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  1. Cooperation and Lateral Forces: Moving Beyond Bottom-Up and Top-Down Drivers of Animal Population Dynamics.Ying-Yu Chen, Dustin R. Rubenstein & Sheng-Feng Shen - 2022 - Frontiers in Psychology 13.
    Biologists have long known that animal population dynamics are regulated by a combination of bottom-up and top-down forces. Yet, economists have argued that human population dynamics can also be influenced by intraspecific cooperation. Despite awareness of the role of interspecific cooperation in influencing resource availability and animal population dynamics, the role of intraspecific cooperation under different environmental conditions has rarely been considered. Here we examine the role of what we call “lateral forces” that act within populations and interact with external (...)
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  • The emergence of local norms in networks.Mary A. Burke, Gary M. Fournier & Kislaya Prasad - 2006 - Complexity 11 (5):65-83.
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  • On Six Advances in Cooperation Theory.Robert Axelrod - 2000 - Analyse & Kritik 22 (1):130-151.
    The symposium included in this issue of Analyse & Kritik extends the basis of Cooperation Theory as set forth in Axelrod’s Evolution of Cooperation (1984). This essay begins with an overview of Cooperation Theory in terms of the questions it asks, its relationship to game theory and rationality, and the principal methodologies used, namely deduction and simulation. This essay then addresses the issues raised in the symposium, including the consequences of extending the original paradigm of the two person iterated Prisoner’s (...)
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  • Evolutionary explanations of distributive justice.J. McKenzie Alexander - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (3):490-516.
    Evolutionary game theoretic accounts of justice attempt to explain our willingness to follow certain principles of justice by appealing to robustness properties possessed by those principles. Skyrms (1996) offers one sketch of how such an account might go for divide-the-dollar, the simplest version of the Nash bargaining game, using the replicator dynamics of Taylor and Jonker (1978). In a recent article, D'Arms et al. (1998) criticize his account and describe a model which, they allege, undermines his theory. I sketch a (...)
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  • Animal network phenomena: Insights from triadic games.Mike Mesterton-Gibbons & Tom N. Sherratt - 2009 - Complexity 14 (4):44-50.
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  • Agent mobility and the evolution of cooperative communities.Stephen J. Majeski, Greg Linden, Corina Linden & Aaron Spitzer - 1999 - Complexity 5 (1):16-24.
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  • The Silent Cooperator: An Epigenetic Model for Emergence of Altruistic Traits in Biological Systems.I. Hashem, D. Telen, P. Nimmegeers & J. Van Impe - 2018 - Complexity 2018:1-16.
    Spatial evolutionary game theory explains how cooperative traits can survive the intense competition in biological systems. If the spatial distribution allows cooperators to interact with each other frequently, the benefits of cooperation will outweigh the losses due to exploitation by selfish organisms. However, for a cooperative behavior to get established in a system, it needs to be found initially in a sufficiently large cluster to allow a high frequency of intracooperator interactions. Since mutations are rare events, this poses the question (...)
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  • Biological altruism in hostile environments.William Harms - 1999 - Complexity 5 (2):23-28.
    The evolution of economic altruism is one of the most vigorous areas of study at the intersection of biology, economics, and philosophy. The basic problem is easily understood. Biological organisms, be they people or paramecia, have ample opportunity to confer benefits on others at relatively low cost to themselves. If conferring such benefits becomes common, the overall productivity of the population in which it occurs is increased. Presumably, there is no advantage to refusing such benefits, but it is also the (...)
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  • Location, location, location: The importance of spatialization in modeling cooperation and communication.Patrick Grim, Stephanie Wardach & Vincent Beltrani - 2006 - Interaction Studiesinteraction Studies Social Behaviour and Communication in Biological and Artificial Systems 7 (1):43-78.
    Most current modeling for evolution of communication still underplays or ignores the role of local action in spatialized environments: the fact that it is immediate neighbors with which one tends to communicate, and from whom one learns strategies or conventions of communication. Only now are the lessons of spatialization being learned in a related field: game-theoretic models for cooperation. In work on altruism, on the other hand, the role of spatial organization has long been recognized under the term ‘viscosity’.Here we (...)
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  • Firstness - As seen from the perspective of Complexity Research.Manfred Füllsack - 2011 - E-Logos 18 (1):1-19.
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  • Agent‐based computational models and generative social science.Joshua M. Epstein - 1999 - Complexity 4 (5):41-60.
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