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  1. Naturalizing intentions.R. J. Nelson - 1984 - Synthese 61 (2):173 - 203.
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  • Phenomenal experience and the measure of information.Craig DeLancey - 2007 - Erkenntnis 66 (3):329-352.
    This paper defends the hypothesis that phenomenal experiences may be very complex information states. This can explain some of our most perplexing anti-physicalist intuitions about phenomenal experience. The approach is to describe some basic facts about information in such a way as to make clear the essential oversight involved, by way illustrating how various intuitive arguments against physicalism (such as Frank Jackson.
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  • Consciousness and the superfunctionality claim.Craig DeLancey - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 161 (3):433-451.
    The superfunctionality claim is that phenomenal experiences are more than functional (objective, causal) relations. This is one of the most widely used but least attacked claims in the anti-physicalist literature on consciousness. Coupled with one form of structuralism, the view that science only explains functional relations, the superfunctionality claim entails that science will not explain phenomenal experience. The claim is therefore essential to many anti-physicalist arguments. I identify an open question argument for the superfunctionality claim that expresses an intuition deserving (...)
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  • Memory and cognition: An information processing model of man.Kenneth Deffenbacher & Evan Brown - 1973 - Theory and Decision 4 (2):141-178.
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  • Whither internalism? How internalists should respond to the extended mind hypothesis.Gary Bartlett - 2008 - Metaphilosophy 39 (2):163–184.
    A new position in the philosophy of mind has recently appeared: the extended mind hypothesis (EMH). Some of its proponents think the EMH, which says that a subject's mental states can extend into the local environment, shows that internalism is false. I argue that this is wrong. The EMH does not refute internalism; in fact, it necessarily does not do so. The popular assumption that the EMH spells trouble for internalists is premised on a bad characterization of the internalist thesis—albeit (...)
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