individuais, em que cada fornecedor de matéria-prima (como farinha, sal, fermento) e serviços (transporte, padaria, limpeza) regula sua oferta a partir do que espera que os consumidores querem consumir – e o quanto estes estão dispostos a pagar. É o caso clássico do funcionamento de uma economia de mercado – em contraste com uma economia de comando, onde um grupo de pessoas, conscientemente, toma decisões sobre produção e distribuição. Esses exemplos ressaltam as “vantagens” dos mercados; pode ser tentador pensar, a partir deles, que todos os bens e serviços deveriam ser fornecidos dessa forma, porque isso maximiza a liberdade individual ou tende a 553 levar ao bem-estar coletivo, e que o melhor a fazer é evitar interferências nesse sistema – ideias associadas ao liberalismo econômico, uma teoria política e econômica que tem por patrono Adam Smith (o primeiro economista clássico). No entanto, mesmo economistas liberais reconhecem que há falhas de mercado (como bens públicos e monopólios129). Voltemos a A. J. Jacobs, o qual frisa seu agradecimento ao serviço de fornecimento de água, um “milagre moderno”: ao longo da história, a imensa maioria das pessoas não teve acesso a água encanada – mesmo hoje, 2 bilhões de pessoas ainda carecem de condições sanitárias adequadas (água e esgoto), o que causa doenças que matam 829 mil por ano (WHO, 2015). É um problema que não pode ser resolvido só por mercados, nem por associações filantrópicas; na maior parte do mundo, é um serviço público, geralmente fornecido ou regulado por estados – e sua ausência decorre de falhas de governo. (shrink)

One of the explanations for the Great Crisis of 2007-2008 was that financial authorities should have issued stricter regulations to prevent the housing bubble. However, according to Alan Greenspan, President of the Federal Reserve System (FED) from 1987 to 2006, this is to judge with hindsight. No one can guess when a “bubble” begins, nor when it ends; they happen because of the “irrational exuberance” in investors’ behavior, which causes boom and bust cycles. Regulators are not in a better situation (...) for assessing risks, though: since market participants supposedly know their own risks better than the regulator (a kind of informational asymmetry), an intervention (except to ensure law-enforcement) would imply unjustified paternalism. However, a regulator does not have to be conceived as a paternalistic authority. We sketch an objection to Greenspan's argument, arguing that crises don’t require a defective reasoning such as the “irrational exuberance” – our usual bounded rationality might be enough to provide the kind of “self-fulfilling prophecy” observed in the rise and fall of bubble assets value. Given the possibility of grave externalities, authorities are justified in adopting measures to ensure investors behave in a prudent way, even if they supposedly know better their own risks. (shrink)

Social decisions are often made under great uncertainty – in situations where political principles, and even standard subjective expected utility, do not apply smoothly. In the first section, we argue that the core of this problem lies in decision theory itself – it is about how to act when we do not have an adequate representation of the context of the action and of its possible consequences. Thus, we distinguish two criteria to complement decision theory under ignorance – Laplace’s principle (...) of insufficient reason and Wald’s maximin criterion. After that, we apply this analysis to political philosophy, by contrasting Harsanyi’s and Rawls’s theories of justice, respectively based on Laplace’s principle of insufficient reason and Wald’s maximin rule – and we end up highlighting the virtues of Rawls’s principle on practical grounds (it is intuitively attractive because of its computational simplicity, so providing a salient point for convergence) – and connect this argument to our moral intuitions and social norms requiring prudence in the case of decisions made for the sake of others. (shrink)

After the 2008 crisis, there were several debates on the bail-out and the lack of accountability of financial institutions; this supposedly affects politica l values such as equality and responsibility: it implies transferring resources from the public (for instance, poor people) to specific economic agents who have chosen to incur certain risks. On the other hand, it is arguable that it would not be up to the regulators to protect investors’ interests, and that there would be more efficient and less (...) burdensome instruments associated with prudential regulation. Our goal is to provide a justification for the bail-out and for holding bankers accountable. In section 2, we present a brief description of the problem in the context of the crisis, followed by a justification for the bail-out through the incentives argument, based on Rawls’s difference principle. In section 3, we provide an ethical discussion over the corresponding moral hazards, and investigate how to mitigate it through coercive measures. (shrink)

This paper argues, through conceptual analysis, against an objection to the disapproval of banks for the 2007-8 crisis: the idea that they could not have acted otherwise (at least not rationally) and that no one should be blamed for a fact one could not have avoided. If true, it would threaten the justification of corporate social responsibility and the legal liability of managers. Identified as the ‘inevitability thesis’, this objection is illustrated by an analysis of the film Margin Call (2011) (...) and associated with other investigations on ethics and responsibility. The target thesis stems from a confusion between different notions of responsibility (for a task, for a decision, for causing an event and for repairing it) and leads to an incoherent form of fatalism. Finally, it is suggested that the invocation of ‘inevitability’ may be a way of rationalizing the decision, obscuring reasons to the contrary. (shrink)

This essay argues, through conceptual analysis, against an objection to reproaches addressed to financiers after the Crisis of 2007-8: the idea that they could not have acted otherwise (at least, not rationally) and that no one should be blamed for a fact one could not have avoided. If correct, this would threaten the justifiability of corporate social responsibility and legal responsibility of directors. Identified as the “thesis of inevitability”, this objection is illustrated by an analysis of the film Margin Call (...) (2011) and associated with other investigations on ethics and responsibility. This target-thesis follows from a confusion between different notions of responsibility (for an assignment, for a judgment, and causal and liability responsibility) and leads to an inconsistent form of fatalism. It is suggested, finally, that invoking the “inevitability” can be a way to rationalize the decision, obscuring reasons against it. (shrink)

This paper examines theories of first person authority proposed by Dorit Bar-On (2004), Crispin Wright (1989a) and Sydney Shoemaker (1988). What all three accounts have in common is that they attempt to explain first person authority by reference to the way our language works. Bar-On claims that in our language self-ascriptions of mental states are regarded as expressive of those states; Wright says that in our language such self-ascriptions are treated as true by default; and Shoemaker suggests that they might (...) arise from our capacity to avoid Moore-paradoxical utterances. I argue that Bar-On’s expressivism and Wright’s constitutive theory suffer from a similar problem: They fail to explain how it is possible for us to instantiate the language structures that supposedly bring about first person authority. Shoemaker’s account does not suffer from this problem. But it is unclear whether the capacity to avoid Moore-paradoxical utterances really yields self-knowledge. Also, it might be that self-knowledge explains why we have this capacity rather than vice versa. (shrink)

In The Varieties of Reference, Gareth Evans describes the acquisition of beliefs about one’s beliefs in the following way: ‘I get myself in a position to answer the question whether I believe that p by putting into operation whatever procedure I have for answering the question whether p.’ In this paper I argue that Evans’s remark can be used to explain first person authority if it is supplemented with the following consideration: Holding on to the content of a belief and (...) ‘prefixing’ it with ‘I believe that’ is as easy as it is to hold on to the contents of one’s thoughts when making an inference. We do not, usually, have the problem, in going, for example, from ‘p’ and ‘q’ to ‘p and q’, that one of our thought contents gets corrupted. Self-ascription of belief by way of Evans’s procedure is based on the same capacity to retain and re-deploy thought contents and therefore should enjoy a similar degree of authority. However, is Evans’s description exhaustive of all authoritative self-ascription of belief? Christopher Peacocke has suggested that in addition to Evans’s procedure there are two more relevant ways of self-ascribing belief. I argue that both methods can be subsumed under Evans’s procedure. (shrink)

En su artículo “On Knowing One’s Own Mind” (1988), Shoemaker argumenta en favor de tres afirmaciones: (1) se requiere un autoconocimiento directo (self-acquaintance) para la cooperación racional con otras personas (porque ésta depende de que podamos decirles qué es lo que creemos e intentamos hacer); (2) el autoconocimiento directo es necesario para la deliberación sobre qué creer y qué hacer (porque no podemos ajustar racionalmente creencias y deseos sin saber qué creencias y deseos tenemos); y (3) el autoconocimiento directo es (...) una consecuencia inmediata de nuestra capacidad para reconocer el carácter paradójico de oraciones que ejemplifican la paradoja de Moore. En este capítulo trato de mostrar que las afirmaciones (1) y (2) no son correctas; la cooperación se puede llevar acabo comunicándonos exclusivamente sobre (supuestos) hechos y acciones y el ajuste racional de creencias normalmente sucede de una manera automática a un nivel de primer orden. Sin embargo, la afirmación (3) indica una relación interesante entre nuestras capacidades conceptuales y lingüísticas, por un lado, y, por el otro, nuestra capacidad de “contestar la pregunta de si creo que p poniendo en marcha el proceso (cualquiera que éste sea) mediante el cual respondo a la pregunta de si p” (Evans, 1982: 225). (shrink)

So-called "transparency theories" of self-knowledge, inspired by a remark of Gareth Evans, claim that we can obtain knowledge of our own beliefs by directing out attention towards the world, rather than introspecting the contents of our own minds. Most recent transparency theories concentrate on the case of self-knowledge concerning belief and desires. But can a transparency account be generalised to knowledge of one's own perceptions? In a recent paper, Alex Byrne (2012) argues that we can know what we see by (...) inferring from visual facts about our environment because such facts can exclusively be known by us through vision. I discuss his proposal and object that visual facts, as conceived of by Byrne, are odd: they cannot be remembered and we cannot, as yet, write them down. More needs to be said about them to make his account plausible. (shrink)

What is the relation between reasoning and self-knowledge? According to Shoemaker (1988), a certain kind of reasoning requires self-knowledge: we cannot rationally revise our beliefs without knowing that we have them, in part because we cannot see that there is a problem with an inconsistent set of propositions unless we are aware of believing them. In this paper, I argue that this view is mistaken. A second account, versions of which can be found in Shoemaker (1988 and 2009) and Byrne (...) (2005), claims that we can reason our way from belief about the world to self-knowledge about such belief. While Shoemaker’s “zany argument” fails to show how such reasoning can issue in self-knowledge, Byrne’s account, which centres on the epistemic rule “If p, believe that you believe that p”, is more successful. Two interesting objections are that the epistemic rule embodies a mad inference (Boyle 2011) and that it makes us form first-order beliefs, rather than revealing them (Gertler 2011). I sketch responses to both objections. (shrink)

Self-knowledge presents a challenge for naturalistic theories of mind. Peter Carruthers’s (2011) approach to this challenge is Rylean: He argues that we know our own propositional attitudes because we (unconsciously) interpret ourselves, just as we have to interpret others in order to know theirs’. An alternative approach, opposed by Carruthers, is to argue that we do have a special access to our own beliefs, but that this is a natural consequence of our reasoning capacity. This is the approach of transparency (...) theories of self-knowledge, neatly encapsulated in Byrne’s epistemic rule (BEL): If p, believe that you believe that p (Byrne 2005). In this paper, I examine an objection to Carruthers’s theory in order to see whether it opens up space for a transparency theory of self-knowledge: Is it not the case that in order to interpret someone I have to have some direct access to what I believe (cf. Friedman and Petrashek 2009)? (shrink)

In this paper, I reconstruct Davidson’s explanation of first person authority and criticize it in three main points: (1) The status of the theory is unclear, given that it is phenomenologically inadequate. (2) The theory explains only that part of the phenomenon of first person authority which is due to the fact that no two speakers speak exactly the same idiolect. But first person authority might be a more far-reaching phenomenon than this. (3) Davidson’s argument depends on the claim that (...) “not getting one’s words wrong” is the same as “knowing what one’s words mean”. I argue that the two are not the same. In conclusion, I sketch some alternatives to Davidson’s account. I argue that the most promising one attempts to explain first person authority by examining how we acquire second-order beliefs. A well-known remark of Evans’s proves useful for such an account. (shrink)

Alex Byrne and Jordi Fernández propose two different versions of a transparency theory of self-knowledge. According to Byrne, we self-attribute beliefs by an inference from what we take to be facts about the world (following a rule he calls BEL). According to Fernández, we self-attribute the belief that p on the basis of a prior mental state, a state which constitutes our grounds for the belief that p (thereby realizing a procedure he calls Bypass). In this paper, I present the (...) two theories in outline and discuss various objections concerning their normative (Can the procedure give us knowledge?) and metaphysical aspects (Is the procedure functional?). I conclude that especially the metaphysical objections against Bypass are somewhat more difficult to counter than those against BEL and that the modifications required of Fernández’s theory make it very similar to Byrne’s. -/- Alex Byrne y Jordi Fernández proponen dos diferentes versiones de la teoría de la transparencia del autoconocimiento. Según Byrne, para autoatribuir creencias inferimos qué es lo que creemos a partir lo que tomamos como hechos sobre el mundo (siguiendo una regla que Byrne llama BEL). Según Fernández, autoatribuimos la creencia de que p con base en un estado anterior a esta creencia, un estado que fundamenta la creencia de que p (realizando un procedimiento que él llama Bypass). En este artículo expongo las dos teorías y discuto objeciones que conciernen su aspecto normativo (¿puede el procedimiento darnos conocimiento?) y metafísico (¿es funcional el procedimiento?). Concluyo que en especial las objeciones metafísicas son más graves en el caso de Bypass que en el de BEL y que las modificaciones requeridas de la teoría de Fernández la asemejan mucho a la de Byrne. (shrink)

Four different notions of freedom can be distinguished in Kant's philosophy: logical freedom, practical freedom, transcendental freedom and freedom of choice ("Willkür"). The most important of these is transcendental freedom. Kant's argument for its existence depend on the claim that, necessarily, the categorical imperative is the highest principle of reason. My paper examines how this claim can be made plausible.

What does environmental ethics have to say about the urban context? Is the city an environment that has only negative value or is it possible, and in fact necessary, to develop ethical recommendations about how to design it? In this paper, I argue for the second of these disjuncts and sketch some ideas for an environmental city ethics. I try to show that the most important principle of such an ethics is procedural: anyone affected by a decision about the urban (...) environment must have the possibility to participate in the process of making it. This principle has certain preconditions and there are also limitations on its applicability. For example, it is plausible that there are certain ecocentric ethical obligations, which are valid independently of the implementation of the principle. I sketch an idea for how a city’s green areas can help to raise citizens’ awareness of these obligations. -/- ¿Qué se puede decir, desde la ética ambiental, acerca del contexto urbano? ¿Se trata de un ambiente únicamente con valor negativo o es posible, e incluso necesario, desarrollar recomendaciones éticas sobre cómo diseñarlo? En este texto argumento en favor de la segunda afirmación y esbozo algunas ideas respecto de una ética ambiental para la ciudad. Defiendo que el principio más importante es procedimental: toda persona afectada debe tener la posibilidad de participar en la toma de las decisiones sobre el ambiente urbano. Este principio tiene ciertas precondiciones y también algunas restricciones. Por ejemplo, es plausible pensar en obligaciones éticas ecocéntricas válidas independientemente de la implementación del principio. Esbozo cómo las áreas verdes de una ciudad pueden ayudar a sensibilizar a los citadinos con estas obligaciones. (shrink)

En este pequeño texto, resumo brevemente tres experimentos psicológicos que Peter Carruthers (2010) cita como evidencia para la tesis según la cual no tenemos un acceso introspectivo y exclusivo de la primera persona a nuestras actitudes proposicionales, sino sólo uno interpretativo. Si Carruthers tiene razón, sólo conocemos nuestras creencias, intenciones y otras actitudes a través de un proceso inconsciente de interpretación de nuestro propio comportamiento y, por ende, de la misma manera en que conocemos las mentes de otras personas. Esta (...) exposición tiene el propósito de mostrar la utilidad y necesidad de acercarse al problema del autoconocimiento desde una perspectiva interdisciplinaria. (shrink)

Las teorías lockeanas de la identidad personal afirman que una persona persiste en el tiempo si su conciencia persiste y los criterios para la persistencia de su conciencia son principalmente psicológicos. Una posible motivación para tal teoría es la idea de que “la identidad de una persona no debería ser distinta de lo que la persona misma considera que es”(Rovane 1990, 360). ¿Pero es posible que la propia identidad dependa de lo que uno mismo piensa que es? En este trabajo (...) se investigan tres posibles maneras de interpretar esta afirmación: la identidad temporal de una persona podría depender 1)del conocimiento que ella tiene de su propia identidad, 2) de alguna creencia que tiene sobre su identidad o 3) de lo que ella ha decidido sobre su identidad. Se argumenta que 1) es incoherente, 2) no es plausible y 3) incompatible con la lógica de nuestro concepto de identidad. Como alternativa se esboza una teoría animalista de la identidad temporal de las personas. (shrink)

Dieter Henrich’s reconstruction of the transcendental deduction in "Identität und Objektivität" has been criticised (probably unfairly) by Guyer and others for assuming that we have a priori Cartesian certainty about our own continuing existence through time. In his later article "The Identity of the Subject in the Transcendental Deduction", Henrich addresses this criticism and proposes a new, again entirely original argument for a reconstruction. I attempt to elucidate this argument with reference to Evans’s theory of the Generality Constraint and a (...) remark of Strawson’s in Individuals. Its logical form of a sentence-operator requires that the "I think" be capable of accompanying every thought that we can form. Henrich seems to rely on this point, claiming in addition that we must be aware of this property of the "I think". I object that we cannot assume everyone to be capable of doing the philosophy of her own situation. (shrink)

What is the relation between first person authority and knowledge of one’s own actions? On one view, it is because we know the reasons for which we act that we know what we do and, analogously, it is because we know the reasons for which we avow a belief that we know what we believe. Carlos Moya (2006) attributes some such theory to Richard Moran (2001) and criticises it on the grounds of circularity. In this paper, I examine the view (...) attributed to Moran. I rebut the charge of circularity, but also reject the theory as an adequate interpretation of Moran. (shrink)

El capítulo introduce al debate sobre la naturaleza del espacio entre Leibniz y Clarke/Newton y a la posición que adopta Kant más tarde. En particular, se exponen los dos principales argumentos de Leibniz, basados en los Principios de Razón Suficiente e Identidad de Indiscernibles, en favor del relacionismo así como algunas respuestas de Clarke/Newton. También se presenta el argumento basado en la orientación del espacio que propuso Kant en 1768 para refutar el relacionismo de Leibniz. Se concluye con una breve (...) exposición del idealismo trascendental de Kant en su Primera Crítica. (shrink)

According to Fernández, we self-attribute beliefs on the basis of their grounds, “bypassing” the beliefs to be attributed. My paper argues that this procedure runs into normative and metaphysical problems if certain changes in the subject’s ways of forming beliefs occur. If the change is accidental, the problem is normative: self-attributing the resulting belief by way of Bypass cannot be justified. The metaphysical problem is that it is unclear how the procedure can reflect any change in belief-formation at all, given (...) that it is not supposed to take into account anything but the (changing) grounds of the beliefs, not the beliefs themselves. (shrink)

In the second Meditation, Descartes argues that, because he thinks, he must exist. What are his reasons for accepting the premise of this argument, namely that he thinks? Some commentators suggest that Descartes has a ‘logic’ argument for his premise: It is impossible to be deceived in thinking that one thinks, because being deceived is a species of thinking. In this paper, I argue that this ‘logic’ argument cannot contribute to the first certainty that supposedly stops the Cartesian doubt. Rather, (...) this certainty must be based on another type of access to our own minds, possibly a faculty of introspection. Applying this result to contemporary constitutive theories of self-knowledge (Wright), I show that these cannot be part of what justifies the ascription of particular mental states to a subject. -/- En la segunda de sus "Meditaciones metafísicas", Descartes argumenta que, porque piensa, debe existir. ¿Cuáles son sus razones para aceptar la premisa de este argumento, a saber el que piensa? Algunos comentaristas sugieren que Descartes tiene un argumento 'lógico' para su premisa: No es posible ser engañado en creer que uno piensa, porque el ser engañado también es una especie de pensamiento. En mi ponencia arguyo que este argumento 'lógico' no puede contribuir a la certeza que supuestamente para la duda cartesiana. Más bien, esta certeza debe fundarse en otro tipo de acceso, talvez de forma introspectiva, que tenemos a nuestra propia mente. Aplicando este resultado a teorías contemporáneas constitutivas del autoconocimiento (Wright), muestro que éstas no pueden contribuir a la justificación de la adscripción de estados mentales particulares. (shrink)

Conocemos la propia mente mejor que la mente de otras personas. Explicaciones racionalistas dicen que este fenómeno se debe a nuestra racionalidad: Somos capaces de ajustar nuestras creencias e intenciones racionalmente en vista de su coherencia o de nueva evidencia y tal ajuste requiere que conozcamos nuestras creencias e intenciones con la autoridad de la primera persona. Examino pasajes de McGinn, Shoemaker y Burge, criticando el argumento en tres puntos: (1) Es posible pensar racionalmente sin autoconocimiento. (2) Los requerimientos racionalistas (...) parecen ser incoherentes. (3) Los racionalistas no explican cómo es posible que tengamos un autoconocimiento autoritativo. Como alternativa a las teorías racionalistas, ofrezco una explicación de la autoridad de la primera persona inspirada en una observación de Evans. (shrink)

In "Individuals", Peter Strawson talks about identifying, discriminating and picking out particular objects, regarding discriminating and picking out as ways of identifying. I object that, strictly speaking, identification means to say of two things that they are the same. In contrast, discriminating an object from all others can be done by just ascribing some predicate to it that does not apply to the others. Picking out an object does not even seem to require to distinguish it from all others. The (...) object picked is distinct in that it is the picked one, but it is not clear - even in the context of sensorily picking out - that I have to be aware of this in order to do the picking. (shrink)


Someone who believes “I believe it will rain” can easily be mistaken about the rain. But it does not seem likely, and might even be impossible, that he is wrong about the fact that he believes that it is going to rain. How can we account for this authority about our own beliefs – the phenomenon known as first person authority? In this paper I examine a type of theory proposed, in distinct forms, by Crispin Wright and Jane Heal for (...) an explanation of our authority. Both authors claim that our second-order beliefs (of the form “I believe that p”) are constitutive of the first-order beliefs that are self-ascribed in them (beliefs of the form “p”) and both try to derive the necessity of first person authority from this constitutive relation. My paper analyses and criticizes the two proposals and suggests a non-constitutive, alternative account of first person authority. (shrink)

Many of us assume that all the free editing and sorting of online content we ordinarily rely on is carried out by AI algorithms — not human persons. Yet in fact, that is often not the case. This is because human workers remain cheaper, quicker, and more reliable than AI for performing myriad tasks where the right answer turns on ineffable contextual criteria too subtle for algorithms to yet decode. The output of this work is then used for machine learning (...) purposes to generate algorithms constructed from large data sets containing thousands of correctly coded observations. The fact that ghost workers are treated as consumers distorts the basic logic of the employment relationship, effectively placing the worker-as-consumer in the worst of both worlds, in which they hold the legal rights of neither group. This puts them in a regulatory limbo position in which they have little or no protection, control, or guarantee of return on investment. This is because the platforms that facilitate ghost work have orchestrated a three-way virtual relationship that absolves all parties of responsibility, while placing nearly all the risks and opportunity costs squarely on the shoulders of the workers. As a result, we believe such a work arrangement as it stands, does not uphold basic standards of Rawlsian justice as fairness. (shrink)

Moral dilemmas can arise from uncertainty, including uncertainty of the real values involved. One interesting example of this is that of experimentation on human embryos and foetuses, If these have a moral stauts similar to that of human persons then there will be server constraitns on what may be done to them. If embryous have a moral status similar to that of other small clusters of cells, then constraints will be motivated largely by consideration for the persons into whom the (...) embryos may develop. If the truth lies somewhere between these two extremes, the embryo having neither the full moral weight of persons, nor a completely negligible moral weight, then different kinds of constraints will be appropriate. On the face of it, in order to know what kinds of experiements, if any, we are morally justified in performing on embryos we have to know what the moral weight of the embryo is. But then an impasse threatens, for it seems implausible that we can settle with certainty the exact moral status of the human embryo. It is the purpose of this paper to show that moral uncertainty need not make rational moral justification impossible. I develop a framework which distinguishes between what is morally right/wrong, and what is morally justified/unjustified, and applies standard decision theoretic tools to the case of moral uncertainties. (This was the first published account of what has subsequently become known as Expected Moral Value Theory. An earlier version of the paper, "A decision theoretic argument against human embryo experimentation", was published in M. Fricke (ed.), Essays in honor of Bob Durrant. (University of Otago Press, 1986) 111-27.). (shrink)

Cet essai présente une description de plusieurs travaux inédits de Jacques Derrida au sujet de Marx et d'Althusser datant des années 1960 et 1970. Au-delà du travail philologique, il s'agit aussi d'une étude théorique de notions telles que 'idéologie', 'fétichisme', 'reproduction', 'division du travail', 'différence sexuelle', 'domination', 'économie politique', 'matérialisme dialectique', ou 'production culturelle' — tout autant à travers les textes marxistes que dans les lectures déconstructives qu'en propose alors Derrida. Durant les années 1970, dans le cadre de son séminaire, (...) Derrida s'efforce de penser une autre économie politique, au-delà de l'économie du propre qu'il identifie aussi bien chez les économistes classiques que chez leurs critiques marxistes. Ces lectures détaillées et combattives de textes marxistes restent aujourd'hui inédites. Leur prise en compte contribue à redéfinir l'image de Derrida et de la déconstruction, en témoignant de ses discussions très avancées de Marx, d'Althusser, et de la pensée marxiste — et ce dès la fin des années 1960 et le début des années 1970, plus de 20 ans avant la publication de Spectres de Marx (1993). -/- Une version plus courte de cet article fut traduite en espagnol par Ramiro Parodi, et publiée en 2019 dans le numéro 7 de la revue Demarcaciones — numéro consacré au 25ème anniversaire de la publication de Spectres de Marx. (shrink)