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  1. Satisfaction Classes with Approximate Disjunctive Correctness.Ali Enayat - forthcoming - Review of Symbolic Logic:1-18.
    The seminal Krajewski–Kotlarski–Lachlan theorem (1981) states that every countable recursively saturated model of $\mathsf {PA}$ (Peano arithmetic) carries a full satisfaction class. This result implies that the compositional theory of truth over $\mathsf {PA}$ commonly known as $\mathsf {CT}^{-}[\mathsf {PA}]$ is conservative over $\mathsf {PA}$. In contrast, Pakhomov and Enayat (2019) showed that the addition of the so-called axiom of disjunctive correctness (that asserts that a finite disjunction is true iff one of its disjuncts is true) to $\mathsf {CT}^{-}[\mathsf {PA}]$ (...)
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  • Soundness arguments for consistency and their epistemic value: A critical note.Matteo Zicchetti - 2024 - Philosophical Quarterly.
    Soundness Arguments for the consistency of a (mathematical) theory S aim to show that S is consistent by first showing or employing the fact that S is sound, i.e., that all theorems of S are true. Although soundness arguments are virtually unanimously accepted as valid and sound for most of our accepted theories, philosophers disagree about their epistemic value, i.e., about whether such arguments can be employed to improve our epistemic situation concerning questions of consistency. This article provides a (partial) (...)
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  • (1 other version)Gaps, Gluts, and Theoretical Equivalence.Carlo Nicolai - manuscript
    When are two formal theories of broadly logical concepts, such as truth, equivalent? The paper investigates a case study, involving two well-known variants Kripke-Feferman truth. The first, KF+CONS, features a consistent but partial truth predicate. The second, KF+COMP, an inconsistent but complete truth predicate. It is well-known that the two truth predicates are dual to each other. We show that this duality reveals a much stricter correspondence between the two theories: they are intertraslatable. Intertranslatability under natural assumptions coincides with definitional (...)
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  • On the Logicality of Truth.Kentaro Fujimoto - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (4):853-874.
    Deflationism about truth describes truth as a logical notion. In the present paper, I explore the implication of the alleged logicality of truth from the perspective of axiomatic theories of truth, and argue that the deflationist doctrine of the logicality of truth gives rise to two types of self-undermining arguments against deflationism, which I call the conservativeness argument from logicality and the topic-neutrality argument.
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  • Classical Determinate Truth I.Kentaro Fujimoto & Volker Halbach - 2024 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 89 (1):218-261.
    We introduce and analyze a new axiomatic theory$\mathsf {CD}$of truth. The primitive truth predicate can be applied to sentences containing the truth predicate. The theory is thoroughly classical in the sense that$\mathsf {CD}$is not only formulated in classical logic, but that the axiomatized notion of truth itself is classical: The truth predicate commutes with all quantifiers and connectives, and thus the theory proves that there are no truth value gaps or gluts. To avoid inconsistency, the instances of the T-schema are (...)
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  • Truth and Finite Conjunction.Leon Horsten, Guanglong Luo & Sam Roberts - 2024 - Mind 133 (532):1121-1135.
    This note is a critical response to Kentaro Fujimoto’s new conservativeness argument about truth, which centres on the notion of finite conjunction. We argue that Fujimoto’s arguments turn on a specific way of formalizing the notions of finite collection and finite conjunction in first-order logic. In particular, by instead formalizing these concepts in a natural way in set theory or in second-order logic, Fujimoto’s new conservativeness argument can be resisted.
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  • (1 other version)Gaps, gluts, and theoretical equivalence.Carlo Nicolai - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-22.
    When are two formal theories of broadly logical concepts, such as truth, equivalent? The paper investigates a case study, involving two well-known variants of Kripke–Feferman truth. The first, \, features a consistent but partial truth predicate. The second, \, an inconsistent but complete truth predicate. It is known that the two truth predicates are dual to each other. We show that this duality reveals a much stricter correspondence between the two theories: they are intertraslatable. Intertranslatability, under natural assumptions, coincides with (...)
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