Buddhist teachings and practices can be viewed as a journey of soteriological transformation, where language, as a tool for the analysis of views, occupies a place of special significance and importance. This article examines how the concept of non-duality, from the Madhyamaka perspective, has served as a powerful rhetorical device with the explicit aim of fostering soteriological transformation. Among the various expressions representative of the Madhyamaka perspective, two are particularly explored in this article for their facilitation of soteriological transformation: the (...) expression of ‘neither a dharma nor a not-dharma’ and the teaching that ‘one should let go even of dharmas, still more so not-dharmas’ . I argue that the Madhyamaka expression of ‘neither A nor not-A’ is hardly ever just about conforming to any linguistic conventions. It is about gaining liberation from linguistic conventions and unexamined remarks. (shrink)

The idea that insight is by nature incompatible with concentration has been a long-term focus of scholarly discussion regarding the interpretation of some sūtra passages that could suggest the occurrence of insight within concentration. In the Prajñāpāramitā literature, the set of three samādhis is identified with insight, the prajñāpāramitā. Some scholars identify the experience of emptiness in these samādhis with a state of concentration, very likely the absorption of extinction. I highlight elsewhere a passage in the Prajñāpāramitā in which preceding (...) vows play an important role in the practice of emptiness, that is, the prajñāpāramitā and may apply to the moment just before entering into the absorption of extinction. However, the problem of how the prajñāpāramitā is by nature incompatible with concentration could be practiced in the absorption of extinction remains. In the Sāgaramatiparipṛcchāsūtra there is a passage which illustrates the significance and effect of dedications preceding the practice of the three samādhis. According to this passage, the set of three samādhis is sometimes described as some very deep concentrations; at their emergence there could be two different attainments: either nirvāṇa or all-knowing accompanied by all qualities of the Buddha. This paper looks into the several steps immediately before the attainment of all-knowing by revealing a new usage of “dedications” in the Sāgaramatiparipṛcchāsūtra. (shrink)

In PV 3.440ab and 473cd–474ab, Dharmakīrti raises the argument of infinite regress twice. The argument originates from the same argument stated by Dignāga in his Pramāṇasamuccaya 1.12ab1, in which the fault of infinite regress is called aniṣṭhā. In Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti 1.12b2, Dignāga presents another type of argument of infinite regress driven by memory, which is elucidated by Dharmakīrtian commentators. The arguments were criticized by Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and Bhaṭṭa Jayanta and even more intensively so by two modern scholars, Jonardon Ganeri and Birgit (...) Kellner. In this paper, I first examine the source of the arguments—Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti 1.12 and its translation, based on which I provide my interpretation of the two models of arguments of infinite regress. I then offer my response, according to Dharmakīrti and his commentators, to Ganeri’s and Kellner’s critiques. By doing so, I attempt to identify the essence of these arguments is and find out to what extent one can defend the infinite regress argument in Dignāga’s and Dharmakīrti’s theory. (shrink)