ABSTRACTIn this essay, I set out key aspects of Nicholas’ Rescher’s Metaphysical Perspectives. I illustrate the tenor and value of the text based on extended analysis of: Chapter 1, on fundamental...

ABSTRACTIn this brief response to Guus Duindam's reply to my objections to his recent article, I explain why I think my original objections were not sufficiently answered. Although I believe Duindam advances the debate to some extent, I do not think he has fully explained how transcendental idealism accounts for the distinctive epistemic significance of experiments or how it avoids inconsistency in affirming the existence of things in themselves.

Scientific progress is one of the topics that has always been considered in the philosophy of science and various accounts have been presented as regards the occurrence of progress. One of the most important challenges in progress is the radical changes in scientific theories, i.e. scientific revolutions. Kuhn considers these revolutions to be discontinuities in the history of science. Although he acknowledges progress in the normal science period by referring to the puzzle solving, he fails to explain the progress in (...) scientific revolutions by proposing the incommensurability of paradigms. In contrast, Bhaskar by describing the stratified world, considers science as a continuous process with the aim of achieving causal mechanisms and structures, discovers and describes new and deeper layers. He explains progress on this basis and believes that science has the potentiality of both change and progress. The present essay discusses the progress theories offered by Bhaskar and Kuhn. Also we compare the epistemological and ontological aspects of these perspectives in order to investigate Khun's inability to explain progress during the revolution in the light of Bhaskar's views. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIn this article I briefly respond to what I view as the most contentious parts of Guus Duindam's defence of transcendental idealism and critique of Bhaskar’s transcendental realism. First, I argue that Duindam does not address the main problem with the transcendental idealist account of causal laws and therefore does not successfully defend it against Bhaskar’s transcendental analysis of experimental activity. Second, I argue that Duindam’s interpretation of transcendental idealism is vulnerable to the problem of the thing in itself, which (...) further weakens his attempt to recommend transcendental idealism to critical realists. (shrink)