This book illustrates the program of Logical-Informational Dynamics. Rational agents exploit the information available in the world in delicate ways, adopt a wide range of epistemic attitudes, and in that process, constantly change the world itself. Logical-Informational Dynamics is about logical systems putting such activities at center stage, focusing on the events by which we acquire information and change attitudes. Its contributions show many current logics of information and change at work, often in multi-agent settings where social behavior is essential, (...) and often stressing Johan van Benthem's pioneering work in establishing this program. However, this is not a Festschrift, but a rich tapestry for a field with a wealth of strands of its own. The reader will see the state of the art in such topics as information update, belief change, preference, learning over time, and strategic interaction in games. Moreover, no tight boundary has been enforced, and some chapters add more general mathematical or philosophical foundations or links to current trends in computer science. The theme of this book lies at the interface of many disciplines. Logic is the main methodology, but the various chapters cross easily between mathematics, computer science, philosophy, linguistics, cognitive and social sciences, while also ranging from pure theory to empirical work. Accordingly, the authors of this book represent a wide variety of original thinkers from different research communities. And their interconnected themes challenge at the same time how we think of logic, philosophy and computation. Thus, very much in line with van Benthem's work over many decades, the volume shows how all these disciplines form a natural unity in the perspective of dynamic logicians (broadly conceived) exploring their new themes today. And at the same time, in doing so, it offers a broader conception of logic with a certain grandeur, moving its horizons beyond the traditional study of consequence relations. (shrink)

This chapter presents a new semantics for inductive empirical knowledge. The epistemic agent is represented concretely as a learner who processes new inputs through time and who forms new beliefs from those inputs by means of a concrete, computable learning program. The agent’s belief state is represented hyper-intensionally as a set of time-indexed sentences. Knowledge is interpreted as avoidance of error in the limit and as having converged to true belief from the present time onward. Familiar topics are re-examined within (...) the semantics, such as inductive skepticism, the logic of discovery, Duhem’s problem, the articulation of theories by auxiliary hypotheses, the role of serendipity in scientific knowledge, Fitch’s paradox, deductive closure of knowability, whether one can know inductively that one knows inductively, whether one can know inductively that one does not know inductively, and whether expert instruction can spread common inductive knowledge—as opposed to mere, true belief—through a community of gullible pupils. (shrink)

Let us assume that you are entrusted by UNESCO with an important task. You are asked to devise a universal logical language, a Begriffsschrift in Frege's sense, which is to serve the purposes of science, business and everyday life. What requirements should such a “conceptual notation” satisfy? There are undoubtedly many relevant desiderata, but here I am focusing on one unmistakable one. In order to be a viable lingua universalis, your language must in any case be capable of representing any (...) possible configuration of dependence and independence between different variables. For if such a configuration is possible in principle, there is no guarantee that it might not one day show up among the natural, human or social phenomena we have to study.But how are dependencies and independencies between variables expressed in our familiar logical notation? Every logician worth his or her truth-table knows the answer. Dependencies between two variables are expressed by dependencies between the quantifiers to which they are bound. For instance, inthe variable y depends on x, while inz depends on x but not on y, while u depends on both x and y.But how is the dependence of a quantifier on another one expressed in familiar logical languages? Obviously by occurring in its scope, indicated by the pair of parentheses following it. But the nesting of scopes is a transitive and antisymmetrical relation which allows branching only in one direction. Hence other kinds of structures of dependence and independence between variables are not representable in the received logical notation. Such previously inexpressible structures form the subject matter of what has been referred to as independence-friendly logic. (shrink)

Branching quantifiers were first introduced by L. Henkin in his 1959 paper ‘Some Remarks on Infmitely Long Formulas’. By ‘branching quantifiers’ Henkin meant a new, non-linearly structured quantiiier-prefix whose discovery was triggered by the problem of interpreting infinitistic formulas of a certain form} The branching (or partially-ordered) quantifier-prefix is, however, not essentially infinitistic, and the issues it raises have largely been discussed in the literature in the context of finitistic logic, as they will be here. Our discussion transcends, however, the (...) resources of standard lst-order languages and we will consider the new form in the context of 1st-order logic with 1- and 2-place ‘Mostowskian` generalized quantifiers.2.. (shrink)

Let us assume that you are entrusted by UNESCO with an important task. You are asked to devise a universal logical language, a Begriffsschrift in Frege's sense, which is to serve the purposes of science, business and everyday life. What requirements should such a “conceptual notation” satisfy? There are undoubtedly many relevant desiderata, but here I am focusing on one unmistakable one. In order to be a viable lingua universalis, your language must in any case be capable of representing any (...) possible configuration of dependence and independence between different variables. For if such a configuration is possible in principle, there is no guarantee that it might not one day show up among the natural, human or social phenomena we have to study.But how are dependencies and independencies between variables expressed in our familiar logical notation? Every logician worth his or her truth-table knows the answer. Dependencies between two variables are expressed by dependencies between the quantifiers to which they are bound. For instance, inthe variable y depends on x, while inz depends on x but not on y, while u depends on both x and y.But how is the dependence of a quantifier on another one expressed in familiar logical languages? Obviously by occurring in its scope, indicated by the pair of parentheses following it. But the nesting of scopes is a transitive and antisymmetrical relation which allows branching only in one direction. Hence other kinds of structures of dependence and independence between variables are not representable in the received logical notation. Such previously inexpressible structures form the subject matter of what has been referred to as independence-friendly logic. (shrink)

The Bounds of Logic presents a new philosophical theory of the scope and nature of logic based on critical analysis of the principles underlying modern Tarskian logic and inspired by mathematical and linguistic development. Extracting central philosophical ideas from Tarski’s early work in semantics, Sher questions whether these are fully realized by the standard first-order system. The answer lays the foundation for a new, broader conception of logic. By generally characterizing logical terms, Sher establishes a fundamental result in semantics. Her (...) development of the notion of logicality for quantifiers and her work on branching are of great importance for linguistics. Sher outlines the boundaries of the new logic and points out some of the philosophical ramifications of the new view of logic for such issues as the logicist thesis, ontological commitment, the role of mathematics in logic, and the metaphysical underpinning of logic. She proposes a constructive definition of logical terms, reexamines and extends the notion of branching quantification, and discusses various linguistic issues and applications. (shrink)

We here examine the expressive power of first order logic with generalized quantifiers over finite ordered structures. In particular, we address the following problem: Given a family Q of generalized quantifiers expressing a complexity class C, what is the expressive power of first order logic FO(Q) extended by the quantifiers in Q? From previously studied examples, one would expect that FO(Q) captures L C , i.e., logarithmic space relativized to an oracle in C. We show that this is not always (...) true. However, after studying the problem from a general point of view, we derive sufficient conditions on C such that FO(Q) captures L C . These conditions are fulfilled by a large number of relevant complexity classes, in particular, for example, by NP. As an application of this result, it follows that first order logic extended by Henkin quantifiers captures L NP . This answers a question raised by Blass and Gurevich [Ann. Pure Appl. Logic, vol. 32, 1986]. Furthermore we show that for many families Q of generalized quantifiers (including the family of Henkin quantifiers), each FO(Q)-formula can be replaced by an equivalent FO(Q)-formula with only two occurrences of generalized quantifiers. This generalizes and extends an earlier normal-form result by I. A. Stewart [Fundamenta Inform. vol. 18, 1993]. (shrink)

In this paper, we introduce a logic based on team semantics, called $\mathbf {FOT} $, whose expressive power is elementary, i.e., coincides with first-order logic both on the level of sentences and (possibly open) formulas, and we also show that a sublogic of $\mathbf {FOT} $, called $\mathbf {FOT}^{\downarrow } $, captures exactly downward closed elementary (or first-order) team properties. We axiomatize completely the logic $\mathbf {FOT} $, and also extend the known partial axiomatization of dependence logic to dependence logic (...) enriched with the logical constants in $\mathbf {FOT}^{\downarrow } $. (shrink)

A dichotomy result of Sevenster (2014) [29] completely classified the quantifier prefixes of regular Independence-Friendly (IF) logic according to the patterns of quantifier dependence they contain. On one hand, prefixes that contain “Henkin” or “signalling” patterns were shown to characterize fragments of IF logic that capture NP-complete problems; all the remaining prefixes were shown instead to be essentially first-order. In the present paper we develop the machinery which is needed in order to extend the results of Sevenster to non-prenex, regular (...) IF sentences. This involves shifting attention from quantifier prefixes to a (rather general) class of syntactical tree prefixes. We partially classify the fragments of regular IF logic that are thus determined by syntactical trees; in particular, a) we identify four classes of tree prefixes that are neither signaling nor Henkin, and yet express NP-complete problems and other second-order concepts; and b) we give more general criteria for checking the first-orderness of an IF sentence. (shrink)

We study the expressive power of independence-friendly quantifier prefixes composed of universal$\left$, existential$\left$, and majority quantifiers$\left$. We provide four quantifier prefixes that can express NP hard properties and show that all quantifier prefixes capable of expressing NP-hard properties embed at least one of these four quantifier prefixes. As for the quantifier prefixes that do not embed any of these four quantifier prefixes, we show that they are equivalent to a first-order quantifier prefix composed of$\forall x$,$\exists x$, and Mx. In unison, (...) our results imply a dichotomy result: every independence-friendly quantifier prefix is either decidable in LOGSPACE or NP hard. (shrink)

The initial goal of the present paper is to reveal a mistake committed by Hintikka in a recent paper on the foundations of mathematics. His claim that independence-friendly logic is the real logic of mathematics is supported in that article by an argument relying on uniformity concepts taken from real analysis. I show that the central point of his argument is a simple logical mistake. Second and more generally, I conclude, based on the previous remarks and on another standard fact (...) of IFL, that first-order logic can adequately express uniformity concepts in real analysis, whereas IFL cannot. This not only radically contradicts Hintikka’s particular claim in that article, but also undermines his whole enterprise of founding mathematics on his logic system. (shrink)

Typical applications of Hintikka’s game-theoretical semantics give rise to semantic attributes—truth, falsity—expressible in the $\Sigma^{1}_{1}$-fragment of second-order logic. Actually a much more general notion of semantic attribute is motivated by strategic considerations. When identifying such a generalization, the notion of classical negation plays a crucial role. We study two languages, $L_{1}$ and $L_{2}$, in both of which two negation signs are available: $\rightharpoondown $ and $\sim$. The latter is the usual GTS negation which transposes the players’ roles, while the former (...) will be interpreted via the notion of mode. Logic $L_{1}$ extends independence-friendly logic; $\rightharpoondown $ behaves as classical negation in $L_{1}$. Logic $L_{2}$ extends $L_{1}$, and it is shown to capture the $\Sigma^{2}_{1}$-fragment of third-order logic. Consequently the classical negation remains inexpressible in $L_{2}$. (shrink)

In order to be able to express all possible patterns of dependence and independence between variables, we have to replace the traditional first-order logic by independence-friendly (IF) logic. Our natural concept of truth for a quantificational sentence S says that all the Skolem functions for S exist. This conception of truth for a sufficiently rich IF first-order language can be expressed in the same language. In a first-order axiomatic set theory, one can apparently express this same concept in set-theoretical terms, (...) since the existence of functions can be expressed there. Because of Tarski's theorem, this is impossible. Hence there must exist set-theoretical statements, even provable ones, which are said to be true in first-order models of axiomatic set theory but whose Skolem functions do not all exist. Hence there are provable sentences in axiomatic set theory that are false in accordance with our ordinary conceptions of set-theoretical truth. Such counter-intuitive propositions have been known to exist, but they have been blamed on the peculiarities of very large sets. It is argued here that this explanation is not correct and that there are intuitively false theorems not involving very large sets. Hence the provability or unprovability of a set-theoretical statement, e.g. of the continuum hypothesis (CH) in axiomatic set theory is not necessarily relevant to the truth of CH. (shrink)

Motivated by constraint satisfaction problems, Feder and Vardi (SIAM Journal of Computing, 28, 57–104, 1998) set out to search for fragments of satisfying the dichotomy property: every problem definable in is either in P or else NP-complete. Feder and Vardi considered in this connection two logics, strict NP (or SNP) and monadic, monotone, strict NP without inequalities (or MMSNP). The former consists of formulas of the form , where is a quantifier-free formula in a relational vocabulary; and the latter is (...) the fragment of SNP whose formulas involve only negative occurrences of relation symbols, only monadic second-order quantifiers, and no occurrences of the equality symbol. It remains an open problem whether MMSNP enjoys the dichotomy property. In the present paper, SNP and MMSNP are characterized in terms of partially ordered connectives. More specifically, SNP is characterized using the logic D of partially ordered connectives introduced in Blass and Gurevich (Annals of Pure and Applied Logic, 32, 1–16, 1986), Sandu and Väänänen (Zeitschrift für Mathematische Logik und Grundlagen der Mathematik, 38, 361–372 1992), and MMSNP employing a generalization C of D introduced in the present paper. (shrink)

This paper examines the contemporary philosophical and cognitive relevance of Charles Peirce's diagrammatic logic of existential graphs (EGs), the ‘moving pictures of thought’. The first part brings to the fore some hitherto unknown details about the reception of EGs in the early 1900s that took place amidst the emergence of modern conceptions of symbolic logic. In the second part, philosophical aspects of EGs and their contributions to contemporary logical theory are pointed out, including the relationship between iconic logic and images, (...) the problem of the meaning of logical constants, the cognitive economy of iconic logic, the failure of the Frege–Russell thesis, and the failure of the Language of Thought hypothesis. (shrink)

1. Two kinds of logic. To a first approximation there are two main kinds of pursuit in logic. The first is the traditional one going back two millennia, concerned with characterizing the logically valid inferences. The second is the one that emerged most systematically only in the twentieth century, concerned with the semantics of logical operations. In the view of modern, model-theoretical eyes, the first requires the second, but not vice-versa. According to Tarski’s generally accepted account of logical consequence, inference (...) from some statements as hypotheses to a statement as conclusion is logically valid if the truth of the hypotheses ensures the truth of the conclusion, in a way that depends only on the form of the statements involved, not on their content. Interpreted model-theoretically this means that every model of the hypotheses is a model of the conclusion. However, there is an ambiguity in Tarski’s explication, as he himself emphasized, since for the specification of form one needs to determine what are the logical notions. Once those are isolated and their semantical roles are settled, one can see how the truth of a statement is composed from the truth of its basic parts, in whatever way those are specified. The problem of what are the logical notions is an unsettled and controversial one. In the classical truthfunctional perspective, proposals range from those of first-order logic to generalized quantifiers to second and higher-order quantifiers to infinitary languages and beyond. Many of these stronger semantical notions have been treated in the volume Model Theoretic Logics. In a series of singular, thought-provoking publications in recent years, Jaakko Hintikka has vigorously promoted consideration of an extension of first-order logic called IF logic, along with claims that its adoption promises to have revolutionary consequences. (shrink)

We analyze the expressive resources of \ logic that do not stem from Henkin quantification. When one restricts attention to regular \ sentences, this amounts to the study of the fragment of \ logic which is individuated by the game-theoretical property of action recall. We prove that the fragment of prenex AR sentences can express all existential second-order properties. We then show that the same can be achieved in the non-prenex fragment of AR, by using “signalling by disjunction” instead of (...) Henkin or signalling patterns. We also study irregular IF logic and analyze its correspondence to regular IF logic. By using new methods, we prove that the game-theoretical property of knowledge memory is a first-order syntactical constraint also for irregular sentences, and we identify another new first-order fragment. Finally we discover that irregular prefixes behave quite differently in finite and infinite models. In particular, we show that, over infinite structures, every irregular prefix is equivalent to a regular one; and we present an irregular prefix which is second order on finite models but collapses to a first-order prefix on infinite models. (shrink)

We define a logic capable of expressing dependence of a variable on designated variables only. Thus has similar goals to the Henkin quantifiers of [4] and the independence friendly logic of [6] that it much resembles. The logic achieves these goals by realizing the desired dependence declarations of variables on the level of atomic formulas. By [3] and [17], ability to limit dependence relations between variables leads to existential second order expressive power. Our avoids some difficulties arising in the original (...) independence friendly logic from coupling the dependence declarations with existential quantifiers. As is the case with independence friendly logic, truth of is definable inside . We give such a definition for in the spirit of [11] and [2] and [1]. (shrink)

We investigate some logics with Henkin quantifiers. For a given logic L, we consider questions of the form: what is the degree of the set of L–tautologies in a poor vocabulary (monadic or empty)? We prove that the set of tautologies of the logic with all Henkin quantifiers in empty vocabulary L*∅ is of degree 0’. We show that the same holds also for some weaker logics like L ∅(Hω) and L ∅(Eω). We show that each logic of the form (...) L ∅ (k)(Q), with the number of variables restricted to k, is decidable. Nevertheless – following the argument of M. Mostowski from [Mos89] – for each reasonable set theory no concrete algorithm can provably decide L (k) (Q), for some (Q). We improve also some results related to undecidability and expressibility for logics L(H4) and L(F2) of Krynicki and M. Mostowski from [KM92]. (shrink)

We show that for any pair $\phi$ and $\psi$ of contradictory formulas of dependence logic there is a formula $\theta$ of the same logic such that $\phi\equiv\theta$ and $\psi\equiv\neg\theta$. This generalizes a result of Burgess.

In the literature on logics of imperfect information it is often stated, incorrectly, that the Game-Theoretical Semantics of Independence-Friendly quantifiers captures the idea that the players of semantical games are forced to make some moves without knowledge of the moves of other players. We survey here the alternative semantics for IF logic that have been suggested in order to enforce this “epistemic reading” of sentences. We introduce some new proposals, and a more general logical language which distinguishes between “independence from (...) actions” and “independence from strategies”. New semantics for IF logic can be obtained by choosing embeddings of the set of IF sentences into this larger language. We compare all the semantics proposed and their purported game-theoretical justifications, and disprove a few claims that have been made in the literature. (shrink)

Independence-friendly logic is a conservative extension of first-order logic that has the same expressive power as existential second-order logic. We attempt to algebraize IF logic in the same spirit as cylindric algebra. We define independence-friendly cylindric set algebras and investigate to what extent they satisfy the axioms of cylindric algebra. We ask whether the equational theory of IF algebras is finitely axiomatizable, and prove two partial results. First, every IF algebra over a structure is an expansion of a Kleene algebra. (...) Moreover, the class of such Kleene algebras generates the variety of all Kleene algebras. Second, every one-dimensional IF algebra over a structure is an expansion of a monadic Kleene algebra. However, the class of such monadic Kleene algebras does not generate the variety of all monadic Kleene algebras. (shrink)

Intuitionistic dependence logic was introduced by Abramsky and Väänänen [1] as a variant of dependence logic under a general construction of Hodges’ (trump) team semantics. It was proven that there is a translation from intuitionistic dependence logic sentences into second order logic sentences. In this paper, we prove that the other direction is also true, therefore intuitionistic dependence logic is equivalent to second order logic on the level of sentences.

‘Epistemic structural realism’ (ESR) insists that all that we know of the world is its structure, and that the ‘nature’ of the underlying elements remains hidden. With structure represented via Ramsey sentences, the question arises as to how ‘hidden natures’ might also be represented. If the Ramsey sentence describes a class of realisers for the relevant theory, one way of answering this question is through the notion of multiple realisability. We explore this answer in the context of the work of (...) Carnap, Hintikka and Lewis. Both Carnap and Hintikka offer clear structuralist perspectives which, crucially, accommodate the openness inherent in theory change. Unfortunately there is little purchase for a viable form of realism in either case. Lewis’s approach, on the other hand, offers more scope for realism but, as we shall see, concerns arise as to whether a relevant form of structuralism can be maintained. In particular his thesis of Ramseyan humility undermines certain conceptions of scientific laws that the structural realist might naturally cleave to. Our overall conclusion is that the representational device of Ramsey sentence plus multiple realisability can accommodate either the structuralist or realist aspects of ESR but has difficulties capturing both. (shrink)

That the result of flipping quantifiers and negating what comes after, applied to branching-quantifier sentences, is not equivalent to the negation of the original has been known for as long as such sentences have been studied. It is here pointed out that this syntactic operation fails in the strongest possible sense to correspond to any operation on classes of models.

We study the expressive power of open formulas of dependence logic introduced in Väänänen [Dependence logic (Vol. 70 of London Mathematical Society Student Texts), 2007]. In particular, we answer a question raised by Wilfrid Hodges: how to characterize the sets of teams definable by means of identity only in dependence logic, or equivalently in independence friendly logic.

We shall introduce in this paper a language whose formulas will be interpreted by games of imperfect information. Such games will be defined in the same way as the games for first-order formulas except that the players do not have complete information of the earlier course of the game. Some simple logical properties of these games will be stated together with the relation of such games of imperfect information to higher-order logic. Finally, a set of applications will be outlined.

In this paper we show that first-order languages extended with partially ordered connectives and partially ordered quantifiers define, under a certain interpretation, their own truth-predicate. The interpretation in question is in terms of games of imperfect information. This result is compared with those of Kripke and Feferman.

Jaakko Hintikka points out the power of Skolem functions to affect both what there is and what we know. There is a tension in his presupposition that these functions actually extend the realm of logic. He claims to have resolved the tension by “reconstructing constructivism” along epistemological lines, instead of by a typical ontological construction; however, after the collapse of the distinction between first and second order, that resolution is not entirely satisfactory. Still, it does throw light on the conceptual (...) analysis Hintikka proposes. (shrink)

Inspired by Hintikka’s ideas on constructivism, we are going to ‘effectivize’ the game-theoretic semantics for independence-friendly first-order logic, but in a somewhat different way than he did in the monograph ‘The Principles of Mathematics Revisited’. First we show that Nelson’s realizability interpretation—which extends the famous Kleene’s realizability interpretation by adding ‘strong negation’—restricted to the implication-free first-order formulas can be viewed as an effective version of GTS for FOL. Then we propose a realizability interpretation for IF-FOL, inspired by the so-called ‘trump (...) semantics’ which was discovered by Hodges, and show that this trump realizability interpretation can be viewed as an effective version of GTS for IF-FOL. Finally we prove that the trump realizability interpretation for IF-FOL appropriately generalises Nelson’s restricted realizability interpretation for the implication-free first-order formulas. (shrink)

Krynicki, M. and M. Mostowski, Decidability problems in languages with Henkin quantifiers, Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 58 149–172.We consider the language L with all Henkin quantifiers Hn defined as follows: Hnx1…xny1…yn φ iff f1…fnx1. ..xn φ, ...,fn). We show that the theory of equality in L is undecidable. The proof of this result goes by interpretation of the word problem for semigroups.Henkin quantifiers are strictly related to the function quantifiers Fn defined as follows: Fnx1…xny1…yn φ iff fx1…xn φ,...,f). (...) In contrast with the first result we show that the theory of equality with all quantifiers Fn is decidable.We also consider decidability problems for other theories in languages L and L. (shrink)

In the present paper we confront Martin- Löf’s analysis of the axiom of choice with J. Hintikka’s standing on this axiom. Hintikka claims that his game theoretical semantics for Independence Friendly Logic justifies Zermelo’s axiom of choice in a first-order way perfectly acceptable for the constructivists. In fact, Martin- Löf’s results lead to the following considerations:Hintikka preferred version of the axiom of choice is indeed acceptable for the constructivists and its meaning does not involve higher order logic.However, the version acceptable (...) for constructivists is based on an intensional take on functions. Extensionality is the heart of the classical understanding of Zermelo’s axiom and this is the real reason behind the constructivist rejection of it.More generally, dependence and independence features that motivate IF-Logic, can be formulated within the frame of constructive type theory without paying the price of a system that is neither axiomatizable nor has an underlying theory of inference – logic is about inference after all.We conclude pointing out that recent developments in dialogical logic show that the CTT approach to meaning in general and to the axiom of choice in particular is very natural to game theoretical approaches where metalogical features are explicitly displayed at the object language-level. Thus, in some way, this vindicates, albeit in quite of a different manner, Hintikka’s plea for the fruitfulness of game-theoretical semantics in the context of the foundations of mathematics. (shrink)

Independence‐Friendly logic introduced by Hintikka and Sandu studies patterns of dependence and independence of quantifiers which exceed those found in ordinary first‐order logic. The present survey focuses on the game‐theoretical interpretation of IF‐logic, including connections to solution concepts in classical game theory, but we shall also present its compositional interpretation together with its connections to notions of dependence and dependence between terms.

We present a compositional semantics for first-order logic with imperfect information that is equivalent to Sevenster and Sandu’s equilibrium semantics (under which the truth value of a sentence in a finite model is equal to the minimax value of its semantic game). Our semantics is a generalization of an earlier semantics developed by the first author that was based on behavioral strategies, rather than mixed strategies.

We show how sequent calculi for some generalized quantifiers can be obtained by generalizing the Herbrand approach to ordinary first order proof theory. Typical of the Herbrand approach, as compared to plain sequent calculus, is increased control over relations of dependence between variables. In the case of generalized quantifiers, explicit attention to relations of dependence becomes indispensible for setting up proof systems. It is shown that this can be done by turning variables into structured objects, governed by various types of (...) structural rules. These structured variables are interpreted semantically by means of a dependence relation. This relation is an analogue of the accessibility relation in modal logic. We then isolate a class of axioms for generalized quantifiers which correspond to first-order conditions on the dependence relation. (shrink)