In this paper, we give an introduction to intuitionistic logic and a defense of it from certain formal logical critiques. Intuitionism is the thesis that mathematical objects are mental constructions produced by the faculty of a priori intuition of time. The truth of a mathematical proposition, then, consists in our knowing how to construct in intuition a corresponding state of affairs. This understanding of mathematical truth leads to a rejection of the principle, valid in classical logic, that a proposition is (...) either true or false (put symbolically, a ∨ ~a). The rejection of this principle leads to a different system of formal logic. This logic has been critiqued as being three-valued in such a way that it is self-contradictory. That this is a misunderstanding of intuitionistic logic can be proven formally on the basis of Heyting's axioms and rules of inference for intuitionistic logic. A proposition that is neither true nor false does not, on an intuitionist view, have some third truth value, but lacks any truth value whatsoever. In the process of proving that this is the case we will also prove several other theorems which will give us some insight into the formal similarities and differences between intuitionistic and classical mathematics, specifically with regard to the validity of different proof techniques. (shrink)

The concept of self-stigmatization is guided by a representational account of selfhood that fails to accommodate for resilience against, and recovery from, stigma. Mainstream research on self-stigma has portrayed it only as a reified self, that is, as collectively shared stereotypes representing individuals’ identity. Self-stigma viewed phenomenologically, however, elucidates what facilitates a stigmatized self. A phenomenological analysis discloses the lived phenomenon of stigma as an act of self-objectification, as related to the experiential self, and therefore an achievement of subjectivity. Following (...) a phenomenological account, the stigmatized self can thus return to a state-of-being, similar to that Jean-Paul Sartre once referred to as bad faith. Regarding your identity as analogous to an inanimate thing is ultimately self-deceptive. Self-stigma is here phenomenologically illuminated as constituted by basic discretion, that is, as a minimal form of agency. The study found that basic discretion can uphold the possibility for emancipation from a stigmatized self. (shrink)

The study’s main thesis is that respect for some moral values is a condition for methodologically rational decisions, namely, decisions which do not satisfy the condition are either not methodologically rational at all, or not fully rational. The paper shows supporting arguments for the thesis in terms of the philosophical theories by Aristotle, Immanuel Kant, Tadeusz Kotarbiński, Max Weber, Jean-Paul Sartre and some other thinkers. Their presentation undergoes phenomenological analysis of the phenomenon of decision making.

How have online communities affected the ways their users construct, view, and define their identity? In this paper, we will approach this issue by considering two philosophical sets of problems related to personal identity: the “Characterization Question” and the “Self-Other Relations Question.” Since these queries have traditionally brought out different problems around the concept of identity, here we aim at rethinking them in the framework of online communities. To do so, we will adopt an externalist and cognitive point of view (...) on online communities, describing them as virtual cognitive niches. We will evaluate and agree with the Attachment Theory of Identity, arguing that there is continuity between offline and online identity and that usually the latter contributes to the alteration of the former. Finally, we will discuss ways users can enact self-reflection on online frameworks, considering the impact of the Filter Bubble and the condition of Bad Faith. (shrink)