Truth is often considered to be a logico-linguistic tool for expressing indirect endorsements and infinite conjunctions. In this article, I will point out another logico-linguistic function of truth: to enable and validate what I call a blind argument, namely, an argument that involves indirectly endorsed statements. Admitting this function among the logico-linguistic functions of truth has some interesting consequences. In particular, it yields a new type of so-called conservativeness argument, which poses a new type of threat to deflationism about truth.

We introduce a tool for analysing models of$\text {CT}^-$, the compositional truth theory over Peano Arithmetic. We present a new proof of Lachlan’s theorem that the arithmetical part of models of$\text {CT}^-$are recursively saturated. We also use this tool to provide a new proof of theorem from [8] that all models of$\text {CT}^-$carry a partial inductive truth predicate. Finally, we construct a partial truth predicate defined for a set of formulae whose syntactic depth forms a nonstandard cut which cannot be (...) extended to a full truth predicate satisfying$\text {CT}^-$. (shrink)

This note is a critical response to Kentaro Fujimoto’s new conservativeness argument about truth, which centres on the notion of finite conjunction. We argue that Fujimoto’s arguments turn on a specific way of formalizing the notions of finite collection and finite conjunction in first-order logic. In particular, by instead formalizing these concepts in a natural way in set theory or in second-order logic, Fujimoto’s new conservativeness argument can be resisted.

The seminal Krajewski–Kotlarski–Lachlan theorem (1981) states that every countable recursively saturated model of $\mathsf {PA}$ (Peano arithmetic) carries a full satisfaction class. This result implies that the compositional theory of truth over $\mathsf {PA}$ commonly known as $\mathsf {CT}^{-}[\mathsf {PA}]$ is conservative over $\mathsf {PA}$. In contrast, Pakhomov and Enayat (2019) showed that the addition of the so-called axiom of disjunctive correctness (that asserts that a finite disjunction is true iff one of its disjuncts is true) to $\mathsf {CT}^{-}[\mathsf {PA}]$ (...) axiomatizes the theory of truth $\mathsf {CT}_{0}[\mathsf {PA}]$ that was shown by Wcisło and Łełyk (2017) to be nonconservative over $\mathsf {PA}$. The main result of this paper (Theorem 3.12) provides a foil to the Pakhomov–Enayat theorem by constructing full satisfaction classes over arbitrary countable recursively saturated models of $\mathsf {PA}$ that satisfy arbitrarily large approximations of disjunctive correctness. This shows that in the Pakhomov–Enayat theorem the assumption of disjunctive correctness cannot be replaced with any of its approximations. (shrink)

We investigate the theory Peano Arithmetic with Indiscernibles ( \(\textrm{PAI}\) ). Models of \(\textrm{PAI}\) are of the form \(({\mathcal {M}},I)\), where \({\mathcal {M}}\) is a model of \(\textrm{PA}\), _I_ is an unbounded set of order indiscernibles over \({\mathcal {M}}\), and \(({\mathcal {M}},I)\) satisfies the extended induction scheme for formulae mentioning _I_. Our main results are Theorems A and B following. _Theorem A._ _Let_ \({\mathcal {M}}\) _be a nonstandard model of_ \(\textrm{PA}\) _ of any cardinality_. \(\mathcal {M }\) _has an expansion (...) to a model of _ \(\textrm{PAI}\) _iff_ \( {\mathcal {M}}\) _has an inductive partial satisfaction class._ Theorem A yields the following corollary, which provides a new characterization of countable recursively saturated models of \(\textrm{PA}\) : _Corollary._ _A countable model_ \({\mathcal {M}}\) of \(\textrm{PA}\) _is recursively saturated iff _ \({\mathcal {M}}\) _has an expansion to a model of _ \(\textrm{PAI}\). _Theorem B._ _There is a sentence _ \(\alpha \) _ in the language obtained by adding a unary predicate_ _I_(_x_) _to the language of arithmetic such that given any nonstandard model _ \({\mathcal {M}}\) _of_ \(\textrm{PA}\) _ of any cardinality_, \({\mathcal {M}}\) _has an expansion to a model of _ \(\text {PAI}+\alpha \) _iff_ \({\mathcal {M}}\) _has a inductive full satisfaction class._. (shrink)

We show that for every countable recursively saturated model M of Peano arithmetic and every subset A⊆M, there exists a full satisfaction class SA⊆M2 such that A is definable in (M,SA) without parameters. It follows that in every such model, there exists a full satisfaction class which makes every element definable, and thus the expanded model is minimal and rigid. On the other hand, as observed by Roman Kossak, for every full satisfaction class S there are two elements which have (...) the same arithmetical type, but exactly one of them is in S. In particular, the automorphism group of a model expanded with a satisfaction class is never equal to the automorphism group of the original model. The analogue of the first result proved here for full satisfaction classes was obtained also by Roman Kossak for partial inductive satisfaction classes. However, the proof relied on the induction scheme in a crucial way, so recapturing the result in the setting of full satisfaction classes requires quite different arguments. (shrink)

It is well-known that natural axiomatic theories are well-ordered by consistency strength. However, it is possible to construct descending chains of artificial theories with respect to consistency strength. We provide an explanation of this well-orderedness phenomenon by studying a coarsening of the consistency strength order, namely, the$\Pi ^1_1$reflection strength order. We prove that there are no descending sequences of$\Pi ^1_1$sound extensions of$\mathsf {ACA}_0$in this ordering. Accordingly, we can attach a rank in this order, which we call reflection rank, to any$\Pi (...) ^1_1$sound extension of$\mathsf {ACA}_0$. We prove that for any$\Pi ^1_1$sound theoryTextending$\mathsf {ACA}_0^+$, the reflection rank ofTequals the$\Pi ^1_1$proof-theoretic ordinal ofT. We also prove that the$\Pi ^1_1$proof-theoretic ordinal of$\alpha $iterated$\Pi ^1_1$reflection is$\varepsilon _\alpha $. Finally, we use our results to provide straightforward well-foundedness proofs of ordinal notation systems based on reflection principles. (shrink)

The current paper studies the formal properties of the Global Reflection Principle, to wit the assertion “All theorems of$\mathrm {Th}$are true,” where$\mathrm {Th}$is a theory in the language of arithmetic and the truth predicate satisfies the usual Tarskian inductive conditions for formulae in the language of arithmetic. We fix the gap in Kotlarski’s proof from [15], showing that the Global Reflection Principle for Peano Arithmetic is provable in the theory of compositional truth with bounded induction only ($\mathrm {CT}_0$). Furthermore, we (...) extend the above result showing that$\Sigma _1$-uniform reflection over a theory of uniform Tarski biconditionals ($\mathrm {UTB}^-$) is provable in$\mathrm {CT}_0$, thus answering the question of Beklemishev and Pakhomov [2]. Finally, we introduce the notion of a prolongable satisfaction class and use it to study the structure of models of$\mathrm {CT}_0$. In particular, we provide a new model-theoretical characterization of theories of finite iterations of uniform reflection and present a new proof characterizing the arithmetical consequences of$\mathrm {CT}_0$. (shrink)

A model is said to be Leibnizian if it has no pair of indiscernibles. Mycielski has shown that there is a first order axiom LM (the Leibniz-Mycielski axiom) such that for any completion T of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory ZF, T has a Leibnizian model if and only if T proves LM. Here we prove: THEOREM A. Every complete theory T extending ZF + LM has $2^{\aleph_{0}}$ nonisomorphic countable Leibnizian models. THEOREM B. If $\kappa$ is aprescribed definable infinite cardinal of a (...) complete theory T extending ZF + V = OD. then there are $2^{\aleph_{1}}$ nonisomorphic Leibnizian models $\mathfrak{M}$ of T of power $\aleph_{1}$ such that $(\kappa^{+})^\mathfrak{M}$ is $\aleph_{1}-like$ . THEOREM C. Every complete theory T extending ZF + V = OD has $2^{\aleph_{1}}$ nonisomorphic \aleph_{1}-like$ Leibnizian models. (shrink)

In Cieśliński (J Philos Logic 39:325–337, 2010), Cieśliński asked whether compositional truth theory with the additional axiom that all propositional tautologies are true is conservative over Peano Arithmetic. We provide a partial answer to this question, showing that if we additionally assume that truth predicate agrees with arithmetical truth on quantifier-free sentences, the resulting theory is as strong as $$\Delta _0$$ Δ 0 -induction for the compositional truth predicate, hence non-conservative. On the other hand, it can be shown with a (...) routine argument that the principle of quantifier-free correctness is itself conservative. (shrink)

We employ the lens provided by formal truth theory to study axiomatizations of Peano Arithmetic ${\textsf {(PA)}}$. More specifically, let Elementary Arithmetic ${\textsf {(EA)}}$ be the fragment $\mathsf {I}\Delta _0 + \mathsf {Exp}$ of ${\textsf {PA}}$, and let ${\textsf {CT}}^-[{\textsf {EA}}]$ be the extension of ${\textsf {EA}}$ by the commonly studied axioms of compositional truth ${\textsf {CT}}^-$. We investigate both local and global properties of the family of first order theories of the form ${\textsf {CT}}^-[{\textsf {EA}}] +\alpha $, where $\alpha (...) $ is a particular way of expressing “ ${\textsf {PA}}$ is true” (using the truth predicate). Our focus is dominantly on two types of axiomatizations, namely: (1) schematic axiomatizations that are deductively equivalent to ${\textsf {PA}}$ and (2) axiomatizations that are proof-theoretically equivalent to the canonical axiomatization of ${\textsf {PA}}$. (shrink)