- Truth, Pretense and the Liar Paradox.Bradley Armour-Garb & James A. Woodbridge - 2015 - In T. Achourioti, H. Galinon, J. Martínez Fernández & K. Fujimoto (eds.), Unifying the Philosophy of Truth. Dordrecht: Imprint: Springer. pp. 339-354.details
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Trivial Languages.Arvid Båve - 2018 - Acta Analytica 33 (1):1-17.details
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Semantic dispositionalism without exceptions.Arvid Båve - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (6):1751-1771.details
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Keeping ‘True’: A Case Study in Conceptual Ethics.Alexis Burgess - 2014 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 57 (5-6):580-606.details
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Something is true.Jamin Asay - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 105 (3):687-705.details
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Easy Ontology Made Easier.Arvid Båve - forthcoming - In Xavier de Donato-Rodríguez, José Falguera & Concha Martínez-Vidal (eds.), Deflationist Conceptions of Abstract Objects. Springer.details
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Validity as Truth-Conduciveness.Arvid Båve - forthcoming - In Adam Podlaskowski & Drew Johnson (eds.), Truth 20/20. Synthese Library.details
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The Ethics of Conceptualization: A Needs-Based Approach.Matthieu Queloz - forthcoming - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Incoherentism and the Sorites Paradox.Matti Eklund - 2019 - In Sergi Oms & Elia Zardini (eds.), The Sorites Paradox. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.details
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The Practical Origins of Ideas: Genealogy as Conceptual Reverse-Engineering (Open Access).Matthieu Queloz - 2021 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Replacing truth.Kevin Scharp - 2007 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 50 (6):606 – 621.details
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Toward a Theory of Concept Mastery: The Recognition View.Gabriel Oak Rabin - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (3):627-648.details
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Function-Based Conceptual Engineering and the Authority Problem.Matthieu Queloz - 2022 - Mind 131 (524):1247-1278.details
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The cognitivist account of meaning and the liar paradox.Mark Pinder - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (5):1221-1242.details
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Scharp on inconsistent concepts and their engineered replacements, or: can we mend these broken things?Mark Pinder - 2023 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 66 (5):863-884.details
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In Defence of Radical Restrictionism.David Liggins - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (1):3-25.details
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Disagreement about logic.Ole Thomassen Hjortland - 2022 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 65 (6):660-682.details
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Conceptual Marxism and Truth: Inquiry Symposium on Kevin Scharp’s Replacing Truth.Patrick Greenough - 2019 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 62 (4):403-421.details
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Nothing Is True.Will Gamester - 2023 - Journal of Philosophy 120 (6):314-338.details
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What are Thick Concepts?Matti Eklund - 2011 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (1):25-49.details
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Characterizing vagueness.Matti Eklund - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (6):896–909.details
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Inferentialism.Florian Steinberger & Julien Murzi - 2017 - In Blackwell Companion to Philosophy of Language. Wiley Blackwell. pp. 197-224.details
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From one to many: recent work on truth.Jeremy Wyatt & Michael Lynch - 2016 - American Philosophical Quarterly 53 (4):323-340.details
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Fragmented Truth.Andy Demfree Yu - 2016 - Dissertation, University of Oxforddetails
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