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  1. Attention and Encapsulation.Jake Quilty-Dunn - 2020 - Mind and Language 35 (3):335-349.
    The question of whether perception is encapsulated from cognition has been a major topic in the study of perception in the past decade. One locus of debate concerns the role of attention. Some theorists argue that attention is a vehicle for widespread violations of encapsulation; others argue that certain forms of cognitively driven attention are compatible with encapsulation, especially if attention only modulates inputs. This paper argues for an extreme thesis: no effect of attention, whether on the inputs to perception (...)
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  • Is Attention Both Necessary and Sufficient for Consciousness?Antonios Kaldas - 2019 - Dissertation, Macquarie University
    Is attention both necessary and sufficient for consciousness? Call this central question of this treatise, “Q.” We commonly have the experience of consciously paying attention to something, but is it possible to be conscious of something you are not attending to, or to attend to something of which you are not conscious? Where might we find examples of these? This treatise is a quest to find an answer to Q in two parts. Part I reviews the foundations upon which the (...)
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  • Range Content, Attention, and the Precision of Representation.Trey Boone - 2020 - Philosophical Psychology 33 (8):1141-1161.
    A number of authors have recently cited phenomenal effects of covert attention as a source of objection to representationalism. These authors maintain that covert attention brings about changes to phenomenology that cannot be explained by changes in representational content. This paper deals with two related issues that are central to this debate: (1) how attention interacts with representational content, and (2) how variations in the precision or determinacy of representational content should be incorporated into representationalist accounts of perceptual phenomenology. I (...)
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  • Fuzziness in the Mind: Can Perception Be Unconscious?Henry Taylor - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (2):383-398.
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.
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  • Attenuating Oneself.Jakub Limanowski & Karl Friston - 2020 - Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 1 (I):1-16.
    In this paper, we address reports of “selfless” experiences from the perspective of active inference and predictive processing. Our argument builds upon grounding self-modelling in active inference as action planning and precision control within deep generative models – thus establishing a link between computational mechanisms and phenomenal selfhood. We propose that “selfless” experiences can be interpreted as cases in which normally congruent processes of computational and phenomenal self-modelling diverge in an otherwise conscious system. We discuss two potential mechanisms – within (...)
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