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  1. Assertion, Denial, Content, and (Logical) Form.Jack Woods - 2016 - Synthese 193 (6).
    I discuss Greg Restall’s attempt to generate an account of logical consequence from the incoherence of certain packages of assertions and denials. I take up his justification of the cut rule and argue that, in order to avoid counterexamples to cut, he needs, at least, to introduce a notion of logical form. I then suggest a few problems that will arise for his account if a notion of logical form is assumed. I close by sketching what I take to be (...)
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  • Assertion, Denial, Content, and (Logical) Form.Jack Woods - 2016 - Synthese 193 (6):1667-1680.
    I discuss Greg Restall’s attempt to generate an account of logical consequence from the incoherence of certain packages of assertions and denials. I take up his justification of the cut rule and argue that, in order to avoid counterexamples to cut, he needs, at least, to introduce a notion of logical form. I then suggest a few problems that will arise for his account if a notion of logical form is assumed. I close by sketching what I take to be (...)
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  • A Unified Semantic Treatment of Singular NP Coordination.Yoad Winter - 1996 - Linguistics and Philosophy 19 (4):337 - 391.
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  • On Logical Relativity.Achille C. Varzi - 2002 - Philosophical Issues 12 (1):197-219.
    One logic or many? I say—many. Or rather, I say there is one logic for each way of specifying the class of all possible circumstances, or models, i.e., all ways of interpreting a given language. But because there is no unique way of doing this, I say there is no unique logic except in a relative sense. Indeed, given any two competing logical theories T1 and T2 (in the same language) one could always consider their common core, T, and settle (...)
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  • Bolzano and Kant on the Nature of Logic.Clinton Tolley - 2012 - History and Philosophy of Logic 33 (4):307-327.
    Here I revisit Bolzano's criticisms of Kant on the nature of logic. I argue that while Bolzano is correct in taking Kant to conceive of the traditional logic as a science of the activity of thinking rather than the content of thought, he is wrong to charge Kant with a failure to identify and examine this content itself within logic as such. This neglects Kant's own insistence that traditional logic does not exhaust logic as such, since it must be supplemented (...)
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  • Symmetric Propositions and Logical Quantifiers.R. Gregory Taylor - 2008 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 37 (6):575-591.
    Symmetric propositions over domain D and signature Σ = are characterized following Zermelo, and a correlation of such propositions with logical type- quantifiers over D is described. Boolean algebras of symmetric propositions over D and Σ are shown to be isomorphic to algebras of logical type- quantifiers over D. This last result may provide empirical support for Tarski's claim that logical terms over fixed domain are all and only those invariant under domain permutations.
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  • Completeness and Categoricity: Frege, Gödel and Model Theory.Stephen Read - 1997 - History and Philosophy of Logic 18 (2):79-93.
    Frege?s project has been characterized as an attempt to formulate a complete system of logic adequate to characterize mathematical theories such as arithmetic and set theory. As such, it was seen to fail by Gödel?s incompleteness theorem of 1931. It is argued, however, that this is to impose a later interpretation on the word ?complete? it is clear from Dedekind?s writings that at least as good as interpretation of completeness is categoricity. Whereas few interesting first-order mathematical theories are categorical or (...)
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  • Leśniewski and Generalized Quantifiers.Peter Simons - 1994 - European Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):65-84.
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  • Truth, Logical Structure, and Compositionality.Gila Sher - 2001 - Synthese 126 (1):195-219.
    In this paper I examine a cluster of concepts relevant to the methodology of truth theories: 'informative definition', 'recursive method', 'semantic structure', 'logical form', 'compositionality', etc. The interrelations between these concepts, I will try to show, are more intricate and multi-dimensional than commonly assumed.
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  • The Formal-Structural View of Logical Consequence.Gila Sher - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (2):241-261.
    In a recent paper, “The Concept of Logical Consequence,” W. H. Hanson criticizes a formal-structural characterization of logical consequence in Tarski and Sher. Hanson accepts many principles of the formal-structural view. Relating to Sher 1991 and 1996a, he says.
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  • Partially-Ordered (Branching) Generalized Quantifiers: A General Definition.Gila Sher - 1997 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 26 (1):1-43.
    Following Henkin's discovery of partially-ordered (branching) quantification (POQ) with standard quantifiers in 1959, philosophers of language have attempted to extend his definition to POQ with generalized quantifiers. In this paper I propose a general definition of POQ with 1-place generalized quantifiers of the simplest kind: namely, predicative, or "cardinality" quantifiers, e.g., "most", "few", "finitely many", "exactly α", where α is any cardinal, etc. The definition is obtained in a series of generalizations, extending the original, Henkin definition first to a general (...)
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  • On the Possibility of a Substantive Theory of Truth.Gila Sher - 1998 - Synthese 117 (1):133-172.
    The paper offers a new analysis of the difficulties involved in the construction of a general and substantive correspondence theory of truth and delineates a solution to these difficulties in the form of a new methodology. The central argument is inspired by Kant, and the proposed methodology is explained and justified both in general philosophical terms and by reference to a particular variant of Tarski's theory. The paper begins with general considerations on truth and correspondence and concludes with a brief (...)
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  • Is Logic in the Mind or in the World?Gila Sher - 2011 - Synthese 181 (2):353 - 365.
    The paper presents an outline of a unified answer to five questions concerning logic: (1) Is logic in the mind or in the world? (2) Does logic need a foundation? What is the main obstacle to a foundation for logic? Can it be overcome? (3) How does logic work? What does logical form represent? Are logical constants referential? (4) Is there a criterion of logicality? (5) What is the relation between logic and mathematics?
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  • Epistemic Friction: Reflections on Knowledge, Truth, and Logic.Gila Sher - 2010 - Erkenntnis 72 (2):151-176.
    Knowledge requires both freedom and friction . Freedom to set up our epistemic goals, choose the subject matter of our investigations, espouse cognitive norms, design research programs, etc., and friction (constraint) coming from two directions: the object or target of our investigation, i.e., the world in a broad sense, and our mind as the sum total of constraints involving the knower. My goal is to investigate the problem of epistemic friction, the relation between epistemic friction and freedom, the viability of (...)
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  • Why We View the Brain as a Computer.Oron Shagrir - 2006 - Synthese 153 (3):393-416.
    The view that the brain is a sort of computer has functioned as a theoretical guideline both in cognitive science and, more recently, in neuroscience. But since we can view every physical system as a computer, it has been less than clear what this view amounts to. By considering in some detail a seminal study in computational neuroscience, I first suggest that neuroscientists invoke the computational outlook to explain regularities that are formulated in terms of the information content of electrical (...)
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  • Models and Logical Consequence.Gil Sagi - 2014 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (5):943-964.
    This paper deals with the adequacy of the model-theoretic definition of logical consequence. Logical consequence is commonly described as a necessary relation that can be determined by the form of the sentences involved. In this paper, necessity is assumed to be a metaphysical notion, and formality is viewed as a means to avoid dealing with complex metaphysical questions in logical investigations. Logical terms are an essential part of the form of sentences and thus have a crucial role in determining logical (...)
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  • Logicality and Meaning.Gil Sagi - 2018 - Review of Symbolic Logic 11 (1):133-159.
    In standard model-theoretic semantics, the meaning of logical terms is said to be fixed in the system while that of nonlogical terms remains variable. Much effort has been devoted to characterizing logical terms, those terms that should be fixed, but little has been said on their role in logical systems: on what fixing their meaning precisely amounts to. My proposal is that when a term is considered logical in model theory, what gets fixed is its intension rather than its extension. (...)
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  • Extensionality and Logicality.Gil Sagi - 2017 - Synthese (Suppl 5):1-25.
    Tarski characterized logical notions as invariant under permutations of the domain. The outcome, according to Tarski, is that our logic, which is commonly said to be a logic of extension rather than intension, is not even a logic of extension—it is a logic of cardinality. In this paper, I make this idea precise. We look at a scale inspired by Ruth Barcan Marcus of various levels of meaning: extensions, intensions and hyperintensions. On this scale, the lower the level of meaning, (...)
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  • Zermelo's Analysis of 'General Proposition'.R. Gregory Taylor - 2009 - History and Philosophy of Logic 30 (2):141-155.
    On Zermelo's view, any mathematical theory presupposes a non-empty domain, the elements of which enjoy equal status; furthermore, mathematical axioms must be chosen from among those propositions that reflect the equal status of domain elements. As for which propositions manage to do this, Zermelo's answer is, those that are ?symmetric?, meaning ?invariant under domain permutations?. We argue that symmetry constitutes Zermelo's conceptual analysis of ?general proposition?. Further, although others are commonly associated with the extension of Klein's Erlanger Programme to logic, (...)
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  • Vague Representation.Agustín Rayo - 2008 - Mind 117 (466):329-373.
    The goal of this paper is to develop a theory of content for vague language. My proposal is based on the following three theses: (1) language-mastery is not rulebased— it involves a certain kind of decision-making; (2) a theory of content is to be thought of instrumentally—it is a tool for making sense of our linguistic practice; and (3) linguistic contents are only locally defined—they are only defined relative to suitably constrained sets of possibilities. CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this?
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  • Plurals.Agustín Rayo - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (3):411–427.
    Forthcoming in Philosophical Compass. I explain why plural quantifiers and predicates have been thought to be philosophically significant.
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  • The Logic of Indexicals.Alexandru Radulescu - 2015 - Synthese 192 (6):1839-1860.
    Since Kaplan : 81–98, 1979) first provided a logic for context-sensitive expressions, it has been thought that the only way to construct a logic for indexicals is to restrict it to arguments which take place in a single context— that is, instantaneous arguments, uttered by a single speaker, in a single place, etc. In this paper, I propose a logic which does away with these restrictions, and thus places arguments where they belong, in real world conversations. The central innovation is (...)
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  • ‘Fregean’ Logic and ‘Russellian’ Logic.Jaroslav Peregrin - 2000 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (4):557 – 574.
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  • The Undergeneration of Permutation Invariance as a Criterion for Logicality.Catarina Dutilh Novaes - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (1):81-97.
    Permutation invariance is often presented as the correct criterion for logicality. The basic idea is that one can demarcate the realm of logic by isolating specific entities—logical notions or constants—and that permutation invariance would provide a philosophically motivated and technically sophisticated criterion for what counts as a logical notion. The thesis of permutation invariance as a criterion for logicality has received considerable attention in the literature in recent decades, and much of the debate is developed against the background of ideas (...)
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  • Tarski’s Staggering Existential Assumptions.V. Mcgee - 2005 - Synthese 142 (3):371-387.
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  • Fixed- Versus Variable-Domain Interpretations of Tarski’s Account of Logical Consequence.Paolo Mancosu - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (9):745-759.
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  • Logical Constants.John MacFarlane - 2008 - Mind.
    Logic is usually thought to concern itself only with features that sentences and arguments possess in virtue of their logical structures or forms. The logical form of a sentence or argument is determined by its syntactic or semantic structure and by the placement of certain expressions called “logical constants.”[1] Thus, for example, the sentences Every boy loves some girl. and Some boy loves every girl. are thought to differ in logical form, even though they share a common syntactic and semantic (...)
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  • Frege, Kant, and the Logic in Logicism.John MacFarlane - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (1):25-65.
    Let me start with a well-known story. Kant held that logic and conceptual analysis alone cannot account for our knowledge of arithmetic: “however we might turn and twist our concepts, we could never, by the mere analysis of them, and without the aid of intuition, discover what is the sum [7+5]” (KrV, B16). Frege took himself to have shown that Kant was wrong about this. According to Frege’s logicist thesis, every arithmetical concept can be defined in purely logical terms, and (...)
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  • Grounding and Defining Identity.Jon Erling Litland - forthcoming - Noûs.
    I systematically defend a novel account of the grounds for identity and distinct- ness facts: they are all uniquely zero-grounded. First, the Null Account is shown to avoid a range of problems facing other accounts: a relation satisfying the Null Account would be an excellent candidate for being the identity relation. Second, a plenitudinist view of relations suggests that there is such a relation. To flesh out this plenitudinist view I sketch a novel framework for expressing real definitions, use this (...)
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  • What is Global Supervenience?Stephan Leuenberger - 2009 - Synthese 170 (1):115 - 129.
    The relation of global supervenience is widely appealed to in philosophy. In slogan form, it is explained as follows: a class of properties A supervenes on a class of properties B if no two worlds differ in the distribution of A-properties without differing in the distribution of B-properties. It turns out, though, that there are several ways to cash out that slogan. Three different proposals have been discussed in the literature. In this paper, I argue that none of them is (...)
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  • Generics and the Structure of the Mind.Sarah-Jane Leslie - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):375–403.
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  • Interpreted Logical Forms.Richard K. Larson & Peter Ludlow - 1993 - Synthese 95 (3):305 - 355.
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  • Logic for Morals, Morals From Logic.Charlie Kurth - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 155 (2):161-180.
    The need to distinguish between logical and extra-logical varieties of inference, entailment, validity, and consistency has played a prominent role in meta-ethical debates between expressivists and descriptivists. But, to date, the importance that matters of logical form play in these distinctions has been overlooked. That’s a mistake given the foundational place that logical form plays in our understanding of the difference between the logical and the extra-logical. This essay argues that descriptivists are better positioned than their expressivist rivals to provide (...)
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  • Ist Die Linguistische Theorie Des Logischen Apriori Obsolet?Darius Koriako - 2003 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 34 (1):43-68.
    The linguistic theory of the logical A Priori: is it obsolete In holistic interpretations, the logical truths are considered as continuous with empirical science: they are revisable, a posteriori, though very near to the centre of our web of belief. In this paper, we consider the merits and demerits of this approach, and we propose that it is necessary to revaluate holistic philosophies of logic. Some arguments are put forward which point in favour of the logical empiricists’ theory of logical (...)
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  • On Bracketing Names and Quantifiers in First-Order Logic.Jacek Pasniczek - 1999 - History and Philosophy of Logic 20 (3-4):239-304.
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  • Frege and Semantics.Richard G. Heck - 2007 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 75 (1):27-63.
    In recent work on Frege, one of the most salient issues has been whether he was prepared to make serious use of semantical notions such as reference and truth. I argue here Frege did make very serious use of semantical concepts. I argue, first, that Frege had reason to be interested in the question how the axioms and rules of his formal theory might be justified and, second, that he explicitly commits himself to offering a justification that appeals to the (...)
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  • The Accident of Logical Constants.Tristan Grøtvedt Haze - 2020 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 9 (1):34-42.
    Work on the nature and scope of formal logic has focused unduly on the distinction between logical and extra-logical vocabulary; which argument forms a logical theory countenances depends not only on its stock of logical terms, but also on its range of grammatical categories and modes of composition. Furthermore, there is a sense in which logical terms are unnecessary. Alexandra Zinke has recently pointed out that propositional logic can be done without logical terms. By defining a logical-term-free language with the (...)
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  • The Formal-Structural View of Logical Consequence: A Reply to Gila Sher.William H. Hanson - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (2):243-258.
    In a recent discussion article in this journal, Gila Sher responds to some of my criticisms of her work on what she calls the formal-structural account of logical consequence. In the present paper I reply and attempt to advance the discussion in a constructive way. Unfortunately, Sher seems to have not fully understood my 1997. Several of the defenses she mounts in her 2001 are aimed at views I do not hold and did not advance in my 1997. Most prominent (...)
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  • Ray on Tarski on Logical Consequence.William H. Hanson - 1999 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 28 (6):605-616.
    In "Logical consequence: A defense of Tarski" (Journal of Philosophical Logic, vol. 25, 1996, pp. 617-677), Greg Ray defends Tarski's account of logical consequence against the criticisms of John Etchemendy. While Ray's defense of Tarski is largely successful, his attempt to give a general proof that Tarskian consequence preserves truth fails. Analysis of this failure shows that de facto truth preservation is a very weak criterion of adequacy for a theory of logical consequence and should be replaced by a stronger (...)
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  • Is There a Neutral Metalanguage?Rea Golan - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 20):4831-4858.
    Logical pluralists are committed to the idea of a neutral metalanguage, which serves as a framework for debates in logic. Two versions of this neutrality can be found in the literature: an agreed upon collection of inferences, and a metalanguage that is neutral as such. I discuss both versions and show that they are not immune to Quinean criticism, which builds on the notion of meaning. In particular, I show that the first version of neutrality is sub-optimal, and hard to (...)
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  • Rereading Tarski on Logical Consequence.Mario Gómez-Torrente - 2009 - Review of Symbolic Logic 2 (2):249-297.
    I argue that recent defenses of the view that in 1936 Tarski required all interpretations of a language to share one same domain of quantification are based on misinterpretations of Tarski’s texts. In particular, I rebut some criticisms of my earlier attack on the fixed-domain exegesis and I offer a more detailed report of the textual evidence on the issue than in my earlier work. I also offer new considerations on subsisting issues of interpretation concerning Tarski’s views on the logical (...)
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  • A Note on Formality and Logical Consequence.Mario Gómez-Torrente - 2000 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 29 (5):529-539.
    Logic is formal in the sense that all arguments of the same form as logically valid arguments are also logically valid and hence truth-preserving. However, it is not known whether all arguments that are valid in the usual model-theoretic sense are truthpreserving. Tarski claimed that it could be proved that all arguments that are valid (in the sense of validity he contemplated in his 1936 paper on logical consequence) are truthpreserving. But he did not offer the proof. The question arises (...)
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  • What is Tarski's Theory of Truth?Sher Gila - 1999 - Topoi 18 (2):149-166.
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  • The Model-Theoretic Argument: Another Turn of the Screw. [REVIEW]Manuel García-Carpintero - 1996 - Erkenntnis 44 (3):305-316.
    This paper gives a new twist to already familia refutations of Putnam's "model-theoretic" argument against realism. Recent attempts to defend the model-theoretic argument in the face of those criticisms indicate that the main point of previous rebuttals of the argument can be easily missed. The paper expounds the same point again in a different guise, by having recourse to ideas on models and the model-theoretic account of the logical properties developed by the author in earlier work. Some writers appear to (...)
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  • Arguments Whose Strength Depends on Continuous Variation.James Franklin - 2013 - Informal Logic 33 (1):33-56.
    Both the traditional Aristotelian and modern symbolic approaches to logic have seen logic in terms of discrete symbol processing. Yet there are several kinds of argument whose validity depends on some topological notion of continuous variation, which is not well captured by discrete symbols. Examples include extrapolation and slippery slope arguments, sorites, fuzzy logic, and those involving closeness of possible worlds. It is argued that the natural first attempts to analyze these notions and explain their relation to reasoning fail, so (...)
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  • The Universal Density of Measurement.Danny Fox & Martin Hackl - 2006 - Linguistics and Philosophy 29 (5):537 - 586.
    The notion of measurement plays a central role in human cognition. We measure people’s height, the weight of physical objects, the length of stretches of time, or the size of various collections of individuals. Measurements of height, weight, and the like are commonly thought of as mappings between objects and dense scales, while measurements of collections of individuals, as implemented for instance in counting, are assumed to involve discrete scales. It is also commonly assumed that natural language makes use of (...)
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  • The Different Ways in Which Logic is (Said to Be) Formal.Catarina Dutilh Novaes - 2011 - History and Philosophy of Logic 32 (4):303 - 332.
    What does it mean to say that logic is formal? The short answer is: it means (or can mean) several different things. In this paper, I argue that there are (at least) eight main variations of the notion of the formal that are relevant for current discussions in philosophy and logic, and that they are structured in two main clusters, namely the formal as pertaining to forms, and the formal as pertaining to rules. To the first cluster belong the formal (...)
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  • Standard Quantification Theory in the Analysis of English.Stephen Donaho - 2002 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 31 (6):499-526.
    Standard first-order logic plus quantifiers of all finite orders ("SFOLω") faces four well-known difficulties when used to characterize the behavior of certain English quantifier phrases. All four difficulties seem to stem from the typed structure of SFOLω models. The typed structure of SFOLω models is in turn a product of an asymmetry between the meaning of names and the meaning of predicates, the element-set asymmetry. In this paper we examine a class of models in which this asymmetry of meaning is (...)
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  • Kant’s Dynamic Hylomorphism in Logic.Elena Dragalina Chernaya - 2016 - Con-Textos Kantianos 4: 127-137.
    The aim of this paper is to provide a dynamic interpretation of Kant’s logical hylomorphism. Firstly, various types of the logical hylomorphism will be illustrated. Secondly, I propose to reevaluate Kant’s constitutivity thesis about logic. Finally, I focus on the design of logical norms as specific kinds of artefacts.
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  • Logical Operations and Invariance.Enrique Casanovas - 2007 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 36 (1):33-60.
    I present a notion of invariance under arbitrary surjective mappings for operators on a relational finite type hierarchy generalizing the so-called Tarski-Sher criterion for logicality and I characterize the invariant operators as definable in a fragment of the first-order language. These results are compared with those obtained by Feferman and it is argued that further clarification of the notion of invariance is needed if one wants to use it to characterize logicality.
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