The article discusses ways of developing bioethical guidance in the Orthodox Christian discourse. Here, “ethical” refers to what contributes to holiness, “un-ethical” refers to sin as what hinders man’s foundational calling to holiness. To explore the development of guidance for emerging bioethical issues, we use the “therapeutic” understanding of treatment for sin in two senses. (1) It refers to the spiritual means provided by the “hospital” of the Orthodox Church for healing the fallenness of human nature in general; and (2) (...) it helps identify in particular cases both what counts as transgression of unconditional boundaries (defining what is illicit for everyone) and what is advisable in order to help particular persons to choose rightly within the area of the “more or less licit” (or “permissible”). Sources of the Orthodox faith that frame the general understanding of the boundaries between the permissible and the impermissible reflect the work of the Holy Spirit in the Church framing her Sacred (Holy) Tradition. In Holy Tradition, prayers, as communion with God, occupy a central position. This is why Orthodox moral reasoning, and thus also Orthodox bioethics, takes the form of liturgical bioethics. Penalties of excommunication determine hard boundaries that believers should not overstep: when crossing such boundaries, they enter on a spiritually dangerous path that completely distracts them away from God. Many minor sins, by contrast, have not been codified in Canons. They are not taken to remove the sinner completely from contact with the Lord. Within this realm of actions, it depends on a person’s spiritual maturity whether such actions are classified as sinful. Thus, an act can be counted merely as a small offense if committed by a beginner, while that same act can become a grave sin for an advanced believer. Due to acceleration of the technological progress, Orthodox recourse to Holy Tradition encounters ever-new challenges. There are bioethical issues that had not surfaced at the time of the Fathers of the Church. Today, Bishops gathered at a local council can supply the guidance lacking on a newly emerging bioethical problem. Even if ratified only by such local councils, the resulting decrees can also be regarded as the expression of the Holy Spirit working within a local Church and conveying His guidance. The article illustrates this source of Christian bioethics by reference to how the Russian Orthodox Church orients and develops its position on the ethics of reproductive technologies. (shrink)

Clinical ethics consultants (CECs) are not moral authorities. Standardization of CECs’ professional role does not confer upon them moral authority. Certification of particular CECs does not confer upon them moral authority (nor does it reflect such authority). Or, so we will argue. This article offers a distinctly Orthodox Christian response to those who claim that CECs—or any other academically trained bioethicist—retain moral authority (i.e., an authority to know and recommend the right course of action). This article proceeds in three parts. (...) First, we discuss recent movements toward the certification of CECs in the United States, focusing primarily on proposals and programs put forth by the American Society for Humanities and Bioethics (ASBH). Second, we outline two secular reasons to be concerned about the relevant trends toward certification. For one thing, certification is currently being advanced via political dominance, rather than gaining authority by reliance on rigorous philosophical argument or reason. For another, the trends operate on the assumption that there exists a secular, content-full, canonical, morality. There is no such morality. Next, we argue that Orthodox Christians should resist the current trends toward certification of CECs. Specifically, we unpack ways in which the ASBH’s certification program (and those like it) conflict with Orthodox claims about moral authority and the moral life more generally. We conclude that Orthodox Christians should resist the current certification trends. (shrink)

Programmatic secularism aims to secure public reason from rival rationalities, notably those from religious experience and education. The gathering of knowledge in clinical ethics into a concrete array of consensus claims and consensus-derived principles are thought by Janet Malek to secure such public reason—an essential tool for clinical ethics consultants to execute their professional role. The author compares this gathering of knowledge to an understanding of what technology is. Accordingly, the following interrogates Malek’s programmatic secularism, which is a moral technique (...) that not only homogenizes moral dialogue but also dehumanizes persons as it tyrannizes the creative freedom for moral conversation and genuine encounter. Thus, the reader is encouraged to dissent of such a vision for delimiting the role of clinical ethics consultants according to the rule and measure of technology, the ontology of our age. (shrink)

This essay begins by distinguishing among the viewpoints of philosophy, theology, and religion; it then explores how each deals with “sin” in the bioethical context. The conclusions are that the philosophical and theological viewpoints are intellectually defective in that they cripple our ability to deal with normative issues, and are in the end unable to integrate Christian concepts like “sin” successfully into bioethics. Sin is predicated only of beings with free will, though only in Western Christianity must all sins be (...) committed with knowledge and voluntarily. Without the notions of free will, sin, and a narrative of redemption, bioethics remains unable to provide itself with an adequate normative framework. Bioethics, and morality in general, remain a morass precisely because there has been a failure to translate Christian morality into fully secular and scientistic terms. (shrink)

Contemporary Christians are separated by foundationally disparate understandings of Christianity itself. Christians do not share one theology, much less a common understanding of the significance of sin, suffering, disease, and death. These foundational disagreements not only stand as impediments to an intellectually defensible ecumenism, but they also form the underpinnings of major disputes in the culture wars, particularly as these are expressed in healthcare. There is not one Christian bioethics of sin, suffering, sickness, and death. In this article, the character (...) of the moral-theological visions separating the various Christianities and thus their bioethics is examined. Particular emphasis is placed on the differences that set contemporary Western theology at odds with the theology of the Christianity of the first millennium. As is shown, the ground for this gulf lies in the divide between traditional and post-traditional views of the appropriate role of philosophy in theology, a difference rooted in disparate understandings of the meaning of church and of the meaning of the logos, the Son of God. (shrink)

Once God is no longer recognized as the ground and the enforcer of morality, the character and force of morality undergoes a significant change, a point made by G.E.M. Anscombe in her observation that without God the significance of morality is changed, as the word criminal would be changed if there were no criminal law and criminal courts. There is no longer in principle a God's-eye perspective from which one can envisage setting moral pluralism aside. In addition, it becomes impossible (...) to show that morality should always trump concerns of prudence, concerns for one's own non-moral interests and the interests of those to whom one is close. Immanuel Kant's attempt to maintain the unity of morality and the force of moral obligation by invoking the idea of God and the postulates of pure practical reason are explored and assessed. Hegel's reconstruction of the status of moral obligation is also examined, given his attempt to eschew Kant's thing-in-itself, as well as Kant's at least possible transcendent God. Severed from any metaphysical anchor, morality gains a contingent content from socio-historical context and its enforcement from the state. Hegel's disengagement from a transcendent God marks a watershed in the place of God in philosophical reflections regarding the status of moral obligations on the European continent. Anscombe is vindicated. Absent the presence of God, there is an important change in the force of moral obligation. (shrink)

As the prototype par excellence of Christian Orthodox ethics, the Divine Liturgy must constitute the prototype for Christian bioethics. According to St. Nicholas Cabasilas, the Divine Liturgy corresponds to the history of the economy of the Saviour and cultivates life in Christ, that is the way of life, the ethics that should characterize the life of a faithful Christian. The import of such an approach is significant for Orthodox Christian bioethics with regard to ethical questions that are connected both with (...) the beginning and the end of human life. In contrast to a way of thinking that, in order to answer the question about the beginning and the end of human life, tries to define moments in time in biological terms, Orthodox Christian ethics reveals man’s desire to himself define the content of the answer, and proposes instead God as the beginning and the end of man. (shrink)

(2005). Between Morality and Repentance: Recapturing “Sin” for Bioethics. Christian Bioethics: Vol. 11, No. 2, pp. 93-132.

Corinna Delkeskamp-Hayes; Sin and Disease: An Introduction, Christian bioethics: Non-Ecumenical Studies in Medical Morality, Volume 12, Issue 2, 1 January 2006.

Sin-talk, though politically incorrect, is indispensable. Placing human life under the ‘hermeneutic of sin’ means acknowledging that one ought to aim flawlessly at God, and that one can fail in this endeavor. None of this can be appreciated within the contemporary post-Christian, mindset, which has attempted to reduce religion to morality and culture. In such a secular context, the guilt-feelings connected with the recognition of sin are considered to be harmful; the eternal benefit of a repentance is disregarded. Nevertheless, spirituality (...) appears to have therapeutic benefits. Therefore attempts are made to re-locate within healthcare a religion shorn of its transcendent claims, so as then to harvest the benefits of a spirituality ‘saved from sin’. This reduction of religiosity to its therapeutic function is nourished by a post-modern constructivist construal of religion. This article critically examines the dis-ingenuity marring such recasting, as well as the incoherence of related attempts to reduce transcendence to solidarity, and to re-shape the significance of religious rituals. (shrink)

Corinna Delkeskamp-Hayes; Sin and Disease in a Post-Christian Culture: An Introduction, Christian bioethics: Non-Ecumenical Studies in Medical Morality, Volume.

Once God is no longer recognized as the ground and the enforcer of morality, the character and force of morality undergoes a significant change, a point made by G.E.M. Anscombe in her observation that without God the significance of morality is changed, as the word criminal would be changed if there were no criminal law and criminal courts. There is no longer in principle a God's-eye perspective from which one can envisage setting moral pluralism aside. In addition, it becomes impossible (...) to show that morality should always trump concerns of prudence, concerns for one's own non-moral interests and the interests of those to whom one is close. Immanuel Kant's attempt to maintain the unity of morality and the force of moral obligation by invoking the idea of God and the postulates of pure practical reason are explored and assessed. Hegel's reconstruction of the status of moral obligation is also examined, given his attempt to eschew Kant's thing-in-itself, as well as Kant's at least possible transcendent God. Severed from any metaphysical anchor, morality gains a contingent content from socio-historical context and its enforcement from the state. Hegel's disengagement from a transcendent God marks a watershed in the place of God in philosophical reflections regarding the status of moral obligations on the European continent. Anscombe is vindicated. Absent the presence of God, there is an important change in the force of moral obligation. (shrink)