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Why Mental Disorders are not Like Software Bugs

Harriet Fagerberg

Philosophy of Science 89 (4):661-682 (2022)

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En contra del compromiso causal de la psiquiatría biológica.Rafael Ambríz González - 2023 - Aporía. International Journal for Philosophical Investigations 4 (Especial):141-162.details Se le llama ‘psiquiatría biológica’ a la vertiente de la investigación psiquiátrica que busca establecer asociaciones estables entre condiciones psiquiátricas y factores biológicos específicos. La búsqueda de tales asociaciones está motivada por lo que llamo el “compromiso causal” de la psiquiatría biológica, que es la presunción de que factores biológicos específicos son las causas principales de las condiciones psiquiátricas. En este artículo argüiré que dicho compromiso es una presunción implausible sobre esas condiciones, pues la mejor evidencia psiquiátrico-biológica disponible no lo (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
Brain dysfunction without function.Harriet Fagerberg - 2023 - Philosophical Psychology 1 (3):570-582.details In an important and timely book, Anneli Jefferson outlines a view according to which a given mental disorder is a brain disorder if it is a (harmful) mental dysfunction realised by a brain dysfunction. Prima facie, Jefferson’s book is a study in the metaphysics of dysfunction: how does mental dysfunction relate to brain dysfunction, and what does this imply for the status of mental disorders and brain disorders? In what follows, I shall argue that Jefferson’s contribution to this debate is (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
Partial realization and biological normality: Jefferson’s account of brain dysfunction reinterpreted.Fabian Hundertmark - 2024 - Philosophical Psychology 37 (3):596 - 605.details In her book “Are Mental Disorders Brain Disorders?” (2022), Anneli Jefferson proposes that brain processes that always realize mental dysfunctions are brain dysfunctions. This paper explores possible interpretations of two underdeveloped aspects of this thesis. First, it argues that “realization” should be interpreted as partial rather than full realization. Second, it argues that the “always” should only quantify over biologically normal situations. Taken together, these changes can account for the fact that some psychological dysfunctions are partially realized by functional mechanisms, (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
Brain disorders reconsidered – a response to commentaries.Anneli Jefferson - 2024 - Philosophical Psychology 37 (3):644-657.details In this paper, I respond to commentaries on my book “Are Mental Disorders Brain Disorders?”. The topics I discuss are: accounts of function and dysfunction, constraints on the relationship between processes at the level of the brain and the mind, externalism in psychiatry, implications for moral responsibility and the question whether my account is a form of conceptual engineering. I defend my account and argue that the key criterion for whether mental disorders are brain disorders is whether we can map (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
Are mental disorders brain disorders? – A precis.Anneli Jefferson - 2022 - Philosophical Psychology 37 (3):552-557.details People hold wildly opposing and very strong views on the question whether mental disorders are brain disorders, and the disagreement is primarily a conceptual one, not one about whether there are,... Download Export citation Bookmark 5 citations

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