Edward Shils presented his book Tradition (1981) as the first extensive study of the subject. This article casts light on Shils' multifaceted understanding of tradition, comprising pragmatic, Burkean, veridical, and evolutionist perspectives. His typology of traditions is noted, and his view of institutional bearers of tradition described. In assessing Shils' theory, however, we find that it overreaches, collapsing differences that exist between traditions, transmissions, and the traditional. Key Words: tradition • transmission • rationalization • antitradition • science.

This article offers a Weberian perspective on philosophy's relationship to social science research in education. Two key areas where it can make an important contribution are discussed: methodology, and the clarification of value principles that necessarily frame inquiries. In relation to both areas, it is claimed that some researchers underestimate philosophy's contribution, while others exaggerate it. Thus, in methodological work, there are those who effectively suppress philosophical issues, producing ‘methodology-as-technique’; at the same time, others generate ‘methodology-as-philosophy’, often denying the possibility (...) of knowledge, the regulative ideal of truth, and the desirability of objectivity. It is argued that both these tendencies are counterproductive: neither enables research on education to flourish. In relation to the second area, it is shown that philosophy is needed to clarify the value principles that educational researchers use to frame their inquiries; but, at the same time, that it cannot provide a value framework to govern social science. The concept of equity is discussed as an example. In summary, it is argued that while philosophy plays an essential role in social and educational inquiry, there are important limits to its contribution. (shrink)

Just as political theorists have long argued that democracy is viable only in communities of certain sizes and shapes, perhaps epistemologists should also entertain the idea that knowledge is possible only within certain social parameters-ones which today's world may have exceeded. This is what I mean by the "postepistemic" society. I understand an "epistemic society" in Popperian terms as an environment that fosters the spirit of conjectures and refutations. After castigating analytic philosophers for their failure to see this point, I (...) show how Rousseau and Feyerabend occupy analogous positions as critics of, respectively, the nation-state and Big Science. Rather than endorsing the disestablishment of the state, however, I offer a proposal for reinjecting the critical attitude into Big Science. It involves heightening the sporting character of scientific disputes, perhaps even to the point of enabling the public to bet on their outcomes. (shrink)

The ArgumentI argue that “social epistemology” can be usefully reformulated as a philosophy of science accounting, specifically one that fosters a critical form of instrumental rationality. I begin by observing that philosophical and sociological species of “science accountancy” can be compared along two dimensions; constructive versus deconstve; reflexive versus unreflexive. The social epistemologist proposes a constructive and reflixive accounting for science. This possibility has been obscured, probably because of the persuasiveness of the Frankfulrt School's portrayal of “critical” and “instrumental” rationalities (...) as polar opposites. In challenging this polarity, I present four “acciybtability conditions” that define pure critico-instrumental rationality. These conditions are most likely to be met during a period of“crisis” in the future direction of science. The bulk of the paper concerns case study of such a crisis that enables us to examine contrasting ways of meeting the four conditions. Ernst Mach and Max Planck debated“the end of science” in the first decade of this century, a time marked by both science's increasing involvement in the means of social reproduction and prowing concern that science pursued for its own sake was exhibiting diminishing margianl returns on investment. In analyzing Planck's victory, I conclude that its tegacy has been an ever-widenig gap between the“content” and“function” of scientific knowledge in society, as measured by the increasing numbers of jobs that are devoted to mediating the production and distribution of knowledge. (shrink)

Feyerabend and Lakatos were invited to be assistants of the literary Marxists Brecht and Lukács, respectively. In the 1930s Expressionism Debate, Lukács associated artistic expressionism with irrationalism and fascism, while Brecht criticized Lukács' anti-modernism. Lakatos' criti cisms of Kuhn echo Lukács' denunciations of German idealism, and Lukács influenced the terminology and topics in Lakatos' methodol ogy. Lakatos, concerned with progress, and fearful of irrationalism and degeneration, recapitulates positions of his teacher, Lukács, in the latter's attack on modern art. Feyerabend's criticisms (...) of Lakatos paral lel Brecht's critique of Lukács. (shrink)

The central purpose of this paper is to address the tension between legal and medical discourses within the coronial system. Medical expertise, based largely upon internal autopsy, becomes positioned as providing the more important information, rather than the legal model which focuses on evidence gathering at the scene. This paper will examine the aspects of the history, philosophy and consequences of the processes by which the medical model gained its current dominance and will conclude that, while autopsies are necessary, they (...) are also over-used in the coronial system. (shrink)

Perhaps no other aspect of Hans-Georg Gadamer's Wahrheit und Methode has generated more controversy and caustic criticism than his attempt to defend the role of ‘prejudice’ in human understanding. Gadamer's goal in challenging what he calls ‘the Enlightenment's prejudice against prejudice’ is not to defend irresponsible, idiosyncratic, parochial or otherwise self-willed understanding in the human sciences, but to argue that all human cognition is ‘finite’ and ‘limited’ in the sense that it always involves, to borrow Polanyi's phrase, a ‘tacit dimension’ (...) of implicit judgments, concerns, or commitments which shape definitively our grasp of the subject matter in ways we cannot anticipate or control. This implies a ‘finite’ or ‘limited’ view of human understanding in at least two ways. First, Gadamer seems to use the word ‘finite’ in conscious opposition to Hegel's notion of an ‘infinite’ intellect. For Hegel the ‘infinite’ was the ‘unconditioned’ and ‘self-determining’. An ‘infinite’ intellect would be its own master, an autonomous, spontaneous source of all its essential activities and contents. (shrink)

Bruno Latour is not the only scholar to reflect on his earlier contributions to science studies with some regret and resolve over climate skepticism and science denialism. Given the ascendency of merchants of doubt, should those who share Latour's concerns join the scientists they study in circling the wagons, or is there a productive role still for science studies to question and critique scientists and scientific institutions? I argue for the latter, looking to postpositivist feminist philosophy as exemplified by Alison (...) Wylie and Lynn Nelson, among others, as a guide. Feminist philosophers of science who ground their analysis in a detailed understanding of scientific practice are not science's champions nor its antagonists, but they do stand in a distinct relationship to science. If not merchants of doubt, are they scientific gadflies or perhaps in scientific loyal opposition? Though these notions can underwrite useful approaches to science studies, neither captures the distinctive interdependency and interestedness of feminist philosophers and science. I suggest that we would be better served by the notion of trustworthy science criticism, building on the analyses of trust and trustworthiness by Annette Baier, among others, attendant to the dynamics of interdependency in trust relationships. (shrink)

The significance of the research topic is found in the analysis of the problem of thinking, one of the most important abilities of man, which today, in combination with knowledge, appears as a means of creating a new world and man. The purpose of the study is to identify the main content load of thinking in the process of its formation and development in the system of various intellectual and cognitive practices, in the culture of communication, which determines its role (...) in the acquisition and transformation of the surrounding reality - natural, social, spiritual. Objectives of the study - to identify the main directions of development of thinking - logical, philosophical, psychological, to reveal the content of the concept of "productive thinking", its development in classical epistemology and post-classical philosophy of science, which show the polymeaningfulness of the phenomenon of thinking. Methodology of the research - analytical-historical, contaminant, rational-heuristic methods are used, which allows to carry out a systematic analysis of thinking, which acquired a variety of forms and means in the history of philosophy and culture; methods of contemporary socio-philosophical and cognitive analysis showed the relationship of theoretical foundations of thinking with practical principles. The result of the study is the conceptualization of the problem of thinking as an effective intellectual, heuristic, cognitive and theoretical tool in the development of knowledge, objectivized in concepts, principles, and laws. The establishment of the role of thinking in the development of scientific knowledge, in the creation of new paradigms of knowledge is also an important aspect. The result of the analysis is the development of scientific-theoretical and methodological approaches in identifying the heuristic, creative essence of thinking, whose influence on the objective and subjective world causes their transformation and the transition to a new quality. Conclusion - the solution of theoretical problems of intellectual and intellectual activity as a factor in the formation and development of philosophy, culture and creative activity of man. (shrink)

Ruth Chang and Joseph Raz have both drawn far-reaching consequences for agency from the phenomenon of incommensurability. After criticizing their arguments, I outline an alternative view: if incommensurability is vagueness, then there are no substantial implications for agency, except perhaps a limited form of naturalistic voluntarism if our reasons are provided by desires.

Matthew Colborn’s book on what might seem a topic radically unrelated to the above quote nevertheless might have used Rodney King’s much-cited comment as its theme. In the areas of cognitive science and philosophy of mind, there is plenty of conceptual head-bashing going on as multiple views contend. The conflict is more acute than in typical disputes among philosophical positions. Where science stands in relation to this conflict of ideas lies in the advent of neuroscience transformed by the marriage of (...) functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) with the computer model of the brain. By finding that the activity of more or less discrete areas of the brain can be correlated with more or less imprecisely defined mental functions, and by assuming that the brain is a digital machine, the conclusion is drawn that the mind, self, and consciousness are now entirely within the purview of neuroscience. It follows that all other theories of the mind, and especially theories that appeal to spheres inaccessible to the physical sciences, are consigned to the trash heap. As a result, intentionality (meaning) must be cast out along with illusions such as freedom of will and spiritual aspiration. (shrink)

In this paper I develop and defend a form of argumentative normativity that is not based on fundamental principles. I first argue that research agendas that aim to discover fundamental principles of ‘good’ argumentative discourse share one crucial weak spot, viz. circularity. I then argue that this weak spot can be avoided in a pancritical view of normativity.

The aim of the paper is to give an outline of the development of Feyerabend´s thought through four basic periods: the realist-empiricistic, intermediate, relativist and, finally, process-realistic periods. The ideas Feyerabend presents in his papers are often misunderstood and misinterpreted. The author attempts at revaluation of his work within the philosophy of science and to show the applicability of his ideas in problem solving in contemporary philosophy, epistemology and methodology of science as well as in other areas of sciences – (...) e. g. anthropology or cognitive sciences. In his view Feyerabend´s ideas are still valid especially in analyses concerning different approaches to the problems of scientific realism, connections between perception and cognition, and comparability of radically different scientific conceptions. (shrink)