Self-evidencing describes the purported predictive processing of all self-organising systems, whether conscious or not. Self-evidencing in itself is therefore not sufficient for consciousness. Different systems may however be capable of self-evidencing in different, specific and distinct ways. Some of these ways of self-evidencing can be matched up with, and explain, several properties of consciousness. This carves out a distinction in nature between those systems that are conscious, as described by these properties, and those that are not. This approach throws new (...) light on phenomenology, and suggests that some self-evidencing may be characteristic of consciousness. (shrink)

Husserl’s (2023) “Paradox of the Psychological Reduction,” with support and elucidation from Husserl’s published writings, shows the necessity of employing the phenomenological epoché and reduction in order to perform valid psychological research. The relationship between the transcendental and psychological reductions, including their closeness, differences, and peculiar identity are explored. Although necessary, the phenomenological method does not guarantee true psychological knowledge but rather requires a reflexive, self-critical, self-corrective historical process that confronts and overcomes naturalistic prejudice and other misguiding assumptions and dogma (...) as well as superficial and flawed research performances. Phenomenological psychology and philosophy are inseparable, in a bidirectional relationship that informs the socio-cultural sciences including empirical psychology and all disciplines that study persons, communities, human artifacts, and humanity. The implications and relevance of phenomenological method are spelled out in light of the history and contemporary challenges of psychology. (shrink)

Questions about phenomenology’s role in non-philosophical disciplines gained renewed attention. While we claim that phenomenology makes indispensable, unique contributions to different domains of scientific practice such as concept formation, experimental design, and data collection, we also contend that when it comes to explanation, phenomenological approaches face a dilemma. Either phenomenological attempts to explain conscious phenomena do not satisfy a central constraint on explanations, i.e. the asymmetry between explanans and explanandum, or they satisfy this explanatory asymmetry only by largely merging with (...) non-phenomenological explanation types. The consequence of this dilemma is that insofar as phenomenological approaches are explanatory, they do not provide an own type of explanation. We substantiate our two claims by offering three case studies of phenomenologically inspired experiments in cognitive science. Each case study points out a specific phenomenological contribution to experimental practice while also illustrating how phenomenological approaches face the explanatory dilemma we outline. (shrink)