- It wasn’t up to Jones: unavoidable actions and intensional contexts in Frankfurt examples.Seth Shabo - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (3):379-399.details
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Free will and the structure of motivation.David Shatz - 1985 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1):451-82.details
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Free Will and the Structure of Motivation.David Shatz - 1986 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1):451-482.details
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Flickers of freedom and modes of action: A reply to Timpe.Seth Shabo - 2007 - Philosophia 35 (1):63-74.details
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Fischer and Ravizza on history and ownership.Seth Shabo - 2005 - Philosophical Explorations 8 (2):103-114.details
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Direct Brain Interventions and Responsibility Enhancement.Elizabeth Shaw - 2014 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 8 (1):1-20.details
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Agency without Avoidability: Defusing a New Threat to Frankfurt’s Counterexample Strategy1.Seth Shabo - 2011 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (4):505-522.details
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Why causal facts matter: a critique of Jeppsson’s hard-line reply to four-case manipulation arguments.Samantha L. Seybold - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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Is “Free Will” an Emergent Property of Immaterial Soul? A Critical Examination of Human Beings’ Decision-Making Process(es) Followed by Voluntary Actions and Their Moral Responsibility.Satya Sundar Sethy & M. Suresh - 2021 - Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research 38 (3):491-505.details
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Androids, Oracles and Free Will.Maria Sekatskaya - 2021 - Kriterion – Journal of Philosophy 35 (4):359-378.details
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Weak reasons-responsiveness meets its match: in defense of David Widerker’s attack on PAP.Ira M. Schnall - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 150 (2):271 - 283.details
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Weak reasons-responsiveness meets its match: in defense of David Widerker’s attack on PAP.Ira M. Schnall - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 150 (2):271-283.details
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Vasubandhu, reactive attitudes, and attentional freedom.Aaron Schultz - 2021 - Asian Philosophy 31 (2):178-194.details
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The Double Intentionality of Moral Intentional Actions: Scotus and Ockham on Interior and Exterior Acts.Sonja Schierbaum - 2021 - Topoi 41 (1):171-181.details
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Traditional Compatibilism Reformulated and Defended.Markus E. Schlosser - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Research 42:277-300.details
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Spinoza on the Conditions that Nominally Define the Human Condition.Daniel Schneider - 2019 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 27 (5):753-773.details
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Moral responsibility and tourette syndrome.Timothy Schroeder - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):106–123.details
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Kant’s Reply to the Consequence Argument.Matthé Scholten - 2021 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 29 (2):135-158.details
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Free Will, Control, and the Possibility to do Otherwise from a Causal Modeler’s Perspective.Gerhard Schurz, Maria Sekatskaya & Alexander Gebharter - 2020 - Erkenntnis 87 (4):1889-1906.details
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Free will in the clustered-minds multiverse, and some comments on S. Sarasvathy’s ‘choice matters’.Christian D. Schade - 2020 - Mind and Society 19 (2):323-330.details
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Conscious Will, Reason-Responsiveness, and Moral Responsibility.Markus E. Schlosser - 2013 - The Journal of Ethics 17 (3):205-232.details
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Archytas of Tarentum: Pythagorean, Philosopher, and Mathematician King.Malcolm Schofield - 2009 - Philosophical Review 118 (1):108-112.details
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Vihvelin on Frankfurt-Style Cases and the Actual-Sequence View.Carolina Sartorio - 2016 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 10 (4):875-888.details
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The grounds of our freedom.Carolina Sartorio - 2022 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 65 (10):1250-1268.details
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Situations and Responsiveness to Reasons.Carolina Sartorio - 2017 - Noûs 52 (4):796-807.details
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Resultant Luck.Carolina Sartorio - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):63-86.details
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Précis of Causation and free will.Carolina Sartorio - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (6):1513-1516.details
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Normative Verantwortung für Handlungen Anderer. Eine Untersuchung im Rahmen der stit -Theorie.Sarah Ganter & Heinrich Wansing - 2005 - Facta Philosophica 7 (2):167-187.details
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Making a Difference in a Deterministic World.Carolina Sartorio - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (2):189-214.details
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Flickers of Freedom and Moral Luck.Carolina Sartorio - 2019 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 43 (1):93-105.details
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A Partial Defense of the Actual-Sequence Model of Freedom.Carolina Sartorio - 2016 - The Journal of Ethics 20 (1-3):107-120.details
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A new asymmetry between actions and omissions.Carolina Sartorio - 2005 - Noûs 39 (3):460–482.details
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Actual Causes and Free Will.Carolina Sartorio - 2017 - Disputatio 9 (45):147-165.details
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Nudging in interpersonal contexts.Yashar Saghai - 2013 - American Journal of Bioethics 13 (6):33-34.details
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Rescatando los casos Mele/Robb.Pablo Rychter - 2018 - Quaderns de Filosofia 5 (1).details
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Rescuing Mele/Robb-Style Cases.Pablo Rychter - 2023 - Acta Analytica 38 (4):689-705.details
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Does Free Will Require Alternative Possibilities?Pablo Rychter - 2017 - Disputatio 9 (45):131-146.details
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Imitation, conscious will and social conditioning.Daniel Rueda Garrido - 2020 - Mind and Society 20 (1):85-102.details
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A conditional theory of trying.David-Hillel Ruben - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (1):271-287.details
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Raising Responsibility: Motherhood and Moral Luck.Sheryl Tuttle Ross - 2009 - Hypatia 24 (1):56-69.details
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Freedom as Satisfaction? A Critique of Frankfurt's Hierarchical Theory of Freedom.Christian F. Rostbøll - 2004 - SATS 5 (1):131-146.details
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Decision-Making and Self-Governing Systems.Adina L. Roskies - 2016 - Neuroethics 11 (3):245-257.details
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50 Years of responsibility without alternative possibilities: guest editors’ introduction.Jaster Romy & Keil Geert - 2022 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 65 (9):1143-1148.details
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Semikompatybilizm J. M. Fischera w kontekście alternatywnych możliwości działań.Krzysztof Rojek - 2015 - Idea. Studia Nad Strukturą I Rozwojem Pojęć Filozoficznych 27:177-197.details
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Causal deviance and the ascription of intent and blame.Ross Rogers, Mark D. Alicke, Sarah G. Taylor, David Rose, Teresa L. Davis & Dori Bloom - 2019 - Philosophical Psychology 32 (3):404-427.details
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The limits of limited-blockage Frankfurt-style cases.Michael Robinson - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (3):429-446.details
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Self-Inflicted Frankfurt-Style Cases and Flickers of Freedom.Michael Robinson - forthcoming - The Journal of Ethics:1-23.details
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Robust flickers of freedom.Michael Robinson - 2019 - Social Philosophy and Policy 36 (1):211-233.details
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Modified Frankfurt-type counterexamples and flickers of freedom.Michael Robinson - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (2):177-194.details
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Flickering the W‐Defense.Michael Robinson - 2023 - Philosophical Issues 33 (1):198-210.details
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