Traditional Compatibilism Reformulated and Defended

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Traditional compatibilism about free will is widely considered to be untenable. In particular, the conditional analysis of the ability to do otherwise appears to be subject to clear counterexamples. I will propose a new version of traditional compatibilism that provides a conditional account of both the ability to do otherwise and the ability to choose to do otherwise, and I will argue that this view withstands the standard objections to traditional compatibilism. For this, I will assume with incompatibilists that the mere possession of a general ability to do otherwise is not sufficient for having the ability that is required for free will. This concession distinguishes the view from the traditional conditional analysis and from recent dispositional accounts of the ability to do otherwise, and we will see that this concession enables a straightforward response to the counterexamples. This, in turn, will play a crucial role in my response to the strongest version of the consequence argument for incompatibilism.
ISBN(s)
1053-8364
PhilPapers/Archive ID
SCHTCR-8
Revision history
Archival date: 2016-08-22
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
Leviathan.Hobbes, Thomas

View all 42 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2016-08-22

Total views
504 ( #5,520 of 41,569 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
135 ( #3,068 of 41,569 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.