The social science literature abounds with unconnected and, so it seems, diverse propositions about the emergence of norms. This article sets out to show that many of these propositions only differ in regard to terminology. Proponents of different theoretical orientations seem to accept a key hypothesis that is called “instrumentality proposition”: norms emerge if they are instrumental for attaining the goals of a group of actors. Apart from a problematic functionalist version the article focuses on an individualistic version: if actors (...) want to achieve certain goals and if a norm is instrumental to attain these goals individuals perform those actions that bring about the norm. This proposition involves several assumptions that are discussed.This version of the instrumentality proposition explains norms that are planned (i.e., that are second-order public goods). In order to account for the evolutionary emergence of norms a second version of the instrumentality proposition is discussed. It assumes that actors do not want to create a general norm but aim at providing certain private goods in interaction situations. For example, smokers sanction non-smokers in order not to be exposed to smoke in the interaction situation, but non-smokers do not want to engender a general non-smoking-norm. However, the aggregated effect of those actions is often a general norm.The article further explores problems of the two instrumentality propositions, the extent to which they answer important questions of a theory of norm emergence and alternative propositions to explain norms. (shrink)

Our economic system, the market economy, is a part of a broader system or “society.” We frequently study the operation of the market economy as if it were autonomous, even though there are many complex and mutual relationships between society, the economic system and the other systems – political, cultural, religious, legal, etc. – that form part of society. In a market economy we may identify several components: a frame or background in which the economic activity takes place, a set (...) of ideas and theories, the values shared by this society, the set of institutions, norms and rules that control the economic behavior of people, and the incentives or motivations of the economic agents. The play of these elements defines the operation of a market economy. Is ethics an institution, or does it belong to the set of values and ideas? In this paper I will discuss the role of institutions, norms and rules in society, with special reference to the economic system, in order to gain insight into the relationship between institutions and ethics. I study first the concept and features of social institutions and norms; second, institutional change, and third, the relationship between ethics and institutions. (shrink)

In addition to facing the known competitors in the formal economy, entrepreneurs must also be concerned with rivalry emanating from the informal economy. The informal economy is characterized by actions outside the normal scope of commerce, such as unsanctioned payments and gift-giving, as means of influencing competition. Scholars and policy makers alike have an interest in mitigating the impacts of such informal activity in that it might present an obstacle for legitimate commerce. Received theory suggests that country institutions can enable (...) and constrain productive activity, and, in doing so, influence competitive obstacles in a country. Leveraging 13,670 responses from entrepreneurs distributed across 59 countries, we provide evidence that two particular types of enabling institutions, countries’ property rights regulations and cooperative actions, are useful for lowering the obstacles presented by informal activity. We also find evidence that two constraining institutions, economic and financial regulations lead to more obstacles presented by informal activity. We describe implications for entrepreneurs, policy makers, and future researchers stemming from these findings. (shrink)

Ecological and social systems are complex and entwined. Complex social-ecological systems interact in a multitude of ways at many spatial scales across time. Their interactions can contribute both positive and negative consequences in terms of sustainability and the context in which they exist affecting future landscape change. Non-metropolitan landscapes are the major theatre of interactions where large-scale alteration occurs precipitated by local to global forces of economic, social, and environmental change. Such regional landscape effects are critical also to local natural (...) resource and social sustainability. The institutions contributing pressures and responses consequently shape future landscapes and in turn influence how social systems, resource users, governments, and policy makers perceive those landscapes and their future. Science and policy for "sustainable" futures need to be integrated at the applied "on-ground" level where products and effects of system interactions are fully included, even if unobserved. Government agencies and funding bodies often consider such research as "high-risk". This paper provides some examples of interdisciplinary research that has provided a level of holistic integration through close engagement with landholders and communities or through deliberately implementing integrative and innovative on-ground experimental models. In retrospect, such projects have to some degree integrated through spatial synthesis, policy analysis, and institutional arrangements that are relevant locally and acceptable in business, as well as at broader levels of government and geography. This has provided transferable outcomes that can contribute real options and adaptive capacity for suitable positive futures. (shrink)

Diverse agricultural technologies are promoted to increase yields and incomes, save time, improve food and nutritional security, and even empower women. Yet a gender gap in technology adoption remains for many agricultural technologies, even for those that are promoted for women. This paper complements the literature on gender and technology adoption, which largely focuses on reasons for low rates of female technology adoption, by shifting attention to what happens within a household after it adopts a technology. Understanding the expected benefits (...) and costs of adoption, from the perspective of women users in households with adult males, can help explain observed technology adoption rates and why technology adoption is often not sustained in the longer term. Drawing on qualitative data from Ethiopia, Ghana, and Tanzania, this paper develops a framework for examining the intrahousehold distribution of benefits from technology adoption, focusing on small-scale irrigation technologies. The framework contributes to the conceptual and empirical exploration of joint control over technology by men and women in the same household. Efforts to promote technology adoption for agricultural development and women’s empowerment would benefit from an understanding of intrahousehold control over technology to avoid interpreting technology adoption as an end in and of itself. (shrink)

States are ill equipped to meet the challenges of a globalized world. The concept of citizenship with its rights and obligations, including the allegiance owed, is too narrowly defined to exist only between individuals and a state. Today, people identify with, and pay allegiance to, many organizations beyond the state. This article suggests that citizenship could be extended further and be possible between individuals and quasi-governmental organizations, as well as non-governmental organizations, such as churches, clubs, interest groups, functional organizations and (...) profit firms. Due to the larger set of types of citizenship individuals could choose from, their preferences would be better fulfilled and, due to the competition for citizens induced among organizations, the efficiency of public activity would be raised. Key Words: citizenship • public goods • clubs • political competition • nations • globalization. (shrink)

Most writers on resource management presume that local populations, if they act in their self-interest, seldom conserve or protect natural resources without external intervention or privatization. Using the example of forest management by villagers in the Indian Himalayas, this paper argues that rural populations can often use resources sustainably and successfully, even under assumptions of self-interested rationality. Under a set of specified social and environmental conditions, conditions that prevail in large areas of the Himalayas and may also exist in other (...) mountain regions, community institutions are more efficient in managing resources than either private individuals or the central government. In advancing this argument, the paper undermines the often dogmatic belief in the universal superiority of private forms of ownership and management. (shrink)