_ Source: _Volume 9, Issue 2, pp 129 - 145 The aim of this paper is to highlight the importance of ἕξις in Plotinus’ virtue ethics. It is argued that since ἕξις signifies a quality of being in a permanent state of possession and virtue is defined as an ἕξις that intellectualizes the soul, therefore, it is suggested that virtue is an active ἕξις of the soul directed higher to the intelligible world in permanent contemplation of the Forms.

The debate on compatibility of fate with human responsibility lasted for five hundred years of the Stoic school and it is still with us in terms of contemporary discussions of the compatibility of determinism and free will. Chrysippus was confronted with the standard objection: It would be unjust to punish criminals “if human beings do not do evils voluntarily but are dragged by fate.” Chrysippus uses the famous illustration of the cylinder and cone, which cannot start moving without being pushed. (...) However, when this has happened, from then on the cylinder rolls and the cone spins by their own nature. I explore the cylinder analogy and its modern relevance from the perspective of thought experiments. I argue that it helps us isolate the main causal factor (the locus of responsibility and agency) and insulate this factor from the rest of the causal history and causal background. The cylinder/cone analogy is a compatibilistic tool, a kind of “mental distillation” in which we separate in imagination those aspects (causal factors) which are relevant for moral responsibility from those which are not. I suggest, somehow anachronistically, but in line both with contemporary compatibilism and Chrysippian views on causal structure of agency that the actions of an agent are “fated” from the theoretical point of view, but they are up to her from the practical point of view. (shrink)

Plotinus: Virtue Ethics This article focuses on the virtue ethics of Plotinus and its implications for later accounts of virtue ethics, particularly in Porphyry and Iamblichus. Plotinus' ethical theory is discussed in relation to the aim of the virtuous person to become godlike, the role of disposition in the soul's intellectualization, the four … Continue reading Plotinus: Virtue Ethics.

In normative ethical theory, computer ethics belongs to the area of applied ethics dealing with practical and everyday moral problems arising from the use of computers and computer networks in the information society. Modern scholarship usually approves deontological and utilitarian ethics as appropriate to computer ethics, while classical theories of ethics, such as virtue ethics, are usually neglected as anachronistic and unsuitable to the information era and ICT industry. During past decades, an Aristotelian form of virtue ethics has been revived (...) in modern philosophical enquiries with serious attempts for application to computer ethics and cyberethics. In this paper, the author argues that current trends and behaviours in online communication require an ethics of self-care found in Plotinus’ self-centred virtue ethics theory. The paper supports the position that Plotinus’ virtue ethics of intellectual autonomy and self-determination is relevant to cyberethics discussions involved in computer education and online communication. (shrink)

The ethical problem of privacy lies at the core of computer ethics and cyber ethics discussions. The extensive use of personal data in digital networks poses a serious threat to the user’s right of privacy not only at the level of a user’s data integrity and security but also at the level of a user’s identity and freedom. In normative ethical theory the need for an informational self-deterministic approach of privacy is stressed with greater emphasis on the control over personal (...) data. However, scant attention has been paid on a virtue ethics approach of information privacy. Plotinus’ discussion of self-determination is related to ethical virtue, human freedom and intellectual autonomy. The Plotinian virtue ethics approach of self-determination is not primarily related to the sphere of moral action, but to the quality of the self prior to moral practice. In this paper, it is argued that the problem of information privacy should be reconsidered in the light of Plotinus’ virtue ethics and his notion of self-determination. (shrink)

Does the Stoic school really, accepting fate, reject free will? It would seem so, mainly if we read the evidences of Zeno or Chrysippus. The Stoic Senecais central to this particular theoretical inquiry, which hinges on the concepts of causality, of determinism and responsibility.

The volume contains 11 contributions of the best experts on the topics of fate, fortune and free will, in reference to Ancient Philosophy: Plato, Aristotle, Stoicism, Epicureanism, Plotinus.

This article argues that Plotinus wrote Ennead VI 8 (39) to direct his students to see that our freedom is founded on the One, a goal pursued by means of a polemic against Alexander of Aphrodisias’ De fato and De anima. The first part aims to establish that the “rash discourse” introduced in chapter 7 is an interpretation of De fato’s position on the freedom of the gods. Plotinus reads his opponent’s thesis by transferring to the level of the One (...) a tripartite structure made up of nature, reason, and chance, a structure that Alexander used to explain events on the level of Becoming. The second part proposes to see the treatise as a dialectical process. Plotinus starts his inquiry at the levels of soul and Intellect. He later arrives at the discourse about the One, in which he tries to progressively overcome the limits of language by analyzing alternative positions from the viewpoint of discourse, words, and finally thought. In doing this, he insists on his reversal of Alexander’s theses: the One is simple and therefore not constrained by its nature; it is free thanks to a will incapable of choosing between the contraries and directed metaphorically toward itself. (shrink)