Switch to: References

Citations of:

Two Paradoxes of Satisfaction

Mind 124 (493):85-119 (2015)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. In Search of Modal Hypodoxes using Paradox Hypodox Duality.Peter Eldridge-Smith - 2022 - Philosophia 50 (5):2457-2476.
    The concept of hypodox is dual to the concept of paradox. Whereas a paradox is incompatibly overdetermined, a hypodox is underdetermined. Indeed, many particular paradoxes have dual hypodoxes. So, naively the dual of Russell’s Paradox is whether the set of all sets that are members of themselves is self-membered. The dual of the Liar Paradox is the Truth-teller, and a hypodoxical dual of the Heterological paradox is whether ‘autological’ is autological. I provide some analysis of the duality and I search (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Two Fallacies in Proofs of the Liar Paradox.Peter Eldridge-Smith - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (3):947-966.
    At some step in proving the Liar Paradox in natural language, a sentence is derived that seems overdetermined with respect to its semantic value. This is complemented by Tarski’s Theorem that a formal language cannot consistently contain a naive truth predicate given the laws of logic used in proving the Liar paradox. I argue that proofs of the Eubulidean Liar either use a principle of truth with non-canonical names in a fallacious way or make a fallacious use of substitution of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • The Liar Hypodox: A Truth-Teller’s Guide to Defusing Proofs of the Liar Paradox.Peter Eldridge-Smith - 2019 - Open Journal of Philosophy 9 (2):152-171.
    It seems that the Truth-teller is either true or false, but there is no accepted principle determining which it is. From this point of view, the Truth-teller is a hypodox. A hypodox is a conundrum like a paradox, but consistent. Sometimes, accepting an additional principle will convert a hypodox into a paradox. Conversely, in some cases, retracting or restricting a principle will convert a paradox to a hypodox. This last point suggests a new method of avoiding inconsistency. This article provides (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Is Classical Mathematics Appropriate for Theory of Computation?Farzad Didehvar - manuscript
    Throughout this paper, we are trying to show how and why our Mathematical frame-work seems inappropriate to solve problems in Theory of Computation. More exactly, the concept of turning back in time in paradoxes causes inconsistency in modeling of the concept of Time in some semantic situations. As we see in the first chapter, by introducing a version of “Unexpected Hanging Paradox”,first we attempt to open a new explanation for some paradoxes. In the second step, by applying this paradox, it (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • A Unified Theory of Truth and Paradox.Lorenzo Rossi - 2019 - Review of Symbolic Logic 12 (2):209-254.
    The sentences employed in semantic paradoxes display a wide range of semantic behaviours. However, the main theories of truth currently available either fail to provide a theory of paradox altogether, or can only account for some paradoxical phenomena by resorting to multiple interpretations of the language. In this paper, I explore the wide range of semantic behaviours displayed by paradoxical sentences, and I develop a unified theory of truth and paradox, that is a theory of truth that also provides a (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Theories of truth based on four-valued infectious logics.Damian Szmuc, Bruno Da Re & Federico Pailos - 2020 - Logic Journal of the IGPL 28 (5):712-746.
    Infectious logics are systems that have a truth-value that is assigned to a compound formula whenever it is assigned to one of its components. This paper studies four-valued infectious logics as the basis of transparent theories of truth. This take is motivated as a way to treat different pathological sentences differently, namely, by allowing some of them to be truth-value gluts and some others to be truth-value gaps and as a way to treat the semantic pathology suffered by at least (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  • Paradoxical hypodoxes.Alexandre Billon - 2019 - Synthese 196 (12):5205-5229.
    Most paradoxes of self-reference have a dual or ‘hypodox’. The Liar paradox (Lr = ‘Lr is false’) has the Truth-Teller (Tt = ‘Tt is true’). Russell’s paradox, which involves the set of sets that are not self-membered, has a dual involving the set of sets which are self-membered, etc. It is widely believed that these duals are not paradoxical or at least not as paradoxical as the paradoxes of which they are duals. In this paper, I argue that some paradox’s (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Valuing and believing valuable.Kubala Robbie - 2017 - Analysis 77 (1):59-65.
    Many philosophers recognize that, as a matter of psychological fact, one can believe something valuable without valuing it. I argue that it is also possible to value something without believing it valuable. Agents can genuinely value things that they neither believe disvaluable nor believe valuable along a scale of impersonal value.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Yablo Without Gödel.Volker Halbach & Shuoying Zhang - 2017 - Analysis 77 (1):53-59.
    We prove Yablo’s paradox without the diagonal lemma or the recursion theorem. Only a disquotation schema and axioms for a serial and transitive ordering are used in the proof. The consequences for the discussion on whether Yablo’s paradox is circular or involves self-reference are evaluated.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Pinocchio against the Semantic Hierarchies.Peter Eldridge-Smith - 2018 - Philosophia 46 (4):817-830.
    The Liar paradox is an obstacle to a theory of truth, but a Liar sentence need not contain a semantic predicate. The Pinocchio paradox, devised by Veronique Eldridge-Smith, was the first published paradox to show this. Pinocchio’s nose grows if, and only if, what Pinocchio is saying is untrue. What happens if Pinocchio says that his nose is growing? Eldridge-Smith and Eldridge-Smith : 212-5, 2010) posed the Pinocchio paradox against the Tarskian-Kripkean solutions to the Liar paradox that use language hierarchies. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations