Abstract: Would a global commitment to international human rights norms provide enough of a sense of community to sustain a legitimate and sufficiently democratic global order? Sceptics worry that human rights cannot help maintain the mutual trust among citizens required for a legitimate political order, since such rights are now too broadly shared. Thus prominent contributors to democratic theory insist that the members of the citizenry must share some features unique to them, to the exclusion of others—be it a European (...) identity ( Habermas and Derrida 2003 ) or a national public culture generally shared only by the members ( Miller 1995, 2000 ). This essay considers and rejects these arguments. While stable, democratic redistributive arrangements do require trust and institutionalised means of trustworthiness; they need not rely on norms or values that distinguish members from non-members: such exclusion is not required. Thus human rights may be part of a common political identity. (shrink)

There is widespread agreement that the European Union is presently suffering from a lack of social justice. Yet there is significant disagreement about what the relevant injustice consists in: Federalists believe the EU can only remedy its justice deficit through the introduction of direct interpersonal transfers between people living in separate states. Intergovernmentalists believe the justice-related purpose of the EU is to enable states to cooperate fairly, and to remain internally just and democratic in the face of increased global pressure (...) on welfare states. I suggest that despite their fundamental differences, many of the most reasonable and prominent philosophical accounts of social justice in the EU nonetheless converge in their institutional prescriptions. In particular, they may each serve as a justificatory basis for introducing the European social minimum, an EU-wide income support scheme. (shrink)

Political philosophers often formulate the problem of distributive justice as the problem of how the government ought to distribute different types of goods—for example, income or health care—to its citizens. They therefore presuppose that the government is a unitary agent that governs its citizens directly. However, although a number of governments are unitary in this way, many are federations, exhibiting a division of sovereignty between two or more levels of government having independent grounds of authority. In contrast to unitary states, (...) therefore, within a federation, two or more levels of government directly govern their citizens and are directly accountable to them. Because of the way in which different levels of government in a federation can separately affect the distribution of goods in society, federations face resource allocation problems that are far more complex than those of unitary states. In addition to determining what a just distribution of goods is, federations must also determine (1) whether distributive justice is a shared responsibility amongst different levels of government, and, if so, (2) how this shared responsibility should be allocated between them. (shrink)

The traditional doctrine on federalism claims that economic inequalities are morally justified as long as they result from the legitimate exercise of federal subunit self-government. This paper discusses that claim and examines the philosophical grounds of federal economic decentralization in order to lay the basis for a federal theory of distributive justice. I explore the analogy between federal organizations and the international order claiming that moral conditions of political legitimacy generate some requirements for distribution. But also, I criticize the idea (...) of fraternity as a demanding and fragile political virtue. I try to show that fraternity gives us stronger reasons to reduce economic inequality in territorial federal states than in multicultural federal states. (shrink)