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  1. The ethics of voluntary ethics standards.Hasko von Kriegstein & Chris MacDonald - 2024 - Business and Society Review 129 (1):50-71.
    Many nongovernmental forms of business regulation aim at reducing ethical violations in commerce. We argue that such nongovernmental ethics standards, while often laudable, raise their own ethical challenges. In particular, when such standards place burdens upon vulnerable market participants (often, though not always, SMEs), they do so without the backing of traditional legitimate political authority. We argue that this constitutes a structural analogy to wars of humanitarian intervention. Moreover, we show that, while some harms imposed by such standards are desirable, (...)
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  • (1 other version)Revolution and Intervention.Massimo Renzo - 2019 - Noûs 54 (1):233-253.
    Provided that traditional jus ad bellum principles are fulfilled, military humanitarian intervention to stop large scale violations of human rights (such as genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes) is widely regarded as morally permissible. In cases of “supreme humanitarian emergency”, not only are the victims morally permitted to rebel, but other states are also permitted to militarily intervene. Things are different if the human rights violations in question fall short of supreme humanitarian emergency. Because of the importance of respecting (...)
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  • Self-Defense.Helen Frowe & Jonathan Parry - 2021 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2021.
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  • Legitimate Authority as a Jus Ad Bellum Condition: Defense of a Procedural Requirement in Just War Theory.Jordy Rocheleau - 2020 - Journal of Military Ethics 19 (2):99-117.
    Today, it is widely held that while authorization may be helpful in assuring that the other jus ad bellum criteria are met, legitimate authority is not itself a condition for just recourse to war....
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  • (1 other version)Revolution and Intervention.Massimo Renzo - 2020 - Noûs 54 (1):533–253.
    Provided that traditional jus ad bellum principles are fulfilled, military humanitarian intervention to stop large scale violations of human rights (such as genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes) is widely regarded as morally permissible. In cases of “supreme humanitarian emergency”, not only are the victims morally permitted to rebel, but other states are also permitted to militarily intervene. Things are different if the human rights violations in question fall short of supreme humanitarian emergency. Because of the importance of respecting (...)
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  • Just War Theory: Revisionists Vs Traditionalists.Seth Lazar - 2017 - Annual Review of Political Science 20:37-54.
    Contemporary just war theory is divided into two broad camps: revisionists and traditionalists. Traditionalists seek to provide moral foundations for something close to current international law, and in particular the laws of armed conflict. Although they propose improvements, they do so cautiously. Revisionists argue that international law is at best a pragmatic fiction—it lacks deeper moral foundations. In this article, I present the contemporary history of analytical just war theory, from the origins of contemporary traditionalist just war theory in Michael (...)
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  • Deploying Racist Soldiers: A critical take on the `right intention' requirement of Just War Theory.Nathan G. Wood - 2018 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 32 (1):53-74.
    In a recent article Duncan Purves, Ryan Jenkins, and B. J. Strawser argue that in order for a decision in war to be just, or indeed the decision to resort to war to be just, it must be the case that the decision is made for the right reasons. Furthermore, they argue that this requirement holds regardless of how much good is produced by said action. In this essay I argue that their argument is flawed, in that it mistakes what (...)
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  • Defensive Harm, Consent, and Intervention.Jonathan Parry - 2017 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 45 (4):356-396.
    Many think that it would be wrong to defend an individual from attack if he competently and explicitly refuses defensive intervention. In this paper, I consider the extent to which the preferences of victims affect the permissibility of defending groups or aggregates. These cases are interesting and difficult because there is no straightforward sense in which a group can univocally consent to or refuse defensive intervention in the same way that an individual can. Among those who have considered this question, (...)
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  • Just War Theory, Legitimate Authority, and Irregular Belligerency.Jonathan Parry - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (1):175-196.
    Since its earliest incarnations, just war theory has included the requirement that war must be initiated and waged by a legitimate authority. However, while recent years have witnessed a remarkable resurgence in interest in just war theory, the authority criterion is largely absent from contemporary discussions. In this paper I aim to show that this is an oversight worth rectifying, by arguing that the authority criterion plays a much more important role within just war theorising than is commonly supposed. As (...)
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  • Public war and the requirement of legitimate authority.Yuan Yuan - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (1):265-288.
    This paper offers a non-reductivist account of the requirement of legitimate authority in warfare. I first advance a distinction between private and public wars. A war is private where individuals defend their private rights with their private means. A war is public where it either aims to defend public rights or relies on public means. I argue that RLA applies to public war but not private war. A public war waged by a belligerent without legitimate authority involves a form of (...)
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  • Introduction: Legitimate Authority, War, and the Ethics of Rebellion.Christopher J. Finlay, Jonathan Parry & Pål Wrange - 2017 - Ethics and International Affairs 31 (2):167-168.
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  • Authorization and The Morality of War.Seth Lazar - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (2):211-226.
    Why does it matter that those who fight wars be authorized by the communities on whose behalf they claim to fight? I argue that lacking authorization generates a moral cost, which counts against a war's proportionality, and that having authorization allows the transfer of reasons from the members of the community to those who fight, which makes the war more likely to be proportionate. If democratic states are better able than non-democratic states and sub-state groups to gain their community's authorization, (...)
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  • War.Brian Orend - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    War should be understood as an actual, intentional and widespread armed conflict between political communities. Thus, fisticuffs between individual persons do not count as a war, nor does a gang fight, nor does a feud on the order of the Hatfields versus the McCoys. War is a phenomenon which occurs only between political communities, defined as those entities which either are states or intend to become states (in order to allow for civil war). Classical war is international war, a war (...)
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  • The Perspective of the Rebel: A Gap in the Global Normative Architecture.Christopher J. Finlay - 2017 - Ethics and International Affairs 31 (2):213-234.
    If people have a right to rebel against domestic tyranny, wrongful foreign occupation, or colonial rule, then the normative principles commonly invoked to deal with civil conflicts present a problem. While rebels in some cases might justifiably try to secure human rights by resort to violence, the three normative pillars dealing with armed force provide at best only a partial reflection of the ethics of armed revolt. This article argues that the concept of “terrorism” and the ongoing attempt to define (...)
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