Following Nancy Cartwright and others, I suggest that most (if not all) theories incorporate, or depend on, one or more idealizing assumptions. I then argue that such theories ought to be regimented as counterfactuals, the antecedents of which are simplifying assumptions. If this account of the logic form of theories is granted, then a serious problem arises for Bayesians concerning the prior probabilities of theories that have counterfactual form. If no such probabilities can be assigned, the the posterior probabilities will (...) be undefined, as the latter are defined in terms of the former. I argue here that the most plausible attempts to address the problem of probabilities of conditionals fail to help Bayesians, and, hence, that Bayesians are faced with a new problem. In so far as these proposed solutions fail, I argue that Bayesians must give up Bayesianism or accept the counterintuitive view that no theories that incorporate any idealizations have ever really been confirmed to any extent whatsoever. Moreover, as it appears that the latter horn of this dilemma is highly implausible, we are left with the conclusion that Bayesianism should be rejected, at least as it stands. (shrink)

Whether or not the particular view of generic sentences articulated above is correct, it is quite clear that the study of generic terms and the truth-conditions of generic sentences touches on the representation of other parts of the grammar, as well as on how the world around us is reflected in language. I would hope that the problems mentioned above will highlight the relevance of semantic analysis to other apparently distinct questions, and focus attention on the relevance of linguistic problems (...) to other already established areas of inquiry. (shrink)

To clarify and illuminate the place of probability in science Ellery Eells and James H. Fetzer have brought together some of the most distinguished philosophers ...

The ontology of decision theory has been subject to considerable debate in the past, and discussion of just how we ought to view decision problems has revealed more than one interesting problem, as well as suggested some novel modifications of classical decision theory. In this paper it will be argued that Bayesian, or evidential, decision-theoretic characterizations of decision situations fail to adequately account for knowledge concerning the causal connections between acts, states, and outcomes in decision situations, and so they are (...) incomplete. Second, it will be argues that when we attempt to incorporate the knowledge of such causal connections into Bayesian decision theory, a substantial technical problem arises for which there is no currently available solution that does not suffer from some damning objection or other. From a broader perspective, this then throws into question the use of decision theory as a model of human or machine planning. (shrink)

A probabilistic and counterfactual theory of causality is developed within the framework of branching time. The theory combines ideas developed by James Fetzer, Donald Nute, Patrick Suppes, Ming Xu, John Pollock, David Lewis and Mellor among others.

Objective probability, or objective chance, is the probability of some event occurring in the future independent of what anyone thinks. This paper presents and defends a theory of objective chance. I develop an informal analysis of objective chance, taking the common sense picture underlying our talk about the likelihood of future events as our starting point. A formal semantics is introduced, and I argue that the theory presented satisfies certain criteria of adequacy for a theory of probability.

Tras una breve presentación / explicación de la noción de similaridad intermundana que se utiliza en lógica condicional, se explican cuatro nociones intuitivas, pre-teóricas, de similaridad, así como las implicaciones formales que posee su adopción como correlato informal para la noción técnica de similaridad entre mundos: parecido entre objetos, magnitud del cambio, semejanza estructural, y probabilidad / posibilidad de eventos. Por ultimo, se retoman dos problemas tradicionales de la lógica condicional a la luz de los conceptos recién definidos: la asunción (...) de unicidad (vinculada al tercio excluso condicional), y el principio de comparabilidad (vinculada al principio de monotonía racional). (shrink)

Philip Kitcher and Wesley C. Salmon have edited an important anthology of new papers on scientific explanation, a central problem—possibly the central problem—in the theory of science. Their collection begins with a comprehensive essay by Salmon that attempts to trace the development of work on this issue from Hempel and Oppenheim to the present. The University of Minnesota Press has published this article as a separate volume, which it is promoting as “a definitive introduction” to this area of inquiry. Apart (...) from its preface and indices, the Salmon volume is identical with the original essay. (shrink)

I argue that to the extent to which philosophical theories of objective probability have offered theoretically adequateconceptions of objective probability (in connection with such desiderata as causal and explanatory significance, applicability to single cases, etc.), they have failed to satisfy amethodological standard — roughly, a requirement to the effect that the conception offered be specified with the precision appropriate for a physical interpretation of an abstract formal calculus and be fully explicated in terms of concepts, objects or phenomena understood independently (...) of the idea of physical probability. The significance of this, and of the suggested methodological standard, is then briefly discussed. (shrink)

Default reasoning occurs whenever the truth of the evidence available to the reasoner does not guarantee the truth of the conclusion being drawn. Despite this, one is entitled to draw the conclusion “by default” on the grounds that we have no information which would make us doubt that the inference should be drawn. It is the type of conclusion we draw in the ordinary world and ordinary situations in which we find ourselves. Formally speaking, ‘nonmonotonic reasoning’ refers to argumentation in (...) which one uses certain information to reach a conclusion, but where it is possible that adding some further information to those very same premises could make one want to retract the original conclusion. It is easily seen that the informal notion of default reasoning manifests a type of nonmonotonic reasoning. Generally speaking, default statements are said to be true about the class of objects they describe, despite the acknowledged existence of “exceptional instances” of the class. In the absence of explicit information that an object is one of the exceptions we are enjoined to apply the default statement to the object. But further information may later tell us that the object is in fact one of the exceptions. So this is one of the points where nonmonotonicity resides in default reasoning. (shrink)

My purpose here is to elaborate the reasons I maintain that Salmon has not been completely successful in reporting the history of work on explanation. The most important limitation of his account is that it does not emphasize the critical necessity to embrace a suitable conception of probability in the development of the theory of probabilistic explanation.

I argue that to the extent to which philosophical theories of objective probability have offered theoretically adequate conceptions of objective probability , they have failed to satisfy a methodological standard -- roughly, a requirement to the effect that the conception offered be specified with the precision appropriate for a physical interpretation of an abstract formal calculus and be fully explicated in terms of concepts, objects or phenomena understood independently of the idea of physical probability. The significance of this, and of (...) the suggested methodological standard, is then briefly discussed. (shrink)