(2013). Is scientific theory change similar to early cognitive development? Gopnik on science and childhood. Philosophical Psychology: Vol. 26, No. 1, pp. 109-128. doi: 10.1080/09515089.2011.625114.

: For philosophers of science interested in elucidating the social character of science, an important question concerns the manner in which and degree to which the objectivity of scientific knowledge is socially constituted. We address this broad question by focusing specifically on philosophical theories of evidence. To get at the social character of evidence, we take an interdisciplinary approach informed by categories from argumentation studies. We then test these categories by exploring their applicability to a case study from high-energy physics. (...) Our central claim is that normative philosophy of science must move beyond abstract theories of justification, confirmation, or evidence conceived impersonally and incorporate a theoretical perspective that includes dialogical elements, either as adjuncts to impersonal theories of evidence or as intrinsic to the cogency of scientific argumentation. (shrink)

In this paper we address the issue of how to think about immunity. Many immunological writings suggest a straightforward option: the view that the immune system is primarily a system of defense, which naturally invites the talk of strong immunity and strong immune response. Despite their undisputable positive role in immunology, such metaphors can also pose a risk of establishing a narrow perspective, omitting from consideration phenomena that do not neatly fit those powerful metaphors. Building on this analysis, we argue (...) two things. First, we argue that the immune system is involved not only in defense. Second, by disentangling various possible meanings of ‘strength’ and ‘weakness’ in immunology, we also argue that such a construal of immunity generally contributes to the distortion of the overall picture of what the immune system is, what it does, and why it sometimes fails. Instead, we propose to understand the nature of the immune system in terms of contextuality, regulation, and trade-offs. We suggest that our approach provides lessons for a general understanding of the organizing principles of the immune system in health and disease. For all this to work, we discuss a wide range of immunological phenomena. (shrink)

In Making Sense of Life, Keller emphasizes several differences between biology and physics. Her analysis focuses on significant ways in which modelling practices in some areas of biology, especially developmental biology, differ from those of the physical sciences. She suggests that natural models and modelling by homology play a central role in the former but not the latter. In this paper, I focus instead on those practices that are importantly similar, from the point of view of epistemology and cognitive science. (...) I argue that concrete and abstract models are significant in both disciplines, that there are shared selection criteria for models in physics and biology, e.g. familiarity, and that modelling often occurs in a similar fashion. (shrink)

Članak tematizira ulogu kompleksnog mišljenja u razvoju znanstvene spoznaje i mišljenja općenito. Po Vigotskom, kompleksno mišljenje je početna faza u ontogenezi, pa i filogenezi, ljudskog mišljenja i ono je u tom slijedu predpojmovno. Prema istom autoru, ono ima svoju unutarnju genezu koja započinje asocijativnim kompleksima, a završava pseudopojmovima. Kompleksno mišljenje je po svojoj bitifluidno, neograničeno i omogućuje prenošenje značenja. Smatramo da kompleksno mišljenje dolazi do izraza prije svega u uporabi metafora i analogija. Metafore i analogije imaju važnu eksplanatornu i ponekad (...) čak heurističku ulogu u znanstvenom mišljenju. Kompleksno mišljenje dolazi do izražaja na svim razinama i etapama razvoja znanstvenog mišljenja. Metafore mogu biti dijelom kompleksnog mišljenja kao dominantnog načina mišljenja ili u pojmovnoj strukturi kao pomoćni elementi objašnjenja. Analogije predstavljaju izvjesno strukturiranje kompleksnog i pojmovnogmišljenja.Članak tematizira ulogu kompleksnog mišljenja u razvoju znanstvene spoznaje i mišljenja općenito. Po Vigotskom, kompleksno mišljenje je početna faza u ontogenezi, pa i filogenezi, ljudskog mišljenja i ono je u tom slijedu predpojmovno. Prema istom autoru, ono ima svoju unutarnju genezu koja započinje asocijativnim kompleksima, a završava pseudopojmovima. Kompleksno mišljenje je po svojoj bitifluidno, neograničeno i omogućuje prenošenje značenja. Smatramo da kompleksno mišljenje dolazi do izraza prije svega u uporabi metafora i analogija. Metafore i analogije imaju važnu eksplanatornu i ponekad čak heurističku ulogu u znanstvenom mišljenju. Kompleksno mišljenje dolazi do izražaja na svim razinama i etapama razvoja znanstvenog mišljenja. Metafore mogu biti dijelom kompleksnog mišljenja kao dominantnog načina mišljenja ili u pojmovnoj strukturi kao pomoćni elementi objašnjenja. Analogije predstavljaju izvjesno strukturiranje kompleksnog i pojmovnogmišljenja. (shrink)

In Making Sense of Life , Keller emphasizes several differences between biology and physics. Her analysis focuses on significant ways in which modelling practices in some areas of biology, especially developmental biology, differ from those of the physical sciences. She suggests that natural models and modelling by homology play a central role in the former but not the latter. In this paper, I focus instead on those practices that are importantly similar, from the point of view of epistemology and cognitive (...) science. I argue that concrete and abstract models are significant in both disciplines, that there are shared selection criteria for models in physics and biology, e.g. familiarity, and that modelling often occurs in a similar fashion. (shrink)