Cognitive architectures are unified theories of cognition that take the form of computational formalisms. They support computational models that collectively account for large numbers of empirical regularities using small numbers of computational mechanisms. Empirical coverage and parsimony are the most prominent criteria by which architectures are designed and evaluated, but they are not the only ones. This paper considers three additional criteria that have been comparatively undertheorized. (a) Successful architectures possess subjective and intersubjective meaning, making cognition comprehensible to individual cognitive (...) scientists and organizing groups of like-minded cognitive scientists into genuine communities. (b) Successful architectures provide idioms that structure the design and interpretation of computational models. (c) Successful architectures are strange: They make provocative, often disturbing, and ultimately compelling claims about human information processing that demand evaluation. (shrink)

Recent years saw the rise of an interest in the roles and significance of thought experiments in different areas of human thinking. Heisenberg's gamma ray microscope is no doubt one of the most famous examples of a thought experiment in physics. Nevertheless, this particular thought experiment has not received much detailed attention in the philosophical literature on thought experiments up to date, maybe because of its often claimed inadequacies. In this paper, I try to do two things: to provide an (...) interesting interpretation of the roles played by Heisenberg's gamma ray microscope in interpreting quantum mechanics – partly based on Thomas Kuhn’s views on the function of thought experiments – and to contribute to the ongoing discussions on the roles and significance of thought experiments in physics. (shrink)

Quantum mechanics studies physical phenomena on a microscopic scale. These phenomena are far beyond the reach of our observation, and the connection between QM's mathematical formalism and the experimental results is very indirect. Furthermore, quantum indeterminism defies common sense. Microphysical experiments have shown that, according to the empirical context, electrons and quanta of light behave as waves and other times as particles, even though it is impossible to design an experiment that manifests both behaviors at the same time. Unlike Newtonian (...) physics, the properties of quantum systems are not all well-defined simultaneously. Moreover, quantum systems are not characterized by their properties, but by a wave function. Although one of the principles of the theory is the uncertainty principle, the trajectory of the wave function is controlled by the deterministic Schrödinger equations. But what is the wave function? Like other theories of the physical sciences, quantum theory assigns states to systems. The wave function is a particular mathematical representation of the quantum state of a physical system, which contains information about the possible states of the system and the respective probabilities of each state. (shrink)

When David Bohm published his alternative theory of quantum mechanics in 1952, it was not received well; a recurring criticism was that it formed a reactionary attempt to return to classical physics. In response, Bohm emphasized the progressiveness of his approach, and even turned the accusation of classicality around by arguing that he wanted to move beyond classical elements still inherent in orthodox quantum mechanics. In later years, he moved more and more towards speculative and mystical directions. This paper aims (...) to explain this discrepancy between the ways in which Bohm’s work on quantum mechanics has been received and the way in which Bohm himself presented it. I reject the idea that Bohm’s early work can be described as mechanist, determinist, and realist, in contrast to his later writings, and argue that there is in fact a strong continuity between his work on quantum mechanics from the early 1950s and his later, more speculative writings. In particular, I argue that Bohm was never strongly committed to determinism and was a realist in some ways but not in others. A closer look at Bohm’s philosophical commitments highlights the ways in which his theory of quantum mechanics is non-classical and does not offer a way to avoid all ‘quantum weirdness’. (shrink)

The quantum-like approach of psychosomatic phenomena suggests an explanation of the correlations between mind and body in terms of quantum-like entanglement, that is, without appealing to any concept of psychophysical, efficient causality. This approach is developed within the Hilbert space formalism and its general consequences are drawn. It is first illustrated by a simple, qualitative model of the placebo effect which shows that representing psychosomatic states by entangled states can explain that purely psychological factors can produce a-causal changes of physiological (...) parameters. Then, a dynamical, quantitative and predictive model of bipolar disorder which makes use of the unitarity of the temporal evolution of psychosomatic states due to biological and psychological rhythms is worked out. This model can explain some current observations, like for example the severe fluctuations in mood between depression and mania, and it can forecast the moment of shifting. In addition, it justifies the efficiency of chronotherapy on theoretical basis. (shrink)

In a recent paper Conway and Kochen, Found. Phys. 36, 2006, claim to have established that theories of the Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber (RW) type, i.e., of spontaneous wave function collapse, cannot be made relativistic. On the other hand, relativistic GRW-type theories have already been presented, in my recent paper, J. Stat. Phys. 125, 2006, and by Dowker and Henson, J. Stat. Phys. 115, 2004. Here, I elucidate why these are not excluded by the arguments of Conway and Kochen.

Reminiscing on the fact that E. Schrödinger was rooted in the same physical tradition as M. Planck and A. Einstein, some aspects of his attitude to quantum mechanics are discussed. In particular, it is demonstrated that the quantum-mechanical paradoxes assumed by Einstein and Schrödinger should not exist, but that otherwise the epistemological problem of physical reality raised in this context by Einstein and Schrödinger is fundamental for our understanding of quantum theory. The nonexistence of such paradoxes just shows that quantum-mechanical (...) effects are due to interference and not to interaction. This line of argument leads consequently to quantum field theories with second quantization, and accordingly quantum theory based both on Planck's constant h and on Democritus's atomism. (shrink)

Say that metaphysical indeterminacy occurs just when there is a fact such that neither it nor its negation obtains. The aim of this work is to shed light on the issue of whether orthodox quantum mechanics provides any evidence of metaphysical indeterminacy by discussing the logical, semantic, and broadly methodological presuppositions of the debate. I argue that the dispute amounts to a verbal disagreement between classical and quantum logicians, given Eli Hirsch’s account of substantivity; but that it need not be (...) so if Ted Sider’s naturalness-based account of substantivity is adopted instead. Given the latter approach, can anything be said in order to tip the balance of the dispute either way? Some prima facie reasonable constraints on naturalness entail that the classicist is right, and the quantum world is therefore determinate. Nevertheless, there are reasons for weakening those constraints, to the effect that the dispute remains very much open. Finally, I discuss alternative accounts of metaphysical indeterminacy, and argue that they are unsuitable for framing the quantum indeterminacy debate. (shrink)

The paper argues against an intuitive reading of the Stone-von Neumann theorem as a categoricity result, thereby pointing out that this theorem does not entail any model-theoretical difference between the theories that validate it and those that don't.

Whilst a straightforward consequence of the formalism of non-relativistic quantum mechanics, the phenomenon of quantum teleportation has given rise to considerable puzzlement. In this paper, the teleportation protocol is reviewed and these puzzles dispelled. It is suggested that they arise from two primary sources: (1) the familiar error of hypostatizing an abstract noun (in this case, ‘information’) and (2) failure to differentiate interpretation dependent from interpretation independent features of quantum mechanics. A subsidiary source of error, the simulation fallacy, is also (...) identified. The resolution presented of the puzzles of teleportation illustrates the benefits of paying due attention to the logical status of ‘information’ as an abstract noun. Introduction The quantum teleportation protocol 2.1 Some information-theoretic aspects of teleportation 2.1.1 Preamble 2.1.2Application to teleportation The puzzles of teleportation Resolving (dissolving) the problem 4.1 The simulation fallacy The teleportation process under different interpretations 5.1 Collapse interpretations:Dirac/von Neumann, GRW 5.2 No collapse and no extra values: Everett 5.3 No collapse, but extra values: Bohm 5.3.1 A note on active information 5.4 Ensemble and statistical viewpoints Concluding remarks. (shrink)

The Bayesian approach to quantum mechanics of Caves, Fuchs and Schack is presented. Its conjunction of realism about physics along with anti-realism about much of the structure of quantum theory is elaborated; and the position defended from common objections: that it is solipsist; that it is too instrumentalist; that it cannot deal with Wigner's friend scenarios. Three more substantive problems are raised: Can a reasonable ontology be found for the approach? Can it account for explanation in quantum theory? Are subjective (...) probabilities on their own adequate in the quantum domain? The first question is answered in the affirmative, drawing on elements from Nancy Cartwright's philosophy of science. The second two are not: it is argued that these present outstanding difficulties for the project. A quantum Bayesian version of Moore's paradox is developed to illustrate difficulties with the subjectivist account of pure state assignments. (shrink)

Deutsch and Hayden claim to have provided an account of quantum mechanics which is particularly local, and which clarifies the nature of information transmission in entangled quantum systems. In this paper, a perspicuous description of their formalism is offered and their claim assessed. It proves essential to distinguish, as Deutsch and Hayden do not, between two ways of interpreting the formalism. On the first, conservative, interpretation, no benefits with respect to locality accrue that are not already available on either an (...) Everettian or a statistical interpretation; and the conclusions regarding information flow are equivocal. The second, ontological, interpretation, offers a framework with the novel feature that global properties of quantum systems are reduced to local ones; but no conclusions follow concerning information flow in more standard quantum mechanics. (shrink)

Methods developed in a previous paper are employed to define an exact correspondence between the states of a deterministic cellular automaton in 1+1 dimensions and those of a bosonic quantum field theory. The result may be used to argue that quantum field theories may be much closer related to deterministic automata than what is usually thought possible.

A Hilbert-space model for quantum logic follows from space-time structure in theories with consistent state collapse descriptions. Lorentz covariance implies a condition on space-like separated propositions that if imposed on generally commuting ones would lead to the covering law, and such a generalization can be argued if state preparation can be conditioned to space-like separated events using EPR-type correlations. The covering law is thus related to space-time structure, though a final understanding of it, through a self-consistency requirement, will probably require (...) quantum space-time. (shrink)

The paper describes an algorithm for semantic representation of behavioral contexts relative to a dichotomic decision alternative. The contexts are represented as quantum qubit states in two-dimensional Hilbert space visualized as points on the Bloch sphere. The azimuthal coordinate of this sphere functions as a one-dimensional semantic space in which the contexts are accommodated according to their subjective relevance to the considered uncertainty. The contexts are processed in triples defined by knowledge of a subject about a binary situational factor. The (...) obtained triads of context representations function as stable cognitive structure at the same time allowing a subject to model probabilistically-variative behavior. The developed algorithm illustrates an approach for quantitative subjectively-semantic modeling of behavior based on conceptual and mathematical apparatus of quantum theory. (shrink)

I argue that the Causal Markov Condition (CMC) is in principle applicable to the Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen (EPR) correlations. This is in line with my defence in the past of the applicability of the Principle of Common Cause to quantum mechanics. I first review a contrary claim by Dan Hausman and Jim Woodward, who endeavour to preserve the CMC against a possible counterexample by asserting that the conditions for the application of the CMC are not met in the EPR experiment. In their (...) view the CMC is inapplicable to the EPR correlations—i.e. it neither obtains nor fails. The view is grounded upon the non-separability of the quantum state, and the consequent unavailability of interventions. I urge that whether interventions are available in EPR—and why—is a complex and contextual question that does not have a unique or uniform answer. Instead, I argue that different combinations of causal hypotheses under test and interpretations of quantum mechanics yield different answers to the question. (shrink)

While temporal considerations are of prime importance for chemical reactions, as well as for molecular stability, most chemical concepts are not explicitly formulated on a diachronic basis. It will be argued here that a formulation explicitly incorporating temporal and epistemological considerations enables us to treat chemical reactions and chemical substances on ontologically equivalent terms, instead of assigning a more fundamental status to the latter. After all, in collision theory, a chemical substance is just a collision complex that takes too long. (...) How long qualifies as “too long”, and “too long” in relation to what, are crucial questions that distinguish chemical substances from chemical reactions, and reversible reactions from irreversible ones, thereby introducing anthropocentric considerations into these distinctions. Too long for a lab chemist is very different from too long for an astrochemist studying chemical reactions between chemical substances in inter-stellar space on cosmological timescales. Examining several physical and chemical properties on the basis of which chemical substances are distinguished from one another, the role of temporal and anthropocentric considerations in defining molecular properties is emphasized. I conclude with some observations on the much-debated reduction of chemistry to other disciplines, arguing that such reduction depends on our aesthetic choices as to what kinds of observations demand explanation, and what kinds of explanation are acceptable. (shrink)

Contemporary arguments for scientific realism are typically based on some form of inference to the best explanation. Sometimes such arguments concern the methods of science: given the success of scientific methodology, realism offers the best explanation of this success. Sometimes such arguments concern the content of scientific theories: given observed regularities in nature, explanations must be given of those regularities; the best such explanations will be realist. One forceful explanationist argument about the content of science can be based on Hans (...) Reichenbach’s Principle of the Common Cause. Roughly, CC says that whenever an enduring correlation between two events is observed, there must be some preceding event which is the common cause of the two, and is the explanation for the correlation. Rigid adherence to this demand for a common cause, however, supposedly goes beyond the instrumentalist explanatory resources available to the antirealist, and hence CC is taken to be a sufficient condition for realism. Further, one might claim that any argument that realism has greater explanatory power than antirealism depends either explicitly or implicitly on CC, and hence CC is also a necessary condition for realism. (shrink)

Philosophical Investigations, Volume 45, Issue 4, Page 430-452, October 2022.

b>: Replacing faulty nineteenth century physics by its orthodox quantum successor converts the earlier materialist conception of nature to a structure that does not enforce the principle of the causal closure of the physical. The quantum laws possess causal gaps, and these gaps are filled in actual scientific practice by inputs from our streams of consciousness. The form of the quantum laws permits and suggests the existence of an underlying reality that is built not on substances, but on psychophysical events, (...) and on objective tendencies for these events to occur. These events constitute intrinsic mind-brain connections. They are fundamental links between brain processes described in physical terms and events in our streams of consciousness. This quantum ontology confers upon our conscious intentions the causal efficacy assigned to them in actual scientific practice, and creates a substance- free interactive dualism. This putative quantum ontology has previously been shown to have impressive explanatory power in both psychology and neuroscience. Here it is used to reconcile the existence of physically efficacious conscious free will with causal anomalies of both the Libet and Einstein-Rosen-Podolsky types. (shrink)

Orthodox Copenhagen quantum theory renounces the quest to understand the reality in which we are imbedded, and settles for practical rules describing connections between our observations. Many physicist have regarded this renunciation of our effort describe nature herself as premature, and John von Neumann reformulated quantum theory as a theory of an evolving objective universe interacting with human consciousness. This interaction is associated both in Copenhagen quantum theory and in von Neumann quantum theory with a sudden change that brings the (...) objective physical state of a system in line with a subjectively felt psychical reality. The objective physical state is thereby converted from a material substrate to an informational and dispositional substrate that carries both the information incorporated into it by the psychical realities, and certain dispositions for the occurrence of future psychical realities. The present work examines and proposes solutions to two problems that have appeared to block the development of this conception of nature. The first problem is how to reconcile this theory with the principles of relativistic quantum field theory; the second problem is to understand whether, strictly within quantum theory, a person's mind can affect the activities of his brain, and if so how. Solving the first problem involves resolving a certain non-locality question. The proposed solution to the second problem is based on a postulated connection between effort, attention, and the quantum Zeno effect. This solution explains on the basic of quantum physics a large amount of heretofore unexplained data amassed by psychologists. (shrink)

This paper tries to reconstruct Ernst Cassirer's potential reception of the EPR argument, as exposed by Einstein in his letter to Cassirer of March 1937. It is shown that, in conformity with his transcendental epistemology taking the conditions of accessibility as constitutive of the quantum object, Cassirer would probably have rejected the argument. Indeed, Cassirer would probably not have subscribed to its separability/local causality presupposition (which goes against his interpretation of the quantum formalism as a self-suf!cient condition constitutive of the (...) quantum object, without any reliance on spatial intuition), nor to its completeness requirement (as his partial endorsement of Bohr's complementarity, and his rejection of the Kantian "idea of complete determination", illustrate). By rejecting both of its premises, Cassirer's philosophy of physics thus enables to escape the EPR dilemma, and exhibits what, in Kantian terms, might be called a "negative utility" with respect to physical science. A further investigation of the anti-reductionist utility of Cassirer's systematic philosophy with respect to physics and other "symbolic forms" is !nally suggested. (shrink)

Quantum bit commitment is insecure in the standard non-relativistic quantum cryptographic framework, essentially because Alice can exploit quantum steering to defer making her commitment. Two assumptions in this framework are that: Alice knows the ensembles of evidence E corresponding to either commitment; and system E is quantum rather than classical. Here, we show how relaxing assumption or can render her malicious steering operation indeterminable or inexistent, respectively. Finally, we present a secure protocol that relaxes both assumptions in a quantum teleportation (...) setting. Without appeal to an ontological framework, we argue that the protocol’s security entails the reality of the quantum state, provided retrocausality is excluded. (shrink)

Modal interpretations constitute a particular approach to associating dynamical variables with physical systems in quantum mechanics. Given the “quantum logical” constraints that are typically adopted by such interpretations, only certain sets of variables can be taken to be simultaneously definite-valued, and only certain sets of values can be ascribed to these variables at a given time. Moreover, each allowable set of variables and values can be uniquely specified by a single “core” projector in the Hilbert space associated with the system. (...) In general, the core projector can be one of several possibilities at a given time. In most previous modal interpretations, the different possible core projectors have formed an orthogonal set. This paper investigates the possibility of adopting a non-orthogonal set. It is demonstrated that such non-orthogonality is required if measurements for which the outcome can be predicted with probability 1 are to reveal the pre-existing value of the variable measured, an assumption which has traditionally constituted a strong motivation for the modal approach. The existing framework for modal interpretations is generalized to explicitly accommodate non-orthogonal core projectors. (shrink)

The article addresses the problem of identifying methods to develop the ability of artificial intelligence (AI) systems to provide explanations for their findings. This issue is not new, but, nowadays, the increasing complexity of AI systems is forcing scientists to intensify research in this direction. Modern neural networks contain hundreds of layers of neurons. The number of parameters of these networks reaches trillions, genetic algorithms generate thousands of generations of solutions, and the semantics of AI models become more complicated, going (...) to the quantum and non-local levels. The world’s leading companies are investing heavily in creating explainable AI (XAI). However, the result is still unsatisfactory: a person often cannot understand the “explanations” of AI because the latter makes decisions differently than a person, and perhaps because a good explanation is impossible within the framework of the classical AI paradigm. AI faced a similar problem 40 years ago when expert systems contained only a few hundred logical production rules. The problem was then solved by complicating the logic and building added knowledge bases to explain the conclusions given by AI. At present, other approaches are needed, primarily those that consider the external environment and the subjectivity of AI systems. This work focuses on solving this problem by immersing AI models in the social and economic environment, building ontologies of this environment, taking into account a user profile and creating conditions for purposeful convergence of AI solutions and conclusions to user-friendly goals. (shrink)

A model of spontaneous collapse of fermionic degrees of freedom in a quantum field is presented which has the advantages that it explicitly maintains energy conservation and gives results in agreement with an existing numerical method for calculating quantum state evolution, namely the quantum trajectories model.

Thought experiments in the history of science display a striking asymmetry between chemistry and physics, namely that chemistry seems to lack well-known examples, whereas physics presents many famous examples. This asymmetry, I argue, is not independent data concerning the chemistry/physics distinction. The laws of chemistry such as the periodic table are incurably special, in that they make testable predictions only for a very restricted range of physical conditions in the universe which are necessarily conditioned by the contingences of chemical investigation. (...) The argument depends on how ‚thought experiment’ is construed. Here, several recent accounts of thought experiments are surveyed to help formulate what I call ‚crucial’ thought experiments. These have a historical role in helping to judge between hypotheses in physics, but are not helpful in chemistry past or present. (shrink)

By assuming a deterministic evolution of quantum systems and taking realism into account, we carefully build a hidden variable theory for Quantum Mechanics based on the notion of ontological states proposed by ’t Hooft. We view these ontological states as the ones embedded with realism and compare them to the quantum states that represent superpositions, viewing the latter as mere information of the system they describe. Such a deterministic model puts forward conditions for the applicability of Bell’s inequality: the usual (...) inequality cannot be applied to the usual experiments. We build a Bell-like inequality that can be applied to the EPR scenario and show that this inequality is always satisfied by QM. In this way we show that QM can indeed have a local interpretation, and thus meet with the causal structure imposed by the Theory of Special Relativity in a satisfying way. (shrink)

En este artículo se realiza un recorrido cronológico por las propuestas teóricas y experimentos que condujeron a la constitución del denominado principio de complementariedad, enunciado por Bohr. Se muestra como a dicho principio subyacen dos modelos clásicos (ondulatorio y corpuscular) que se toman como analogía para describir y predecir fenómenos de carácter cuántico. Dichos modelos son excluyentes en ambos ámbitos, clásico y cuántico; no obstante, los fenómenos cuantizados requieren la aplicación – aunque no simultánea - de ambos para conseguir un (...) tratamiento completo. La cuestión es si esta extrapolación de modelos, más allá de su adecuación instrumental, puede considerarse cercana a la realidad. (shrink)

We present a conceptual analysis of the notions of actual physical property and potential physical property as used by theoretical physicists/mathematicians working in the domain of operational quantum logic. We investigate how these notions are being used today and what role they play in the specified field of research. In order to do so, we will give a brief introduction to this area of research and explain it as a part of the discipline known as “mathematical metascience”. An in depth (...) analysis of Aristotle’s use of the notions of “actuality” and “potentiality” is presented in order to point out exactly how much of the Aristotelian connotations are embedded in the contemporary use of the concepts under investigation. Although we will not focus in depth on all the drawbacks in the early historical development of physics due to the overwhelming influence of Aristotle’s writings, our analysis does touch upon some aspects of the Aristotelian theory of movement that are often overthrown nowadays. (shrink)

In the literature the work of C. Piron on OQL, “the operational quantum logic of the Geneva School”, has a few times been criticised. Those criticisms were often due to misunderstandings, as has already been pointed out in [19]. In this paper we follow the line of defense in favour of OQL by replying to the criticisms formulated some time ago in [4] and [17]. In order for the reader to follow our argumentation, we briefly analyze the basic conceptual machinery (...) of OQL. (shrink)

Esfeld has proposed a minimalist ontology of nature called ‘super-Humeanism’ that purports to accommodate quantum phenomena and avoid standard objections to neo-Humean metaphysics. I argue that Esfeld’s sparse ontology has counterintuitive consequences and generates two self-undermining dilemmas concerning the nature of time and space. Contrary to Esfeld, I deny that super-Humeanism supports an ontology of microscopic particles that follow continuous trajectories through space.

The primitive ontology approach to quantum mechanics seeks to account for quantum phenomena in terms of a distribution of matter in three-dimensional space and a law of nature that describes its temporal development. This approach to explaining quantum phenomena is compatible with either a Humean or powerist account of laws. In this paper, I offer a powerist ontology in which the law is specified by Bohmian mechanics for a global configuration of particles. Unlike in other powerist ontologies, however, this law (...) is not grounded in a structural power that is instantiated by the global configuration. Instead, I combine the primitive ontology approach with Aristotle’s doctrine of hylomorphism to create a new metaphysical model, in which the cosmos is a hylomorphic substance with an intrinsic power to choreograph the trajectories of the particles. (shrink)

We articulate the problems posed by the quantum liar experiment (QLE) for backwards causation interpretations of quantum mechanics, time-symmetric accounts and other dynamically oriented local hidden variable theories. We show that such accounts cannot save locality in the case of QLE merely by giving up “lambda-independence.” In contrast, we show that QLE poses no problems for our acausal Relational Blockworld interpretation of quantum mechanics, which invokes instead adynamical global constraints to explain Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen (EPR) correlations and QLE. We make the case (...) that the acausal and adynamical perspective is more fundamental and that dynamical entities obeying dynamical laws are emergent features grounded therein. (shrink)

This paper will present questions from three perspectives about Quantum Mechanics : physics, epistemological, and metaphysical. The quantum phenomena do not fit with the parameters of classical physics, so a daily intuition on macroscopic world is dispensable when it is the quantum object investigated. This physical domain induces a new thinking, which requires also new concepts to describe such object. The QM is disturbing and stimulates epistemological reflections, as the issues of access about what is known; and metaphysical theme are (...) not to be left behind with regard to QM: What would the quantum object to? What is apprehended when this object is perceived, once considered the disturbing characteristics that constitute its physical description: interference and non-separability? What is its nature? This paper focuses briefly on the analysis of B. d’Espagnat in Veiled Reality, which would represent the physical perspective of QT; for epistemological questions, one will resort to the Kantian conception of knowledge; and with regard to the metaphysical perspective, we will rely on an article by Professor J. B. Arenhart. It is necessary to note that the question that pervades in this paper is about if the experience in QM is built. Thus, we will try to seek clarity on the philosophical issues through QT, regarding the problems about the possibility of knowledge of the quantum object and its nature, and whether experience in this case is built. But furthermore, the QM instigates us to think whether metaphysics proceeds on the investigation of nature when it comes to the QM. And such a question is more than to have as problem as the scope of the description of physical data, but rather whether it makes sense or whether metaphysical research is pertinent to the QM. (shrink)

Costa and Shrapnel have recently proposed an interventionist theory of quantum causation. The formalism generalizes the classical methods of Pearl and allows for the discovery of quantum causal structure via localized interventions. Classical causal structure is presented as a special case of this more general framework. I introduce the account and consider whether this formalism provides a causal explanation for the Bell correlations.

Complementarity can be considered as the weirdest idea associated with quantum mechanics. For Bohr, Complementarity is important in order to be able to convey successfully the non-classical features of quantum mechanics. This paper discusses the epistemic and ontological implications of different new experiments that attempt to detect complementarity. Complementarity has surely survived the attempts to overcome it, yet some of these experiments have led to a more general form of complementarity. Others claim to be able to differentiate among the different (...) interpretations of quantum physics. Nonetheless, such claims have revealed contradictory representations of the ontological picture of the universe. Hence, Bohr’s position is still valid. (shrink)

There is confusion among scholars of Bohr as to whether he should be categorized as an instrumentalist (see Faye 1991) or a realist (see Folse 1985). I argue that Bohr is a realist, and that the confusion is due to the fact that he holds a very special view of realism, which did not coincide with the philosophers’ views. His approach was sometimes labelled instrumentalist and other times realist, because he was an instrumentalist on the theoretical level, but a realist (...) on the level of models. Such a realist position is what I call phenomenological realism. In this paper, and by taking Bohr’s debate with Einstein as a paradigm, I try to prove that Bohr was such a realist. (shrink)