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Freewill and Determinism: A Study of Rival Concepts of Man

Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 26 (1):131-133 (1968)

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Artificial Free Will: The Responsibility Strategy and Artificial Agents.Sven Delarivière - 2016 - Apeiron Student Journal of Philosophy (Portugal) 7:175-203.details Both a traditional notion of free will, present in human beings, and artificial intelligence are often argued to be inherently incompatible with determinism. Contrary to these criticisms, this paper defends that an account of free will compatible with determinism, the responsibility strategy (coined here) specifically, is a variety of free will worth wanting as well as a variety that is possible to (in principle) artificially construct. First, freedom will be defined and related to ethics. With that in mind, the two (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation
(1 other version)Scientific Beliefs about Oneself.Donald MacKay - 1970 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures 4:48-63.details In the never-ending debate about the scope and limits of science, the hottest argument now centres on the scientific study of man himself. Can there be a science of man at all, in any comprehensive sense? Or is the idea in some way ultimately self-defeating, like that of pulling oneself up by one's own shoelaces? My purpose in this paper is not to venture a direct answer to this ticklish question, but rather to highlight one or two desirable characteristics of (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 2 citations
(1 other version)Scientific Beliefs about Oneself.Donald MacKay - 1970 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 4:48-63.details In the never-ending debate about the scope and limits of science, the hottest argument now centres on the scientific study of man himself. Can there be a science of man at all, in any comprehensive sense? Or is the idea in some way ultimately self-defeating, like that of pulling oneself up by one's own shoelaces? My purpose in this paper is not to venture a direct answer to this ticklish question, but rather to highlight one or two desirable characteristics of (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
Freewill, Determinism and the Sciences.R. L. Franklin - 1983 - Diogenes 31 (123):50-68.details Philosophers and others have often debated whether we have freewill: i.e. whether (in a sense I shall try to elucidate) our power to choose between X and Y is radically undetermined, so that if we choose X we yet might have chosen Y, and vice versa. My concern is not with that question but with a hypothetical one which arises from it: if we had such freewill, what implications, if any, would, that fact have for the sciences. My argument concentrates (...) Download Export citation Bookmark

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