In her book “Are Mental Disorders Brain Disorders?” (2022), Anneli Jefferson proposes that brain processes that always realize mental dysfunctions are brain dysfunctions. This paper explores possible interpretations of two underdeveloped aspects of this thesis. First, it argues that “realization” should be interpreted as partial rather than full realization. Second, it argues that the “always” should only quantify over biologically normal situations. Taken together, these changes can account for the fact that some psychological dysfunctions are partially realized by functional mechanisms, (...) for the existence of psychological dysfunctions due to mismatches rather than brain dysfunctions, and for the fact that brain dysfunctions do not cease to be brain dysfunctions just because they can be compensated. (shrink)

People hold wildly opposing and very strong views on the question whether mental disorders are brain disorders, and the disagreement is primarily a conceptual one, not one about whether there are,...

Se le llama ‘psiquiatría biológica’ a la vertiente de la investigación psiquiátrica que busca establecer asociaciones estables entre condiciones psiquiátricas y factores biológicos específicos. La búsqueda de tales asociaciones está motivada por lo que llamo el “compromiso causal” de la psiquiatría biológica, que es la presunción de que factores biológicos específicos son las causas principales de las condiciones psiquiátricas. En este artículo argüiré que dicho compromiso es una presunción implausible sobre esas condiciones, pues la mejor evidencia psiquiátrico-biológica disponible no lo (...) respalda y es dudoso que la evidencia futura lo hará. (shrink)

In this paper, I respond to commentaries on my book “Are Mental Disorders Brain Disorders?”. The topics I discuss are: accounts of function and dysfunction, constraints on the relationship between processes at the level of the brain and the mind, externalism in psychiatry, implications for moral responsibility and the question whether my account is a form of conceptual engineering. I defend my account and argue that the key criterion for whether mental disorders are brain disorders is whether we can map (...) dysfunctional psychological processes onto specific differences in brain function. I also acknowledge that my commentators have identified points where my account needs further development. (shrink)