Political liberals typically hold that reasonable citizens should not form political associations (e.g. political parties) with unreasonable citizens. This is because unreasonable citizens are unlikely to conform to the duty of civility—the duty to be able, and willing, to use public reasons in their public political deliberations. Here I argue that a general prohibition on political associations with the unreasonable can undermine the fair value of their political liberties. This is because unreasonable citizens can grow up in epistemic environments that (...) make it difficult to be reasonable, and so to direct citizens to not associate with them can deprive citizens from certain social backgrounds the equal opportunity for political influence. I propose instead that political liberals should distinguish between unreasonable citizens who are disposed to support de re publicly justifiable laws and policies and unreasonable citizens who support illegitimate laws and policies. Reasonable citizens may form political associations with the former group, but not the latter group. (shrink)

Challenging popular and philosophical views, I argue for three main claims. First, political leaders’ worldviews have a deep and underappreciated influence on their official conduct. Second, citizens have a robust claim right to inquire into leaders’ worldviews, and leaders have a corresponding moral duty to provide responses to such inquiries. Third, it is worthwhile for citizens to engage in such inquiry. A citizenry that took this argument seriously would engage in far more searching political inquiry.