Este artículo revisa los fundamentos del utilitarismo de Jeremy Bentham y las principales críticas a esta doctrina, profundizando en aquella que sostiene su incompatibilidad con el respeto irrestricto de los derechos humanos. Insertándose en esta problemática, analiza una paradigmática propuesta política del filósofo inglés: el panóptico, proyecto arquitectónico formulado por Bentham a finales del siglo XVIII con el fin de reformar el sistema penitenciario europeo. A partir del análisis del Panóptico –que se descubre como una aplicación coherente del utilitarismo benthamiano–, (...) se postula que: a) esta doctrina fomenta un trato humanitario; b) los derechos humanos no quedan garantizados, sino condicionados al grado de beneficio colectivo que generen; c) este utilitarismo supone un cuestionamiento por la universalidad e irrevocabilidad de dichos preceptos. (shrink)

First responders to chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) events face decisions having significant human consequences. Some operational decisions are supported by standard operating procedures, yet these may not suffice for ethical decisions. Responders will be forced to weigh their options, factoring-in contextual peculiarities; they will require guidance on how they can approach novel (indeed unique) ethical problems: they need strategies for “on the spot” ethical decision making. The primary aim of this paper is to examine how first responders should (...) approach on the spot ethical decision-making amid the stress and uncertainty of a CBRN event. Drawing on the long-term professional CBRN experience of one of the authors, this paper sets out a series of practical ethical dilemmas potentially arising in the context of a large-scale chemical incident. We propose a broadly consequentialist approach to on the spot ethical decision-making, but one which incorporates ethical values and rights as “side-constraints”. (shrink)

This article challenges the view permeating much philosophical thought that the primacy of individual rights represents the individual's standpoint against the public good or against the requirements of others generally. The author explicates the underlying features of our common culture contending that the conflict between individual and general good as being central to rights misconstrues the surface features of rights. The range and nature of common goods determine the options available to individuals and define their well‐being. The relative absence of (...) conflict of interests and the background of a common tradition make the courts a suitable forum for the conduct of this branch of politics. (shrink)

A response is given to the claim by Claxton and Culyer, who stated that the policies of the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) do not evaluate patients rather than treatments. The argument is made that the use of values such as quality of life and life-years is ethically dubious when used to choose which patients ought to receive treatments in the National Health Service (NHS).

Deliberative democracy is unrealistic, but so are rational-choice models of democracy. The elements of reality that rationalistic theories of democracy leave out are the very elements that deliberative democrats would need to subtract if their theory were to be applied to reality. The key problem is not, however, the altruistic orientation that deliberative democrats require; opinion researchers know that voters are already sociotropic, not self-interested. Rather, as Schumpeter saw, the problems lie in understanding politics, government, and economics under modern—and postmodern—conditions. (...) Modernity entails levels of complexity that stymie voters' attempts to be well informed about which political promises will actually solve social problems. Postmodernity adds to complexity an overabundance of fragmented information experienced impatiently and fleetingly by citizens who confuse entertainment with knowledge, and whose political demands are as unrealistic as their personal desire for a unique identity. These factors can be added, one by one, to the minimalist rational-choice model of politics, with each step leading us farther away from deliberative democracy. (shrink)

This article attempts to demonstrate, via the famous Hart‐Dworkin debate on the nature and functions of judicial discretion, that substantial jurisprudential disputes as well as theories can, and do, arise from misconceived critiques, whether intended or otherwise. It also seeks to show that, whilst Dworkin's initial critique of Hart was misconceived, his theory of adjudication that arose as a result of responses to his initial views is a positive contribution to learning, although 1 argue that Dworkin's views are not, in (...) the final analysis, sufficiently persuasive to constitute a radical departure from Hart's own views. (shrink)

RESUMO Neste artigo, são rejeitadas duas teses relativamente aceitas a respeito do projeto filosófico tardio desenvolvido por John Rawls. A primeira tese afirma que o objetivo de obras como "O Liberalismo Político" e "Justiça como Equidade: Uma Reformulação" seria o de revisar a natureza do argumento contratualista de Rawls. A segunda, por sua vez, afirma que a principal consequência dessa revisão teria sido certo recuo das implicações igualitárias de sua teoria da justiça original. Procurar-se-á rejeitar ambas as proposições mostrando que (...) "O Liberalismo Político" deve ser entendido como uma teoria acerca do uso legítimo do poder em uma sociedade democrática, e que essa teoria da legitimidade possui consequências distributivas próprias, incompatíveis com teorias liberais convencionais. ABSTRACT The article aims to reject two interrelated theses on the philosophical project carried forward by the late John Rawls. The first thesis states that there is an important change in Rawls' late works such as "Political Liberalism" and "Justice as Fairness: A Restatement" regarding the nature of his theory. Particularly, this change would had brought about a reassessment of Rawls' contractualist argument. The second thesis claims that one of the most important consequences of such reassessment is the retreat from strong egalitarian commitments, as they were present in Rawls' original theory of justice. The article rejects both theses, showing that Political Liberalism can be understood as a theory about the legitimate uses of power in a democratic society and that such new theory of legitimacy brings about distributive consequences by its own that sharply contrast with classical liberal theories. (shrink)

The author analyzes the relations between truth and law starting from the distinction between practical and theoretical spheres. He shows, first, how moral and legal statements and reasoning are connected with an operation of weighing and balancing different values and principles and how this operation is ultimately based on personal and intuitive preferences and feeling. The criteria developed by the theoretical sciences to define truth (coherence, consensus and pragmatic success) can only be translated into practical statements as criteria of correctness (...) because we cannot affirm that a norm or value statement is true or false. The three criteria become interrelated indices of correctness: They are criteria for rational discourse. (shrink)

Moral statements are related to some ought‐ and good‐making facts. If at least one of these facts exists then it is reasonable that an action in question is prima facie good and obligatory. If all of these facts take place, then it is reasonable that the action is definitively good and obligatory. Yet, moral reasoning is relatively uncertain. The law is more “fixed”. Legal interpretatory statements ought to express a compromise between the literal sense of the law and moral considerations. (...) They can be to a high degree both coherent and accepted. One may emotionally reject them but most people have a disposition to endorse a coherent and commonly accepted value system. (shrink)

The author distinguishes between scientific and prudential reason (practical wisdom) in Aristotle with reference to the nature of the principles assumed as premises, and to the method of inference. In the history of thought these two models of reason are elieved not only to be proper to science and, respectively, ethics, but also, at times, to be the scientific model proper to ethics (for example, in natural law doctrines) and the prudential model proper to science. Mixed models are also given (...) in the history of thought: scientific‐prudential (for example, in Thomas Aquinas) and prudential‐scientific. Furthermore, some aspects of the relationship between authority and reason are examined. (shrink)

Research in recent history has neglected to address the moral foundations of particular kinds of public policy such as the protection of intellectual property rights (IPRs). On the one hand, nation-states have enforced a tightening of the IPR system. On the other, only recently have national government and international institutions recognised that the moral justification for stronger IPRs protection is far from being plausible and cannot be taken for granted. In this article, IPRs are examined as individual rights founded upon (...) natural law, personality development, just reward and social utility. It is argued that these foundations cannot be philosophically sustained. IPRs constitute morally indefensible political developments which aim to reproduce the capitalist division of knowledge and labour at national, international and global levels. The need for such a critical approach to the moral foundations of IPRs has increased in importance as a consequence of their role in justifying corporate power, globalisation policies and harmonisation of such. (shrink)

Since the establishment of the Human Genome Project and the identification of genes in human DNA that play a role in human diseases and disorders, a long, moral and political, battle has began over the extension of IPRs to information contained in human genetic material. According to the Nuffield Council on Bioethics, over the past 20 years, large numbers of human genes have been the subject of thousands of patent applications. This paper examines whether human gene patents can be justified (...) in terms of liberal theories of morality such as natural law, personality development, just reward and social utility. It is argued that human gene patents are in conflict with fundamental principles of liberal morality and justice because they result in "genetic information feudalism". (shrink)

The perspectives of the dominant Western ethical theories, have dominated the concepts of autonomy and informed consent for many years. Recently this dominant understanding has been challenged by ethics of care which, although, also emanates from the West presents a more nuanced concept: relational autonomy, which is more faithful to our human experience. By paying particular attention to relational autonomy, particularity and Process approach to ethical deliberations in ethics of care, this paper seeks to construct a concept of informed consent (...) from the perspective of ethics of care which is here called relational autonomy-in-informed consent. Thus, providing a broader theoretical basis for informed consent beyond the usual theoretical perspectives that are particularly Western. Care ethics provides such a broader basis because it appeals to a global perspective that encompasses lessons from other cultures, and this will help to enrich the current ideas of bioethics principles of autonomy and informed consent. This objective will be achieved by exploring the ethics of care emphasis on relationships based on a universal experience of caring; and by contrasting its concept of autonomy as relational with the understanding of autonomy in the approaches of the dominant moral theories that reflect rational, individualistic, and rights-oriented autonomy of the American liberalism. (shrink)

Freedom of contract and corrective justice are considered to be the basic principles governing contract law. However, many contemporary legal orders implement various policy goals into private law. The regulatory private law of the European Union is the most striking example of such a trend. This article aims at reconciling the corrective justice theory of private law and the principle of freedom of contract with the regulatory dimension of the EU law. The main argument is that the meaning of the (...) concept of harm, one that is crucial to the principle of corrective justice, should be understood broadly so that it can transform the corrective justice theory from a monistic one into a pluralistic one. (shrink)

The author revisits H. L. A. Hart's theory of positive law and argues for a major qualification to the thesis of the separation of law and morality based on a concept of systemic legitimacy derived from the social theory of Jurgen Habermas. He argues that standards for assessing the degree of systemic legitimacy in modern legal systems can develop through reflective exercise of “critical legality,” a concept coined to parallel Hart's “critical morality,” and an expanded understanding of the “external” and (...) “internal” perspectives on legal systems. Following Habermas, he argues that modern positive law must retain systemic legitimacy. After suggesting criteria for measuring systemic legitimacy, the author concludes that the concept provides a useful approach to contemporary problems of “lawless” regimes and “law's imperialism.”. (shrink)

ABSTRACTSince 2007, when Mexico City decriminalized abortion during the first trimester, a debate has been taking place regarding abortion and the right to conscientious objection. Many people argue that, since the provision of abortions is now a statutory duty of healthcare personnel there can be no place for “conscientious objection.” Others claim that, even if such an objection were to be allowed, it should not be seen as a right, since talk about a right to CO may lead to a (...) slippery slope where we may end up recognizing a right to disobey the law. In this paper, I argue that there is a right to CO and that this may be justified through the notions of autonomy and integrity, which a liberal democracy should respect. However, it cannot be an absolute right, and in the case of abortion, it conflicts with women’s reproductive rights. Therefore, CO should be carefully regulated so that it does not obstruct the exercise o... (shrink)

This article critically reviews what is known about the ethical status of psychologists’ putative involvement with enhanced interrogations and torture (EITs). We examine three major normative ethical accounts (utilitarian, deontic, and virtue ethics) of EITs and conclude, contra the American Psychological Association, that reasonable arguments can be made that in certain cases the use of EITs is ethical and even, in certain circumstances, morally obligatory. We suggest that this moral question is complex as it has competing moral values involved, that (...) is, the humane treatment of detainee competes with the ethical value/duty/virtue of protecting innocent third parties. We also suggest that there is an ethical duty to minimize harm by making only judicious and morally responsible allegations against the psychologists alleged to be involved in EITs. Finally, we make recommendations regarding completing the historical record, improvements in the professional ethics code, and the moral treatment of individuals accused in this controversy. (shrink)

If the current trend is any guide, it looks like we are heading towards a future in which relationships are determined and regulated by rights. In addition to the ?universal human rights? declared soon after the Second World War, other ?universal rights? have been declared and added to the list of rights, such as the rights of the child, the rights of indigenous peoples and so on. A question arises as to whether a world in which our relationships are governed (...) entirely on the basis of rights is an appealing one. I want to suggest that if our common future is regulated entirely by rights then we are moving in the wrong direction. By contrast, Tu Wei-ming believes that if Confucianism flourishes, we will move towards a society based on trust rather than rights, or what he calls a ?fiduciary society?. I will argue that while Tu's Confucian fiduciary society is perhaps an impractical ideal, a move towards it will provide a necessary counter-balance to the relentless march towards a rights-based society. (shrink)

Is it possible to use the courts - or rights instruments - to advance fair access to health care? This article examines this question within the context of the Norwegian public health care system - one special example of the Scandinavian welfare system. In particular, it asks four basic questions: What are the normative justifications for rights to health care? What were the political processes and concerns leading up to the current Patients Rights Act in Norway? What kind of legal (...) status do these rights have? How can rights to access be implemented?Patient rights do not only concern the right to access to health care; they also include the right to information, the right to participate in decision-making, and informed consent. This article examines only the former aspect, the use of the legal system to secure access to prioritized specialized health care services. (shrink)

Is it possible to use the courts - or rights instruments - to advance fair access to health care? This article examines this question within the context of the Norwegian public health care system - one special example of the Scandinavian welfare system. In particular, it asks four basic questions: What are the normative justifications for rights to health care? What were the political processes and concerns leading up to the current Patients Rights Act in Norway? What kind of legal (...) status do these rights have? How can rights to access be implemented?Patient rights do not only concern the right to access to health care; they also include the right to information, the right to participate in decision-making, and informed consent. This article examines only the former aspect, the use of the legal system to secure access to prioritized specialized health care services. (shrink)

The author deals with one aspect of the justification of governmental action and its product (the law). He focuses on the authoritative character of legal rule, analyzing the apparent capacity of governments to produce reasons for action not grounded on substantive moral considerations. The assumption of that capacity seems necessary in order to establish a general moral obligation to obey a government irrespective of the actions required. This question is faced in connection with the thesis that only a particular form (...) of government, democracy, is morally justified insofar as it rests on legal rules issued by a legitimate source. (shrink)

This article aims to challenge the idea of a 'balance' between security and liberty. Set against the background of ever greater demands for security, the article argues that the idea of balance is an essentially liberal myth, a myth that in turn masks the fact that liberalism's key category is not liberty, but security. This fact, it is suggested, undermines any possibility of liberalism challenging current demands for greater security, as witnessed by the thoroughly authoritarian 'concessions' to security by some (...) contemporary liberals. More ambitiously, the article also suggests that attempts to develop a 'radical' politics of security are misplaced, and that what is needed is more a political critique of the concept. (shrink)

This article aims to challenge the idea of a ‘balance’ between security and liberty. Set against the background of ever greater demands for security, the article argues that the idea of balance is an essentially liberal myth, a myth that in turn masks the fact that liberalism's key category is not liberty, but security. This fact, it is suggested, undermines any possibility of liberalism challenging current demands for greater security, as witnessed by the thoroughly authoritarian ‘concessions’ to security by some (...) contemporary liberals. More ambitiously, the article also suggests that attempts to develop a ‘radical’ politics of security are misplaced, and that what is needed is more a political critique of the concept. (shrink)

In this article I examine whether Moral Foundations Theory can fulfil the promises that Haidt claims for the theory: that it will help in developing new approaches to moral education and to the moral conflicts that divide our diverse society. I argue that, first, the model that Haidt suggests for understanding the plurality of moralities—a shared foundation underlying diverse moralities—does not help to overcome conflicts. A better understanding of the nature and background of moral conflicts can lead to a more (...) respectful attitude towards people with conflicting views, but need not contribute to ending conflicts. Second, I show that pervasive moral conflicts should be dealt with on the level of politics. They require a morality of compromising. Third, I examine why this approach does not seem to work in the USA. (shrink)

Many believe that a citizen who engages in civil disobedience is not exempt from the sanctions that apply to standard law-breaking conduct. Since he is responsible for a deliberate breach of the law, he is also liable to punishment. Focusing on a conception of responsibility as answerability, I argue that a civil disobedient is responsible (i.e. answerable) to his fellows for the charges of wrongdoing, yet he is not liable to punishment merely for breaching the law. To support this claim, (...) I defend an account of political obligation framed in terms of respect for (rather than mere obedience to) the law, and argue that the mere illegality of civil disobedience does not suffice to establish wrongdoing. I then discuss and reject three objections to my argument. (shrink)

My argument will proceed as follows. I will first sketch out the broad internalist case for pitching its normative account of sport in the abstract manner that following Dworkin’s lead in the philosophy of law its adherents insist upon. I will next show that the normative deficiencies in social conventions broad internalists uncover are indeed telling but misplaced since they hold only for what David Lewis famously called ‘coordinating’ conventions. I will then distinguish coordinating conventions from deep ones and make (...) my case not only for the normative salience of deep conventions but for their normative superiority over the abstract normative principles broad internalists champion. (shrink)

Justice is important, but so is peaceful cooperation. In this article, I argue that if one takes seriously the autonomy of individuals and groups and the fact of moral pluralism, a just system of cooperation cannot guarantee peaceful cooperation in a pluralistic world. As a response to this consideration, I develop a contractarian theory that can secure peace in a pluralistic world of autonomous agents, assuming that the agents who exist in this world expect that peaceful cooperation is the most (...) beneficial form of interaction for them in the long run. The theory specifies the restrictions on the behavior of autonomous individual and collective agents that are indispensable for peaceful cooperation in a pluralistic world. In particular, I argue for the need of (i) a globally valid rule of conflict resolution to settle all intra- and inter-group conflicts that cannot be resolved locally, (ii) a world court to apply this rule in cases where local group authorities are inadequate to do so, and to serve as a final court of appeal, and (iii) a world police to enforce the rule. (shrink)

What role should the state have in recognizing and regulating marriage? Until recently, liberal political theorists paid little attention to this question. Yet the challenges that the public–private boundary-crossing institution of marriage poses to liberalism are substantial. Tensions in contemporary debates suggest that these challenges remain unaddressed and thus, invite attempts to formulate a coherent and compelling model of the relationship between marriage and the liberal state. This article responds to this invitation. Marriage has long been a concern of at (...) least some liberal thinkers. Typically they focused on the dual character of marriage, or its role in producing gender inequality. While these critical insights are essential to any adequate account of marriage and the state, they are only part of the picture. To grasp the sources of confusion and silences in contemporary debates, and formulate a robust liberal model of marriage and the state, we must examine the functions — intended and effective — of public recognition of marriage. This examination highlights the relevance to the marriage-state relationship of familiar liberal approaches to negotiating the religion-state relationship. Drawing on these approaches and liberal feminist thought, I sketch a model of marriage and the state that aims to expand the area of protected freedom without sacrificing equality, fairness or marriage. Under the model I propose, marriage would be disestablished. The state would neither confer marital status, nor use 'marriage' as a category for dispersing benefits. Legitimate public welfare goals currently treated through marriage would be addressed through an intimate caregiving union status. (shrink)

This article questions some assumptions in legal, moral and political theory regarding the law’s ways of functioning. As the constant revival of the topos ‘living law’ shows, underlying common models of law, and of the legitimacy of law, is, though often implicitly, the view that law is or should be particular, near to the facts, flexible, susceptible to realities, and as a consequence accessible to modernisations. However, this article proposes an immanent critique of similar hopes or fears, and it argues (...) that modern positive law can not be responsive to any other ‘order’ or context because it constitutes an order of its own. The article seeks to give an explanation of the specific character and forms of the juridical operating and to explain more specifically how decisions are produced. The article in this regard also investigates the importance and role of imagination, fiction and performativity. Underlining the fact that the juridical exceeds legal propositions by asserting itself as a distinct form of social communication, it calls for a shift from the representational to the performative analysis in the study of law. (shrink)

Traditional liberalism's blindness to cultural concerns has often come under fire, while so‐called “liberal multiculturalism” has made it its business to take a good look at the place of culture within liberal law. According to them, cultural minorities should be recognized. In my opinion, however, their proposals, in fact, almost entirely preclude the possibility that cultural minorities would receive recognition within liberal society. In what follows, I explain my view of these matters and, above all, argue for a more vital (...) understanding of cultural minorities. This will entail presenting a comprehensive view of minority rights within liberal society. (shrink)

In this paper, we give an account of some of the necessary conditions for an effectively functioning public sphere, and then explore the question of whether these conditions allow for the expression of ideas and values that are fundamentally incompatible with those of liberalism. We argue that speakers who advocate or glorify violence against democratic institutions fall outside the parameters of what constitutes legitimate public debate and may in fact undermine the conditions necessary for the flourishing of free speech and (...) public dialogue more generally. (shrink)

Bovine tuberculosis is an important and controversial animal health policy issue in England, which impacts humans, cattle and badgers. The government policy of badger culling has led to widespread opposition, in part due to the conclusions of a large field trial recommending against culling, and in part because badgers are a cherished wildlife species. Animal rights theorists argue that sentient nonhumans should be accorded fundamental rights against killing and suffering. In bovine TB policy, however, pro-culling actors claim that badgers must (...) be culled to avoid the slaughter of cattle. The first part of the paper compares AR theories of Regan, Francione, Cochrane, Garner and Donaldson and Kymlicka in the context of wildlife species. The second part of the paper applies these AR theories to bovine TB and badger control. AR theories are applied to badger control policy options of do nothing, badger culling, and badger vaccination. We conclude that AR theories are strongly opposed to badger culling. In general, culling is prohibited due to a badger’s right to life and its rights against suffering. The AR theories support a do-nothing, i.e. non-culling, non-vaccination approach to badger control. In the case of the AR theories of Regan and Francione, this is based on abolitionist positions with respect to farming. For Cochrane, Garner, and Donaldson and Kymlicka, the do-nothing policy option is preferred because badger vaccination causes a degree of suffering which generally is not for the individual’s benefit. (shrink)

This paper examines three possible justifications for original ACMG recommendations to return incidental findings from whole exome or genome sequencing independent of patient preferences. The first two potential justifications, based on a patient's authentic values, then on harms to others, are founding lacking as a basis of justification for these recommendations. The third, grounded in analogous professional practices, might serve as a potential justification if several controversies can be avoided. However, given the nature of these controversies and the need to (...) instill public trust in this newly emerging science, the paper finds that updated ACMG recommendations that recognize opt-out rights on behalf of patients is the most prudent, and justifiable, approach. (shrink)

Human rights are those legal and/or moral rights that all persons have simply as persons. In the current digital age, human rights are increasingly being either fulfilled or violated in the online environment. In this article, I provide a way of conceptualizing the relationships between human rights and information technology. I do so by pointing out a number of misunderstandings of human rights evident in Vinton Cerf's recent argument that there is no human right to the Internet. I claim that (...) Cerf fails to recognize the existence of derived human rights. I argue further that we need to consider what other human rights are necessitated by the digital age. I suggest we need a Declaration of Digital Rights. As a step toward the development of such a declaration, I suggest a framework for thinking through how to ensure the human rights are satisfied in digital contexts. (shrink)

This paper addresses the question of what value pluralism tells us about the pursuit of moral coherence as a method of moral reasoning. I focus on the status of the norm of ‘systematicity,’ or the demand that our principles be as few and as simple as possible. I argue that, given certain descriptive facts about the pluralistic ways we value, epistemic ways of supporting a systematicity norm do not succeed. Because it is sometimes suggested that coherence functions in moral reasoning (...) as it does in scientific reasoning, my argument considers analogies and disanalogies between moral reasoning and scientific reasoning. (shrink)

Deep ethical interpretivism has been the standard view of the nature of sport in the philosophy of sport for the past seventeen years or so. On this account excellence assumes the role of the foundational, ethical goal that justice assumes in Ronald Dworkin’s interpretivist model of law. However, since excellence in sports is not an ethical value, and since it should not be regarded as an ultimate goal, the case for the traditional account fails. It should be replaced by the (...) shallow interpretivist model that I begin to sketch out and defend here. (shrink)

This article places the concept of "right to know," which is normally associated with law, in a moral framework. It outlines multiple meanings of the concept, emphasizing the institutional nature of "right to know." Then the article imbeds this understanding in moral thinking, including a discussion of the moral elements of rights, and applies that understanding in specific journalistic situations.

The use of certain performance-enhancing drugs (PED) is banned in sport. I discuss critically standard justifications of the ban based on arguments from two widely used criteria: fairness and harms to health. I argue that these arguments on their own are inadequate, and only make sense within a normative understanding of athletic performance and the value of sport. In the discourse over PED, the distinction between “natural” and “artificial” performance has exerted significant impact. I examine whether the distinction makes sense (...) from a moral point of view. I propose an understanding of “natural” athletic performance by combining biological knowledge of training with an interpretation of the normative structure of sport. I conclude that this understanding can serve as moral justification of the PED ban and enable critical and analytically based line drawing between acceptable and nonacceptable performance-enhancing means in sport. (shrink)

This paper defends a moralized account of conventions, according to which conventional practices are necessarily normative reasons that are ultimately grounded on moral principles . It argues that a convention exists just in case the fact that others participate in some common practice as well as facts about their motivating reasons for doing so, justify conformity to that practice. The paper locates this moralized account within the relevant philosophical literature and argues that it does better than its rivals in explaining (...) the presence of both motivating and normative reasons in our concept of convention. (shrink)

The question of whether the normative testimony of ethics experts should be admissible under the rules of evidence has been the subject of much debate. Professor Imwinkelried's paper is an effort to get us, for a moment, to change that subject. He seeks to turn our attention, instead, to a means by which bioethics experts’ normative analyses might come before the court without regard to the rules of evidence - a means lying formally outside those rules’ jurisdiction. The court, he (...) argues, may freely consider evidence from expert bioethicists so long as it is performing a legislative rather than an adjudicative function. The rules of evidence apply to the court's efforts to find the facts of a particular case, Imwinkelried argues, but they do not constrain the court's investigations relative to its creative law-making efforts. (shrink)

The question of whether the normative testimony of ethics experts should be admissible under the rules of evidence has been the subject of much debate. Professor Imwinkelried's paper is an effort to get us, for a moment, to change that subject. He seeks to turn our attention, instead, to a means by which bioethics experts’ normative analyses might come before the court without regard to the rules of evidence - a means lying formally outside those rules’ jurisdiction. The court, he (...) argues, may freely consider evidence from expert bioethicists so long as it is performing a legislative rather than an adjudicative function. The rules of evidence apply to the court's efforts to find the facts of a particular case, Imwinkelried argues, but they do not constrain the court's investigations relative to its creative law-making efforts. (shrink)

This paper focuses on examining the right to development. More specifically, the paper examines two questions relating to the right to development. The first focuses on the issue of justification: can the right to development that appears in the UN Declaration on the Right to Development be provided an adequate philosophical justification? The second question focuses on the function of the right to development: If the right to development simply ‘repackages’ duties correlative to other existing human rights – as it (...) may be argued to be the case with the right enshrined in the Declaration on the Right to Development – does it serve any meaningful function? In answering the first question, the paper argues that the right to development enshrined in the Declaration on the Right to Development is essentially a derivative right, and ultimately its philosophical justification is dependent on whether or not the legal human rights the realisation of which it seeks to enable can be provided an adequate philosophica.. (shrink)