In this essay, I inquire into the attitudes and conduct toward other agents that go hand in hand with the admirable individual life, as depicted in the Zhuāngzǐ. How do agents adept in a Zhuangist approach to dào handle interpersonal relations? I suggest that on a broadly Zhuangist understanding, interpersonal ethics is simply a special case of competence or adroitness in applying dé (power, agency) and following dào (ways). The general ideal of exemplary activity is to employ our dé to (...) find a fitting, free-flowing dào by which to navigate through contingent, changing circumstances. Interpersonal ethics is an application of this ideal to cases in which other agents and our relations with them are prominent features of our circumstances. The ethics of interacting with others is thus not a distinct subject area in Zhuangist discourse but one application of more general views about dào, dé, and exemplary activity. Instead of wandering the way on our own, interactions with others present us with situations in which we must find our way together. An important consequence of the Zhuangist approach is that discussions of our conduct toward others are not framed in terms of doing what is morally right or permissible. Instead, judgments as to whether some course of action is morally right or wrong are supplanted by judgments about the quality of our activity as a performance of dào—whether it is adept or clumsy, free-flowing or obstructed, in accordance with the situation or at odds with it. This signal feature of Zhuangist ethical discourse makes it challenging to situate it with respect to more familiar ethical views. Although I will suggest the Zhuangist approach overlaps in certain respects with recent moral particularism, I argue that most likely it is distinct from, and amounts to a rejection of, nearly all familiar normative ethical theories, including consequentialism, deontology, virtue ethics, and contractualism. (shrink)

Placed in the first chapter of the Zhuangzi, the dialogue between Huizi and Zhuangzi about a giant gourd is a celebrated anecdote that, both for its structure and for the ideas it seems to mobilize, has aroused the interest of readers and, consequently, has also generated a wide variety of interpretations. While some scholars argue that the message is part of a framework of epistemological discussion, others point to perspectivism as the hermeneutical key to the passage, while others refer to (...) the idea of anti-anthropocentrism. Based on an analysis of the biographical elements that can be extracted from the story, the way in which the metaphor of useless gourds is used in the philosophical literature of the time and the central role played in it by the figure of the thinker-counsellor, this article reconsiders the story from an alternative angle that privileges a political perspective. (shrink)