This paper deals with the relationship between legal responsibility and causation. I argue that legal responsibility is not necessarily rooted in causation. The general claim I aim to disprove is that responsibility is descriptive because it is fundamentally rooted in causality, and causality is metaphysically real and founded. My strategy is twofold. First, I show (in §1) that there are significant and independent non- causal form of responsibility that cannot be reduced to causal responsibility; second, in §2, I show that (...) the very notion of causality is— lato sensu—not plainly descriptive. I will suggest that even causation is tied to evaluative elements, contrary to what is assumed by many theorists and practitioners working in normative domains. (shrink)

Many people in desperate need of an organ will die on waiting lists for transplantation or face increased morbidity because of their wait. This circumstance is particularly troubling since many viable organs for transplantation go unused when individuals fail to participate in their local organ donation system. In this paper, I consider whether participating in organ transplantation should be considered a form of a rescue of others from the great harms caused by a shortage in transplantable organs. Specifically, I consider (...) whether cadaver organ transplantation is a case of an easy rescue. If so, participation in cadaver organ transplantation will be a duty rather than a supererogatory act.1 This question is important in illuminating individual duties to participate in organ transplantation. Moreover, as I will argue, it has repercussions for community-wide policies for enrolling individuals in transplantation schemes. -/- In the first section of this paper, I tie cadaver organ transplantation to the duty to rescue others from great harm when it is easy to do so. Given the number of persons who will die or be greatly harmed without transplanted organs, the transfer of organs upon death is seemingly similar to other, classical cases of easy rescue. In the second section, I consider objections to this proposal on the ground that cadaver organ transplantation is structurally dissimilar to classical rescue cases, especially given uncertainty over when and to whom organs will be transplanted, if they are transplanted at all. In the third section, I consider the objection that cadaver organ transplantation is a demanding, rather than easy, rescue. While I grant that cadaver organ transplantation will be demanding for some persons, I argue that there remain many cases where it will be an easy rescue. In the final section, I consider the policy implications of my argument. In particular, I argue that understanding cadaver organ transplantation as a duty should shift the debate over opt-out, opt-in, and mandatory choice procedures for participating in organ transplantation upon death. While different systems will be appropriate for different communities, understanding transplantation as a duty in some cases helps to justify an opt-out system. (shrink)

In the present paper we argue that besides four traditional methods of property acquisition – that is, homesteading, production, voluntary transfer and rectification of injustice – libertarianism also recognizes a fifth method, namely the method of accession. We contend that not only have some libertarian scholars implicitly embraced the accession principle, but also that if libertarianism wants to distribute exclusive ownership to indivisible things produced from inputs supplied by two or more parties without running into conflict with its own principles (...) of justice, it has to recognize accession as the fifth mode of appropriation. As the main thesis of the paper goes against the received view concerning the very core of libertarianism, that is, its methods of property acquisition, the text indicates some new developments within the libertarian theory of justice. (shrink)

In various areas of Anglo-American law, legal liability turns on causation. In torts and contracts, we are each liable only for those harms we havecausedby the actions that breach our legal duties. Such doctrines explicitly make causation an element of liability. In criminal law, sometimes the causal element for liability is equally explicit, as when a statute makes punishable any act that has “caused… abuse to the child….” More often, the causal element in criminal liability is more implicit, as when (...) criminal statutes prohibitkillings, maimings, rapings, burnings, etc. Such causally complex action verbs are correctly applied only to defendants who have caused death, caused disfigurement, caused penetration, caused fire damage, etc. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Persons injured as a result of exposure to toxic or carcinogenic substances are seldom able to recover damages from those who are responsible for the exposure. Tort law requires proof of causation, and causation is often unprovable because of long latency periods, because of the relative infrequency of the injuries and because many of the injuries among the exposed population are the result of other factors. A number of proposals for modifying the legal causation requirement to allow those who (...) create hazardous risks to be held liable for the injuries that materialise are considered and found inadequate. A proposal to treat risk exposure itself as an injury for which compensation under private law is possible is also considered and ultimately found incoherent. The paper concludes by arguing for a public law solution, modelled on criminal law, but providing compensation for victims. (shrink)

According to the beneficiary-pays principle, the involuntary beneficiaries of injustice ought to disgorge their unjustly obtained benefits in order to compensate the victims of injustice. The paper explores the effectiveness of the above principle in establishing a robust and unique normative connection between the rectificatory duties of the beneficiaries and the rectificatory rights of the victims of injustice. I discuss three accounts of the beneficiary-pays principle according to which the rectificatory duty of the beneficiaries towards the victims is grounded in (...) (a) their duty to oppose injustice and mitigate its effects, (b) their duty to give up benefits that are causally linked to an act of wrongdoing, or (c) their duty to not sustain wrongful harm against the victims. By criticizing these accounts, I intend to highlight the complexities of articulating a distinct rectificatory duty that applies uniquely to the beneficiaries of injustice qua beneficiaries. I conclude that, while it may seem complicated to defend the beneficiary-pays principle as an independent moral principle, it is more plausible to think of it as being derivative of more general principles such as the principle of fair play. (shrink)

Tradicionalmente se ha entendido que la mejor teoría de la responsabilidad extracontractual es aquella que mejor explica los rasgos centrales de la práctica. En este sentido, los defensores de las teorías deontológicas, basadas en principios de justicia, han rechazado el poder explicativo del análisis económico del derecho. Han sostenido que no logra reconstruir la práctica dando sentido a sus conceptos centrales, ni al modo en que están relacionados. Por lo tanto, no puede explicar la pauta de inferencias que llevan a (...) un juicio de responsabilidad. En este trabajo me propongo mostrar que ambas teorías son capaces de explicar aspectos diferen- tes de la práctica. En contra de lo que se asume generalmente, el análisis económico del derecho y las teorías deontológicas no son teorías rivales, sino compatibles, puesto que tienen por objeto responder a preguntas distintas. (shrink)

Algorithms silently structure our lives. Algorithms can determine whether someone is hired, promoted, offered a loan, or provided housing as well as determine which political ads and news articles consumers see. Yet, the responsibility for algorithms in these important decisions is not clear. This article identifies whether developers have a responsibility for their algorithms later in use, what those firms are responsible for, and the normative grounding for that responsibility. I conceptualize algorithms as value-laden, rather than neutral, in that algorithms (...) create moral consequences, reinforce or undercut ethical principles, and enable or diminish stakeholder rights and dignity. In addition, algorithms are an important actor in ethical decisions and influence the delegation of roles and responsibilities within these decisions. As such, firms should be responsible not only for the value-laden-ness of an algorithm but also for designing who-does-what within the algorithmic decision. As such, firms developing algorithms are accountable for designing how large a role individual will be permitted to take in the subsequent algorithmic decision. Counter to current arguments, I find that if an algorithm is designed to preclude individuals from taking responsibility within a decision, then the designer of the algorithm should be held accountable for the ethical implications of the algorithm in use. (shrink)

What does the law demand when it requirescitizens to conform to standards ofreasonableness? I propose and defend theview that the law should demand thatcitizens conform their behavior to someactual conduct in society. I contrast thisidea against what might be called the``empty vessel'' view of reasonableness,where the standard is understood tofunction like an empty vessel in the law,allowing courts to use various norms andmoral judgments to determine what seemsreasonable in the circumstances. Theempty vessel account is the more commonapproach for understanding reasonableness,but (...) it leaves obscure whether and howassessments about appropriate conductconnect with facts about citizens' actualconduct. I argue for a ``binocular'' viewthat focuses our attention on actualpractices and thereby establishes howthese standards provide a stable guide toconduct and support the rule of law. (shrink)

This paper evaluates the economic assumptions of economic theory via an examination of the capitalist transformation of creditor–debtor relations in the 18th century. This transformation enabled masses of people to obtain credit without moral opprobrium or social subordination. Classical 18th century economics had the ethical concepts to appreciate these facts. Ironically, contemporary economic theory cannot. I trace this fault to its abstract representations of freedom, efficiency, and markets. The virtues of capitalism lie in the concrete social relations and social meanings (...) through which capital and commodities are exchanged. Contrary to laissez faire capitalism, the conditions for sustaining these concrete capitalist formations require limits on freedom of contract and the scope of private property rights. (shrink)

One of the assumptions of our legal system is that when a violation of law has occurred, we (society) should provide a remedy for individuals who were harmed. More specifically, we should provide them with corrective remedies—remedies that place them as nearly as possible in the position they would be in if no wrong had occurred. This principle is not universal. There are legal wrongs, usually statutory, for which only public officials can seek a judicial remedy. And where private remedies (...) do apply, not all the effects of a legal wrong are covered. But in general, individuals who have suffered legal wrongs are entitled to remedies that relieve the effects of the wrong and return them to their “rightful position.”. (shrink)