Logical Holism and Wittgenstein’s ‘Practical Turn’. – Logical holism is the idea that each elementary proposition belongs to a system and is logically connected to other propositions of that system. In this paper I explore this idea and draw its connections to the nature of negative propositions and the ‘problem of recognition’ on the basis of Wittgenstein’s Nachlass. In the first section I argue that in January 1930 the idea leads Wittgenstein to a better understanding of how the negative feature (...) is expressed in propositions, thereby raising the problem of recognition to which he is not yet able to find a proper solution. In the second section I explore how the problem still persists during Wittgenstein’s ‘practical turn’. What he now calls the ‘problem of representation’ forces him to change again his conception of propositions. In the final section I argue that this change is mainly due to the modification of his conception of hypotheses which urges a solution to the problem of representation, though the problem remains unsolved in January 1930. (shrink)

In this paper, I explore Wittgenstein’s conception of a hypothesis as articulated in Chapters XII and XXII of ‘Philosophical Remarks’. First, I argue that in Chapter XII, Wittgenstein draws on his account of infinity to begin to challenge the view that all hypotheses can be proven by empirical evidence. I then argue that in Chapter XXII that Wittgenstein sharpens this conception of hypotheses claiming that no hypotheses can be verified. Finally, I suggest that Wittgenstein’s conception of a hypothesis relates to (...) his practical view of how language functions. (shrink)

In Wittgenstein’s manuscripts dating from 1929 and 1930, there are a number of entries on the notion of probability. In this paper, I explore Wittgenstein’s manuscripts between October 1929 and March 1930 and demonstrate, first, that Wittgenstein completely rejects the assumption that probability statements are based on an a priori principle. Second, I argue that the standard interpretation, which claims that Wittgenstein adopts an ‘epistemological view’ of probability, significantly understates the importance of Wittgenstein’s development of the notion of hypotheses as (...) a philosophical term of art. (shrink)