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  1. The liar, the strengthened liar, and bivalence.Adam Rieger - 2001 - Erkenntnis 54 (2):195-203.
    A view often expressed is that to classify the liar sentence as neither true nor false is satisfactory for the simple liar but not for the strengthened liar. I argue that in fact it is equally unsatisfactory for both liars. I go on to discuss whether, nevertheless, Kripke''s theory of truth represents an advance on that of Tarski.
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  • (1 other version)Absolute and relative concepts in logic.Jaroslav Peregrin - manuscript
    It is a common wisdom that whereas consequence or entailment is a semantic concept, provability is a syntactic concept. However, what exactly does this mean? What is provability? In the traditional, intuitive sense, to prove something is to demonstrate its truth, and indeed the Latin word for proof is demonstratio. Hence in this sense, we cannot prove something unless it is true. Now in the course of his well known proof of the incompleteness of arithmetic, Gödel showed that provability within (...)
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