Persistence in Time No person ever steps into the same river twice—or so goes the Heraclitean maxim. Obscure as it is, the maxim is often taken to express two ideas. The first is that everything always changes, and nothing remains perfectly similar to how it was just one instant before. The second is that nothing … Continue reading Persistence in Time →.

Is it possible to get by with just one ontological category? We evaluate L.A. Paul's attempt to do so: the mereological bundle theory. The upshot is that Paul's attempt to construct a one category ontology may be challenged with some of her own arguments. In the positive part of the paper we outline a two category ontology with property universals and kind universals. We will also examine Paul's arguments against a version of universal bundle theory that takes spatiotemporal co-location instead (...) of compresence or coinstantiation as the feature by which we can identify genuine bundles. We compare this novel theory, bundle theory with kinds, and Paul's mereological bundle theory and apply them to a case study concerning entangled fermions and co-located bosons. (shrink)

This paper develops an endurantist theory of persistence. The theory is built around one basic tenet, which concerns existence at a time – the relation between an object and the times at which that object is present. According to this tenet, which I call transcendentism, for an object to exist at a time is for it to participate in events that are located at that time. I argue that transcendentism is a semantically grounded and metaphysically fruitful. It is semantically grounded, (...) insofar as a semantic analysis of our temporal talk favors it over rivals. It is metaphysically fruitful, insofar as the theory of persistence that can be built around it – the transcendentist theory of persistence, to give it a name – requires neither temporal parts nor the problematic commitments to which all extant forms of endurantism are committed, such as the possibility of extended simples or multilocation. (shrink)

We argue that if one wishes to be a realist, one should adopt a Neo-Aristotelian ontology involving tropes instead of a Russellian ontology of property universals and objects. Either Russellian realists should adopt the relata-specific relational tropes of instantiation instead of facts, or convert to Neo-Aristotelian realism with monadic tropes. Regarding Neo-Aristotelian realism, we have two novel points why it fares better than Russellian realism. Instantiation of property universals by tropes and characterization or inherence between tropes and objects are more (...) transparent ontological notions than relational inherence, which is assumed in Russellian realism with the relational tropes of instantiation. Neo-Aristotelian realism makes better sense about abstract universals, which are a more viable option than concrete universals. (shrink)

I offer a mereological bundle of universals theory of material objects. The theory says that objects are identical to fusions of immanent universals at regions of space. Immanent universals are in the objects that instantiate them, and they can be wholly located at many regions of space. The version of the bundle theory I offer explains these characteristics of immanent universals, and it captures the instantiation relation in terms of the part-whole relation. The version of the theory I offer is (...) simpler and more unified than other mereological bundle theories. Yet, it is not as encompassing as other versions. For I suppose throughout that space is a particular substance, but not a bundle of properties. (shrink)

Until recently, an almost perfect parallelism seemed to hold between theories of identity through time and across possible worlds,as every account in the temporal case(endurantism,perdurantism, exdurantism) was mirrored by a twin account in the modal case (trans-world identity, identity-via-parts, identity-via-counterparts). Nevertheless, in the recent literature, this parallelism has been broken because of the implementation in the debate of the relation of location. In particular, endurantism has been subject to a more in-depth analysis, and different versions of it, corresponding to different (...) ways an entity can be located in time, emerged. In this article, we provide a precise map of the conceptions at stake, complete the debate by introducing a version of endurantism not yet considered in the debate — we call transcendentism — and show that it allows us to provide an effective interpretation of the relation of trans-world identity and an intuitive solution in the temporal case. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that there are universals. I begin (Sect. 1) by proposing a sufficient condition for a thing’s being a universal. I then argue (Sect. 2) that some truths exist necessarily. Finally, I argue (Sects. 3 and 4) that these truths are structured entities having constituents that meet the proposed sufficient condition for being universals.

I argue that relations between non-collocated spatial entities, between non-identical topological spaces, and between non-identical basic building blocks of space, do not exist. If any spatially located entities are not at the same spatial location, or if any topological spaces or basic building blocks of space are non-identical, I will argue that there are no relations between or among them. The arguments I present are arguments that I have not seen in the literature.

In his Metaphysical Disputation 5, Francisco Suárez offers a concise argument to the effect that all that does or can possibly exist is singular and individual, and that a commitment to real universals would entail what he calls a ‘manifest contradiction’. According to a recent interpretation of this Master Argument against realism, it reveals that Suárez was committed to a hylomorphic version of the principle of the identity of indiscernibles, and ruled out the possibility of perfectly similar yet numerically distinct (...) entities. In this paper, however, I argue that (1) at least for fundamental items in his ontology such as immaterial forms and matter-form compounds, Suárez was not committed to the identity of indiscernibles, and (2) a reading of the Master Argument that does justice to this is available. On the basis of this reading I provide a reappraisal of the argument, and conclude that (3) it rests on a premise that the realist would have good reasons to challenge. Hence, while the argument seems consistent with the possibility of indiscernible yet numerically distinct immaterial forms and matter-form compounds Suárez wishes to allow for, it is doubtful whether it can accomplish what it sets out to do, and undermine the case for realism. (shrink)

Nel nostro universo, qualunque cosa, dalla più piccola particella alla più smisurata galassia, esiste in un qualche tempo e in un qualche luogo. Ma cosa significa esistere in un qualche tempo? Il fenomeno dell’esistenza temporale gioca un ruolo fondamentale nella comprensione dell’universo e di noi stessi quali creature temporali. Eppure è un fenomeno profondamente misterioso. L’esistenza temporale è da intendersi come una relazione? Che legami ha con l’esistenza dell’ontologia? L’esistenza temporale e la localizzazione spaziale sono due fenomeni essenzialmente differenti o (...) due istanze di un’unica relazione? Tutto ciò che esiste nel tempo esiste nel tempo nello stesso modo? Tutto ciò che è nel tempo è anche nello spazio? (shrink)

Many philosophers believe that there are both particulars and universals. Many of these philosophers, in turn, believe that universals areimmanent. On this view, universals are wholly located where their instances are located. Both Douglas Ehring and E.J. Lowe have argued that immanent universals do not exist on the grounds that nothing can be wholly located in multiple places simultaneously without contradiction. In this paper, I focus on Lowe’s argument, which has received far less attention in the literature. Using the theory (...) of location found in Josh Parsons (2007), I show how Lowe’s argument against immanent universals can be resisted. (shrink)

This paper argues that, assuming properties exist and must be located in spacetime, the prevailing view that they are exactly located where their instances are is false. Instead a property is singularly located at just one region, namely the union of its instance's locations. This bears not just on issues in the metaphysics of properties, but also on the debate over whether multi-location is conceivable and/or possible.

The strong immanent realism (i.e., the view that there exist universals as entities capable of being wholly present wherever their instances are located) has been traditionally criticized for having certain absurd consequences. Although Gilmore (2003) replied to these criticisms by taking spatial relations involving universals as relativized to their locations, his reply has been rebutted by Keskinen et al. (2015). This paper aims to defend the strong immanent realism by proposing a new version of the relativization strategy, according to which (...) a spatial relation is to be relativized just to the extent that it contains universals or concrete particulars among its terms. This version, it will be argued, can satisfactorily address the objections hitherto posed to the strong immanent realism. (shrink)

According to strong immanent realism, proposed for instance by David M. Armstrong, universals are concrete, located in their instances. E.J. Lowe and Douglas Ehring have presented arguments to the effect that strong immanent realism is incoherent. Cody Gilmore has defended strong immanent realism against the charge of incoherence. Gilmore’s argument has thus far remained unanswered. We argue that Gilmore’s response to the charge of incoherence is an ad hoc move without support independent of strong immanent realism itself. We conclude that (...) strong immanent realism remains under the threat of incoherence posed by Lowe and Ehring. (shrink)

Immanent universals, being wholly present wherever they are instantiated, are capable of both multi-location and co-location. As a result, they can become involved in some bizarre situations, situations whose contradictory appearance cannot be dispelled by any of the relativizing maneuvers familiar to metaphysicials as solutions to the problem of change. Douglas Ehring takes this to be a fatal problem for immanent universals, but I do not. Although the old relativizing maneuvers don't solve the problem, I propose a new one that (...) does. I spend half the paper defending the proposed solution against objections, and in the course of this task I touch upon such topics as backward time travel and the distinction between universals and particulars. I close by putting forward -- merely as an option -- a new way to draw the distinction in question. (shrink)

European Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.

Some properties and relations take time to be instantiated. They are not instantiated at a time, but through a temporal interval. Cognitive properties and relations such as understanding and thinking are like this, but also many biological, chemical, and microphysical properties and relations such as absorbing, freezing, radiating, and decaying. In this paper, I make a case for taking seriously such temporally extended properties (TEPs). I argue that they are ubiquitous and that our current theories of persistence would do well (...) to make room for them in their ontology. The focus here is on fourdimensionalism and different ways it can accommodate TEPs. I explore four different ways of dealing with TEPs within a fourdimensionalist framework. These are: (a) to make the objects that bear apparent TEPs temporally more extended or “chunky”, while giving TEPs a reductive or eliminativist treatment in favor of instantaneous properties (IPs); (b) to make a series of objects the bearer of TEP predicates, while, again, holding only to IPs; (c) to endorse TEPs in their own right and take them to be temporally extended in a literal sense; and (d) to hold on to TEPs as atemporal properties and make the exemplification relation temporally extended. I discuss each of these options and highlight the types of problems that a fourdimensionalist faces in attempting to accommodate TEPs. I conclude that fourdimensionalists do not yet have a satisfactory account of TEPs in their hands. (shrink)