Palatable, unhealthy food stimuli can be devalued via Go/No-Go (GNG) training that consistently pairs such stimuli with motor inhibition. However, it remains unclear whether this devaluation is caused via learned associations with motor inhibition or via inferential learning based on the valence of emitted motor responses. The present research disentangles the effects of motor assignment and response valence in GNG training through task instructions. In two studies, chocolate stimuli were consistently paired with motor inhibition (“no-go”) or with motor excitation (“go”). (...) Task instructions indicated that no-go responses were negatively valenced (“do not take”) and that go responses were positively valenced (“take”), or identified no-go responses as positively valenced (“keep”) and go as negatively valenced (“throw away”). The results show an effect of response valence on chocolate evaluations, but no effect of motor assignment: Chocolate stimuli were consistently devalued following pairings with a negatively valenced response, regardless of whether this response entailed motor inhibition or excitation. These findings align best with an inferential account of GNG training, suggesting that devaluation effects critically depend on inferential processes regarding motor response valence. GNG training procedures may, therefore, be optimised by disambiguating the valence of go and no-go motor responses prior to training. (shrink)

In this work I argue that emotion plays a key role in ensuring a unified perspective on the world. In particular, while many thoughts and feelings surface onto consciousness, it is not clear how they get combined into a unified point of view or what’s it’s like to be you at any given time. While many philosophers argue that reason or higher-order cognition plays a key role in delineating our point of view, I argue that higher-order cognition plays a subsidiary (...) role to lower-level emotion in delineating a unified perspective on the world. That is, empirical findings reveal that affect functions akin to attention in organizing our conscious experience and dictating what is actionable. As a result, split-brain patients (patients who have suffered losses to the unity of their higher-order cognition but retain undamaged emotional centers in the brain) manage to retain a unified phenomenal and agential perspective on the world. (shrink)

Attention is automatically allocated to stimuli that are opposite in valence to the current motivational focus (Rothermund, 2003; Rothermund, Voss, & Wentura, 2008). We tested whether this incongruency effect is due to affective–motivational counter-regulation or to an increased salience of stimuli that mismatch with cognitively activated information. Affective processing biases were assessed with a search task in which participants had to detect the spatial position at which a positive or negative stimulus was presented. In the motivational condition, positive or negative (...) affective–motivational states were induced by performance feedback after each trial. In the cognitive activation condition, participants memorised the word “good” or “bad” during the search task. The affective incongruency effect was replicated in the motivational condition, whereas an affective congruency effect obtained in the cognitive activation condition. These findings support an explanation of affective incongruency effects in terms of automatic counter-regulation that is motivational in nature. (shrink)

Viewing emotion from an evolutionary perspective, researchers have argued that simple responses to affective stimuli can be triggered without mediation of cognitive processes. Indeed, findings suggest that positively and negatively valenced stimuli trigger approach and avoidance movements automatically. However, affective stimulus–response compatibility phenomena share so many central characteristics with nonaffective stimulus–response compatibility phenomena that one may doubt whether the underlying mechanisms differ. We suggest an “affectively enriched” version of the theory of event coding (TEC) that is able to account for (...) both affective and nonaffective compatibility, and that can account for the observation that both types of compatibility seem to be modulated by goals and intentions. Predictions from the model are tested in an experiment where participants carried out approach and avoidance responses to either the valence or the orientation of emotionally charged pictures. Under affective instruction the positive-approach/negative-avoid mapping yielded faster responses than the positive-avoid/negative-approach mapping, but no such effect was observed under spatial instruction. Conversely, spatial compatibility effects were obtained under spatial, but not under affective instruction. We conclude that affective and nonaffective compatibility effects reflect the same mechanism. (shrink)