Supporters of political realism and republicanism as well as students of political feasibility and non-ideal theory progressively focus on the dimension of power in the political relation. Yet we lack the theoretical framework to represent these features of power. In this essay, I take a first step towards designing the necessary conceptual tools for such a framework by analyzing the relations between the concepts of power and normativity that define the political relation. Adopting a ‘methodological cynicism’, I analyse the reasons (...) that motivate cynics who are only interested in power to obey a norm against force or violence and to seek legitimacy. This allows us to characterize external or mediate relations between power and normativity (such as the relation underlying political theory’s ambition of offering normative guidance for power) and identify internal and immediate relations between power and normativity. (shrink)

Shmuel Nili’s Philosophizing The Indefensible – Strategic Political Theory represents a sophisticated response to the widespread support of political positions that seem unreasonable from the perspective of liberal political morality. Nili takes seriously extreme right-wing, pro-life, pro-business, and climate change-sceptic positions that other liberal theorists seem to prefer sweeping under the carpet when turning towards yet another puzzle of liberalism. This is a refreshing move, which Nili pursues masterfully through the critical analysis of such seemingly indefensible positions in painstaking detail. (...) That said, readers who are intrigued by the political philosophical methods of Charles Larmore and the late John Rawls, who accept the fact of reasonable moral disagreement and focus primarily on the question of political legitimacy, may sometimes find that Nili’s argumentations are somewhat moralistic. (shrink)

The growth of non-ideal theory and of political realism has had a profound influence on methodological inquiry in political philosophy. It is now the norm for authors defending ideal theory to take special care to show that it can relate to the real world in the right sort of way. Two recent books—David Estlund’s Utopophobia: On the Limits (If Any) of Political Philosophy ( 2020 ), and Ben Laurence’s Agents of Change: Political Philosophy in Practice ( 2021 )—fit this mold. (...) Both authors argue that ideal theory can be practical, and Estlund additionally argues that it can be valuable even if it lacks practical value. In this commentary, I argue that something important is missing from these defenses of ideal theory: they both fail to be realistic in a “second-order” way. I suggest that other recent work comes closer to meeting this standard. (shrink)

What is the appropriate role for the political philosopher in a democratic society? One possible answer to this question is that she should use her expertise to provide normative guidance for her community. My aim in this article is to cast significant doubt on this view. I begin by endorsing a ‘qualitative continuity’ thesis about the nature of political philosophy, which posits an essential crossover between the activities of professional philosophers and ordinary citizens. I then offer a contextual account of (...) scholarly expertise, which views it as a status that is dependent on institutional recognition – rather than knowledge – and involves relational role obligations. I move on to argue that the authority implied by scholarly expertise cannot properly be extended to the normative political domain of a community. I then reject some potential grounds upon which such an extension might be defended, before briefly considering what a rejection of normative expertise might mean for the professional political theorist in a democratic community. (shrink)