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  1. (1 other version)What the States of Truthmaker Semantics Could (Not) Be.Francisca Silva - 2024 - Topoi.
    Developments in truthmaker semantics for the most part stay clear of the metaphysical issue of what sort of entities serve as the truthmakers and falsitymakers for sentences. It is assumed that perhaps facts or states of affairs (Fine, 2017a; Jago, 2020), with these taken sometimes as concrete particulars (Hawke, 2018) could serve for the job, but nonetheless that some such entities would do. In this paper I take a closer look at the issue of what entities could or could not (...)
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  • Mighty Belief Revision.Stephan Krämer - 2022 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 51 (5):1175-1213.
    Belief revision theories standardly endorse a principle of intensionality to the effect that ideal doxastic agents do not discriminate between pieces of information that are equivalent within classical logic. I argue that this principle should be rejected. Its failure, on my view, does not require failures of logical omniscience on the part of the agent, but results from a view of the update as _mighty_: as encoding what the agent learns might be the case, as well as what must be. (...)
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  • The Laws of Thought and the Laws of Truth as Two Sides of One Coin.Ulf Hlobil - 2022 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 52 (1):313-343.
    Some think that logic concerns the “laws of truth”; others that logic concerns the “laws of thought.” This paper presents a way to reconcile both views by building a bridge between truth-maker theory, à la Fine, and normative bilateralism, à la Restall and Ripley. The paper suggests a novel way of understanding consequence in truth-maker theory and shows that this allows us to identify a common structure shared by truth-maker theory and normative bilateralism. We can thus transfer ideas from normative (...)
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  • A plea for inexact truthmaking.Michael Deigan - 2020 - Linguistics and Philosophy 43 (5):515-536.
    Kit Fine distinguishes between inexact and exact truthmaking. He argues that the former can be defined from the latter, but not vice versa, and so concludes that truthmaker semanticists should treat the exact variety of truthmaking as primitive. I argue that this gets things backwards. We can define exact truthmaking in terms of inexact truthmaking and we can’t define inexact truthmaking in terms of exact truthmaking. I conclude that it’s inexact truthmaking, rather than exact truthmaking, that truthmaker semanticists should treat (...)
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  • (1 other version)Deontic logic.Paul McNamara - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  • A semantics for moral error theory.Singa Behrens - 2024 - Analysis 84 (2):221-230.
    Moral error theory has been criticized on formal grounds for lacking a coherent semantics of moral sentences. In this paper, I provide a truthmaker-based semantics of moral sentences that is compatible with moral error theory. The hyperintensional account draws attention to the exact truth- and falsemakers of moral propositions. Error theorists must assume that propositions that have only moral truthmakers have at least one non-moral falsemaker. A central consequence of the discussion is that moral error theory is compatible with a (...)
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  • Proof Systems for Exact Entailment.Johannes Korbmacher - 2023 - Review of Symbolic Logic 16 (4):1260-1295.
    We present a series of proof systems for exact entailment (i.e. relevant truthmaker preservation from premises to conclusion) and prove soundness and completeness. Using the proof systems, we observe that exact entailment is not only hyperintensional in the sense of Cresswell but also in the sense recently proposed by Odintsov and Wansing.
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  • Compliance and Conjunction.Samuel Elgin - manuscript
    I provide counterexamples to Kit Fine's semantics for imperative and deontic modals. In particular, I argue that the semantics fails to provide necessary conditions for conjunctive imperatives.
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  • (1 other version)Knowledge is Closed Under Analytic Content.Samuel Elgin - manuscript
    I am concerned with epistemic closure—the phenomenon in which some knowledge requires other knowledge. In particular, I defend a version of the closure principle in terms of analyticity; if an agent S knows that p is true, then S knows that all analytic parts of p are true as well. After targeting the relevant notion of analyticity, I argue that this principle accommodates intuitive cases and possesses the theoretical resources to avoid the preface paradox. I close by arguing that contextualists (...)
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  • A Truthmaker-based Epistemic Logic.Vita Saitta - 2024 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 53 (4):1067-1107.
    The aim of this work is to investigate the problem of Logical Omniscience in epistemic logic by means of truthmaker semantics. We will present a semantic framework based on $$\varvec{W}$$ W -models extended with a partial function, which selects the body of knowledge of the agents, namely the set of verifiers of the agent’s total knowledge. The semantic clause for knowledge follows the intuition that an agent knows some information $$\varvec{\phi }$$ ϕ, when the propositional content that $$\varvec{\phi }$$ ϕ (...)
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  • (1 other version)Knowledge is closed under analytic content.Samuel Z. Elgin - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):5339-5353.
    I am concerned with epistemic closure—the phenomenon in which some knowledge requires other knowledge. In particular, I defend a version of the closure principle in terms of analyticity; if an agent S knows that p is true and that q is an analytic part of p, then S knows that q. After targeting the relevant notion of analyticity, I argue that this principle accommodates intuitive cases and possesses the theoretical resources to avoid the preface paradox.
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  • Free choice permission, legitimization and relating semantics.Daniela Glavaničová, Tomasz Jarmużek, Mateusz Klonowski & Piotr Kulicki - forthcoming - Logic Journal of the IGPL.
    In this paper, we apply relating semantics to the widely discussed problem of free choice between permitted actions or situations in normative systems. Leaving aside contexts in which the free choice principle is obviously unacceptable or uncontroversially valid, we concentrate on free choice for explicit permissions. In order to construct a formal representation of explicit permissions, we introduce a special constant, $\texttt {permit}$, which is analogous to the constant $\texttt {violation}$ used in the Andersonian–Kangerian approach to deontic logic with respect (...)
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