This paper focuses on Anaximander's pinax, the first map according to Western tradition. Its aim is to demonstrate that it is only after the realization of the pinax that it was possible to distinguish between Being and beings in a Heideggerian sense, that is to pose the question of the ontological difference. Consequently, all the history of Western thought is nothing but the history of the raising of cartographical representation, and of reason here embodied, from the dark rigidity of death (...) to the rarefied splendours of Pure Reason. (shrink)

Nella sua straordinaria opera scientifica, Franco Selleri si è sempre opposto alla rinuncia alla comprensione della struttura della realtà e della natura degli oggetti fisici, che egli considera come l’elemento caratterizzante delle principali teorie della fisica del Novecento e che è stata stigmatizzata da Karl Popper come tesi della “fine della strada in fisica”. Sin dalla fine degli anni ’60, egli ha sviluppato quella riflessione critica nei confronti delle teorie fondamentali della fisica moderna, in particolar modo della teoria delle particelle (...) elementari e della meccanica quantistica, e in un secondo tempo delle teorie relativistiche, che contraddistingue il suo programma di ricerca. Nel corso della sua intensa e infaticabile attività scientifica, Selleri è entrato in proficuo contatto con molti grandi fisici e filosofi della scienza, instaurando un intenso dialogo critico con Louis de Broglie, John Bell e Karl Popper. Le sue originali e non convenzionali ricerche lo hanno portato a risultati significativi non solo nell’ambito dei fondamenti della fisica, ma anche della storia e della filosofia della fisica. Per questo abbiamo voluto dedicare un numero speciale di Isonomia al nostro impareggiabile amico e collega, sia per la sua passione instancabile e la sua profonda conoscenza dei fondamenti formali, concettuali e filosofici delle teorie della fisica contemporanea, sia e forse ancor più come maestro di una prospettiva perennemente critica che egli ha sempre seguito e proposto con particolare rigore ed estrema determinazione. (shrink)

In this paper I will analyse the relationship between metaphor and imagination. This issue has been recently studied by cognitive linguists who appreciate its importance, while other semantic perspectives neglect it. I will analyse the thesis which affirms that metaphors are based on cognitive components which are not logical-propositional but imaginative: the “image schemata” are recurrent models of corporeal experiences, centres of knowledge organization which structure – in a non-propositional form – an amount of salient information. This information emerges from (...) the sensorimotor activities such as: manipulation of objects, spatial orientation and focusing perceptive attention on different goals. According to this theory, imagination is the drive of the entire cognitive experience and, through metaphorical projection, it activates and coordinates the schemata from which the very linguistic activity originates. Starting with empirical studies about the cognitive and neurobiological plausibility of image schemata, I will assert the function of imagination as the trait d’union between experience and cognitive use of the metaphor, through the use of sensory and synesthetic metaphors as mediators among perceptive, physical and linguistic dimensions. I hope future research will concentrate on the relationship between synesthesia and image schemata because of their strong connection with human perceptive, cognitive and neural structures. (shrink)

Una indagación acerca de las ficciones de unidad en el Derecho, los haces de imputación correspondientes a sus diferentes ramas, y la detección de puntos ciegos en el Derecho. Tesis de Maestría en Elaboración de Normas (Universidad de Buenos Aires).

Riassunto : Per la teoria della documentalità gli oggetti sociali sono atti iscritti e per la teoria della mente estesa le menti si estendono a processi o dispositivi esterni al corpo. Pur per motivi diversi, le due teorie convergono nel ridurre le differenze fra menti e documenti, e hanno a loro supporto la dimensione semiotica di menti e documenti; eppure, in una certa lettura, tali teorie risultano implausibili se si considera che le proprietà delle cose che chiamiamo “menti” non sono (...) identiche alle proprietà delle cose che chiamiamo “documenti”. Ciò chiama in causa una implicita tesi comune alle due teorie, quella di un esternismo forte che può essere messo in discussione in favore di un esternismo moderato o interazionista. Parole chiave : Diritto; Documentalità; Esternismo; Oggetti sociali; Ontologia sociale; Mente estesa; Maurizio Ferraris Minds are not documents: In the theory of documentality, social objects are understood as inscribed acts; in extended mind theory, minds are considered to extend beyond the body to external processes and devices. Although for different reasons, these two theories rely on the semiotic dimension to reduce the differences between minds and documents. Yet, in a certain reading, such theories are implausible if we consider that the properties of the things we call “minds” are not identical to the properties of the things we call “documents”. This calls into question a common thesis implicit in both theories: that moderate or interactionist externalism can be used to challenge strong externalism. Keywords : Law; Documents; Extended Mind; Externalism; Social Objects; Social Ontology; Maurizio Ferraris. (shrink)

The post-truth regime is a regime in which certain central categories of modernity seem to be inadequate: that of truth as correspondence, that of truth as verification, and that of truth as sincerity. This reflection aims at proposing a shift from the category of truth to the category of legitimacy, in order to rethink those of correctness, objectivity, adequacy. The advantage potentially offered by the concept of legitimacy, with regards to that of truth, has to do with the reference to (...) a given context, with an element of social recognition and a processual dimension, which makes the management of discourses more flexible, without abdicating to their deregulation. (shrink)

The present article is framed within the biosemiotic glossary project as a way to address common terminology within biosemiotic research. The glossary integrates the view of the members of the biosemiotic community through a standard survey and a literature review. The concept of ‘semiotic threshold’ was first introduced by Umberto Eco, defining it as a boundary between semiotic and non-semiotic areas. We review here the concept of ‘semiotic threshold’, first describing its denotation within semiotics via an examination on the history (...) of the concept, its synonyms, antonyms, etymology, usage in other languages and context in which it is used. Then we present a general overview of the survey among researchers, analyzing the difference in responses for the concept of ‘lower semiotic threshold’ and related concepts. From the answers we also review the difference between the general usage of ‘semiotic threshold’ versus its specific use within biosemiotics, and attempt to make a general synthesis of the concept taking into account what we have learned from the survey and the literature review. (shrink)

Focused on manifestation, semiotics has nevertheless constantly considered its surroundings, the imaginary that makes the image and gives it meaning. The article tries to problematize this relationship. It separates the picture from its imaginary share, the image, and seeks to support its general propositions on plastic analyzes, a painting by Francis Bacon, an installation by Abdelkader Benchamma and another installation by Adrien M and Claire B. It focuses on reductions and the tipping points of the picture, where the “opening” occurs, (...) striving for a structuring of its proposals. It thus instructs both sides of the enunciation, an enunciation centered on the visible and an invisible enunciation still premeditated by the enunciation. (shrink)

The Shield of Heracles by Hesiod and Homer’s Iliad, XVIII show how mimesis should be considered: it is a process that should be seen different according to the levels that it refers to. There is one object constructed by a craftsman (first level of representation), after that a poet may write about this object and its construction (second level of representation). Then yet another poet could write, on the model of the previous text, his poem with his personal idea.Explaining first, (...) the meaning of representation, arts and mimesis in Plato (Ion, Phaedrus, Cratylus, Sophist, Laws, Republic-Book X) and in Aristotle (Poetics, Nichomachean Ethics), I would like to explain how mimesis was considered according to the terms of form and representation. After that I would carry out atextual analysis of The Shield of Heracles and Iliad, to demonstrate that even if Hesiod’s text is quite similar to Homer’s, the context, the meaning, the backgroundof the authors and the narrative structures are different. The different levels of pertinence and the different points of view demonstrate that mimesis is not a process that produces hierarchy in retrospect, but it is something heading to the direction of what “it is not created yet”. (shrink)

This paper analyses the features of the 2021 software for the creation of ultrarealistic digital characters “MetaHuman Creator” and reflects on the causes of such perceived effect of realism to understand if the faces produced with such software represent an actual novelty from an academic standpoint. Such realism is first of all defined as the result of semio-cognitive processes which trigger interpretative habits specifically related to faces. These habits are then related to the main properties of any realistic face: being (...) face-looking, face-meaning and face-acting. These properties, in turn, are put in relation with our interactions with faces in terms of face detection, face recognition, face reading and face agency. Within this theoretical framework, we relate the characteristics of these artificial faces with such interpretative habits. To do so, we first of all make an examination of the technological features behind both the software and the digital faces it produces. This analysis highlights four main points of interest: the mathematical accuracy, the scanned database, the high level of details and the transformative capacities of these artificial faces. We then relate these characteristics with the cultural and cognitive aspects involved in recognizing and granting meaning to faces. This reveals how metahuman faces differs from previous artificial faces in terms of indexicality, intersubjectivity, informativity and irreducibility. But it also reveals some limits of such effect of reality in terms of intentionality and historical context. This examination consequently brings us to conclude that metahuman faces are qualitatively different from previous artificial faces and, in the light of their potentials and limits, to highlight four main lines of future research based on our findings. (shrink)

The years 1880-1914 were a time of intense experimentation in the visual arts. Representative conventions became variable, and artists deliberately departed from a concept of depiction considered as physical resemblance or photographic similarity. Visual representations progressed toward a conceptualization of figures and objects that transcended perceptual data, and the rendering of pictorial objects turned into an experiment involving complex visualization processes. This paper explores the interplay between artistic and scientific representative practices between 1880 and 1914. I argue that science and (...) technology acted as substantial challenges upon the concept of resemblance in art and that the rhythm of scientific and technological discoveries at the turn of the 20th century paralleled a shift from a notion of similarity to one of homomorphism in the conceptualization of pictorial representation. Homomorphism denotes representations which dispense with a point-to-point correspondence between depicted objects and perceptual data. I developed the concept from a scholarly study of Charles S. Peirce’s pragmatic account of representation, and in particular his theory of iconicity. Peirce defined iconic signs as “partaking in the character of the object” (CP 4.531), that is, as preserving the same relational structure as their object. A theory of iconicity as homomorphism successfully exemplifies representative relations based on structure preservation. Applied to 20th century representative practice, homomorphism offers a plausible explanation for representations in which a considerable conceptual effort is required, independently of a point-to-point correspondence between depicted objects and perceptual data. Using four case studies - the photographer Alfred Stieglitz and the painters André Derain, Max Weber and Pablo Picasso - I argue that representative practice between 1880 and 1914 was strongly informed by experimental scientific practices and that the shift from figurative to conceptual representation in art was triggered by a more significant theoretical shift involving representation as a general philosophical notion. Rather than a normative quest for the necessary and sufficient conditions for representation, I will propose a pragmatic evaluation of the means and strategies through which artists and scientists devise perspicuous and useful representations of the world. My analysis of the correlations between artistic and scientific representations at the turn of the 20th century aims to fulfill a twofold purpose. From a historical viewpoint, it draws significant parallels between the experimental aspects of representative practices in art and science considered as ways of exploring natural phenomena and intervening upon them. From a philosophical viewpoint, my goal is to propose a novel epistemological framework to assess how the shift in the conceptualization of representations affected subsequent styles of knowing and experimental practices in art and science. Ultimately, by combining the relative merits of historical and philosophical accounts of representation, I will argue for the advantages and desirability of a philosophically informed history of representative practice. (shrink)

Remembering Moore’s proof of the existence of external world, it seems to me that this philosophical gesture directs us towards many fake problems that strangely enough have returned in the focus of philosophical discussions. I could not say what is new in New Realism, but the very fact that the discussion about it has become so inflamed brings us to read again the paragraphs 43 and 44 in Heidegger’s work Being and Time, that are extremely important for the problem area (...) of Realism. After having this done, I suggest to understand Moore’s gesture in the light of Heidegger’s position so that we might see that New Realism is in fact an appeal to remember that we are always being-in-the-world, that realism is a theoretical point of view, that Lebenswelt is something completely different from any theoretical postulate which depends on it. This becomes evident in the experience of apocalypsis, which I should dedicate some analysis to. (shrink)