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Uljana Feest
Universität Hannover
  1. Why Replication is Overrated.Uljana Feest - 2019 - Philosophy of Science 86 (5):895-905.
    Current debates about the replication crisis in psychology take it for granted that direct replication is valuable and focus their attention on questionable research practices in regard to statistical analyses. This paper takes a broader look at the notion of replication as such. It is argued that all experimentation/replication involves individuation judgments and that research in experimental psychology frequently turns on probing the adequacy of such judgments. In this vein, I highlight the ubiquity of conceptual and material questions in research, (...)
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  2.  68
    Construct validity in psychological tests – the case of implicit social cognition.Uljana Feest - 2020 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 10 (1):1-24.
    This paper looks at the question of what it means for a psychological test to have construct validity. I approach this topic by way of an analysis of recent debates about the measurement of implicit social cognition. After showing that there is little theoretical agreement about implicit social cognition, and that the predictive validity of implicit tests appears to be low, I turn to a debate about their construct validity. I show that there are two questions at stake: First, what (...)
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  3. What Exactly is Stabilized When Phenomena Are Stabilized?Uljana Feest - 2011 - Synthese 182 (1):57-71.
    The last two decades have seen a rising interest in (a) the notion of a scientific phenomenon as distinct from theories and data, and (b) the intricacies of experimentally producing and stabilizing phenomena. This paper develops an analysis of the stabilization of phenomena that integrates two aspects that have largely been treated separately in the literature: one concerns the skills required for empirical work; the other concerns the strategies by which claims about phenomena are validated. I argue that in order (...)
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  4. Phenomenal Experiences, First-Person Methods, and the Artificiality of Experimental Data.Uljana Feest - 2014 - Philosophy of Science 81 (5):927-939.
    This paper argues that whereas philosophical discussions of first-person methods often turn on the veridicality of first-person reports, more attention should be paid to the experimental circumstances under which the reports are generated, and to the purposes of designing such experiments. After pointing to the ‘constructedness’ of first-person reports in the science of perception, I raise questions about the criteria by which to judge whether the reports illuminate something about the nature of perception. I illustrate this point with a historical (...)
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  5.  46
    Phenomena and Objects of Research in the Cognitive and Behavioral Sciences.Uljana Feest - 2017 - Philosophy of Science 84 (5):1165-1176.
    It is commonly held that research efforts in the cognitive and behavioral sciences are mainly directed toward providing explanations and that phenomena figure into scientific practice qua explananda. I contend that these assumptions convey a skewed picture of the research practices in question and of the role played by phenomena. I argue that experimental research often aims at exploring and describing “objects of research” and that phenomena can figure as components of, and as evidence for, such objects. I situate my (...)
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  6.  58
    Gestalt Psychology, Frontloading Phenomenology, and Psychophysics.Uljana Feest - forthcoming - Synthese:1-21.
    In his 1935 book Principles of Gestalt Psychology, Kurt Koffka stated that empirical research in perceptual psychology should begin with “a phenomenological analysis,” which in turn would put constraints on the “true theory.” In this paper, I take this statement as a point of departure to investigate in what sense Gestalt psychologists practiced a phenomenological analysis and how they saw it related to theory construction. I will contextualize the perceptual research in Gestalt psychology vis-a-vis Husserlian phenomenology on the one hand (...)
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  7. The Continuing Relevance of 19th-Century Philosophy of Psychology: Brentano and the Autonomy of Psychological Methods.Uljana Feest - 2014 - In M. C. Galavotti & F. Stadler (eds.), New Directions in the Philosophy of Science, The Philosophy of Science in a European Perspective 5. Springer. Springer. pp. 693-709.
    This paper provides an analysis of Franz Brentano’s thesis that psychology employs a distinctive method, which sets it apart from physiology. The aim of the paper is two-fold: First, I situate Brentano’s thesis (and the broader metaphysical system that underwrites it) within the context of specific debates about the nature and status of psychology, arguing that we regard him as engaging in a form of boundary work. Second, I explore the relevance of Brentano’s considerations to more recent debates about autonomy (...)
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  8. Historical Perspectives on Erklären and Verstehen.Uljana Feest (ed.) - 2010 - Dordrecht: Springer.
    This is a collection of original papers that look at the ways in which the dichotomy between explanation and understanding was conceptualized by various late 19th- and early 20th-century writers both in Germany and in other (mostly) European countries.
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  9.  25
    Christian Damböck,. Studien zur Philosophie im deutschsprachigen Raum 1830-1930. [REVIEW]Uljana Feest - 2018 - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 8 (Fall 2018):480-485.
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