What kind of education is needed for democracy? How can education respond to the challenges that current democracies face? This unprecedented Handbook offers a comprehensive overview of the most important ideas, issues, and thinkers within democratic education. Its thirty chapters are written by leading experts in the field in an accessible format. Its breadth of purpose and depth of analysis will appeal to both researchers and practitioners in education and politics. The Handbook addresses not only the historical roots and philosophical (...) foundations of democratic education, but also engages with contemporary political issues and key challenges to the project of democratic education. (shrink)

When asking fundamental questions about education, philosophers have not shied away from giving radical answers. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, for example, who found himself disenchanted with the artificiality and pride that he encountered in 18th century Paris, advocated a laissez faire education in the countryside. Such an “education by nature,” Rousseau thought, would keep children at bay from morally corrupt society and would allow them to become authentic and sincere persons. Similarly concerned with moral education, in the early 20th century the American (...) pragmatist John Dewey argued that experiential learning in socially diverse settings would be crucial for nourishing democratic culture. Being a pragmatist, Dewey also maintained that educational philosophy should always concentrate on solving practical difficulties of contemporary social life, instead of dealing with idle intellectual puzzles. In this spirit, oriented towards educational practice, several philosophers of education and educational theorists have recently turned their attention to the ways in which education might help solving some of the pressing problems arising from globalization. This special issue of Global Justice: Theory Practice Rhetoric assembles the latest scholarship of some these philosophers and theorists on the topic of “Global Justice and Education” – a topic which until recently has been curiously neglected within the academic literature on global justice. Alejandra Boni (Technical University of Valencia) and Diana Carolina Velasco (University of Ibagué) analyze how power asymmetries in global knowledge production can give rise to epistemic injustices and explored how academics can collaborate with civil society actors to fight such injustices. Johannes Drerup (Technical University of Dortmund and Free University Amsterdam) responds to the postcolonial critique that global citizenship education is Western-centric by arguing that the dichotomy of “the West vs. the Rest” is outdated and that the critical study of colonialism should be part of global citizenship education. Juan Espíndola (National Autonomous University of Mexico) criticizes that low fee private schools in many developing countries often times do not provide an adequate education, and that global philanthropists should therefore be more careful in their support for these schools. Lindsey Schwartz (University of Wisconsin-Madison) discusses a number of problems that students living abroad face because two central principles of educational justice that are usually taken for granted at the national level either systematically overlook or exacerbate their problems. These two principles are the principle of educational adequacy and the presumption of responsibility on the part of a host country for meeting children’s educational needs. Due to their inappropriateness under conditions of globalization and, in particular, transnational migration, Schwartz demands a cosmopolitan revision of the first and a replacement for the second with a focus on collective responsibility. Finally, Danielle Zwarthoed (Catholic University of Louvain) critically examines the proposal that education for autonomy could be conceived of as a global educational aim, and points out that not only do non-Western cultures endorse the ideal of autonomy, but also that autonomy increasingly gains practical value in a world in which mobility is ubiquitous. -/- All paper drafts except that of Lindsey Schwartz have been subject to intensive debate during the two-day international workshop on “Global Justice In and Through Education,” held at the American University of Paris (AUP) on November 29 and 30, 2018. The international workshop was hosted by the Center for Critical Democracy Studies (CCDS) and was generously funded not only from the CCDS but also from the German Research Foundation (DFG). (shrink)

Power is a key concern of international politics, one that the discipline of International Relations has been carefully examining for decades. Political theorists, by contrast – or at least those working within the analytical tradition – have devoted comparatively little attention to the question of which exercises of power beyond borders are problematic. Instead, they have focused on global material deprivation and have elaborated increasingly sophisticated accounts of which principles should govern the distribution of natural and socio-economic resources across borders. (...) But why should we care so much about the distribution of material resources per se, when news that makes the headlines is all about power? (shrink)

The article shows the interlacement of political philosophy and philosophy of education by justifying educational justice as central normative ground for analyzing educational policies as well as by defending a democratic conception of educational justice. In order to ground the importance of the concept of educational justice, the article explains the shortcomings of the alternative – functionalist and liberal perfectionist – normative grounds of educational policy. Then, the article develops a democratic conception of educational justice by first of all criticizing (...) the liberal conception of equal educational opportunity on the ground that it implicitly accepts as valid the socially existing understanding of educational success. Based on this critique the article defends a democratic conception of educational justice that demands the institutionalization of educational practices that prepare students to define themselves as democratic citizens what educational success should mean. (shrink)

Philosophical debates about educational justice concern the justification, the contents, and the realization of rights to education, and they take place at the intersection of political philosophy and philosophy of education. On the one hand, theorists of educational justice turn to conceptions of justice within political philosophy and use them as normative foundations when developing their conceptions of educational justice. On the other hand, they draw on conceptions of moral and political education within philosophy of education to show how persons (...) would eventually adopt and develop attitudes, knowledge, and skills that are needed to build and maintain a just social and political order. Due to this close interlacement between political philosophy and philosophy of education, it is apt to use the label political philosophy of education or philosophy of political education to characterize this distinctive field of philosophical research. Despite this interlacement, however, the intense and wide-ranging debates on global justice within contemporary political philosophy have hardly influenced the current debates on educational justice. The aim of this article is to transcend the national framing of the current discussion on educational justice by presenting a democratic conception of global educational justice. (shrink)

This article will show that the work of international development organizations requires a constant reflection of the moral and political philosophical kind. A major reason for this is that while people agree that the abstract concept of development, in its normative usage, indeed, simply means social progress or good, or desirable, social change, they disagree profoundly about what social progress consists in exactly. There exists a normative disagreement about the conception of development that expresses best how social progress ought to (...) be defined in concrete terms. For example, should we really think of social progress only in terms of economic growth, i.e. in the accumulation of goods and services? Or should we instead, for example, think of it in terms of the eradication of extreme poverty? Or in terms of yet something else, like the expansion of options for human choice? (shrink)

Interview of Katrin Flikschuh, Rainer Forst and Darrel Moellendorf by Valentin Beck and Julian Culp for Global Justice: Theory Practice Rhetoric.

In this article Julian Culp offers a new conceptualization of democratic citizenship education in light of the transformations of contemporary Western societies to which the use of digital technologies has contributed. His conceptualization adopts a deliberative understanding of democracy that provides a systemic perspective on society-wide communicative arrangements and employs a nonideal, critical methodology that concentrates on overcoming democratic deficits. Based on this systemic, deliberative conception of democracy, Culp provides an analysis of the public sphere's normative deficits and argues that (...) current political communication may be systemically distorted. Drawing on this analysis, he suggests that practices of democratic citizenship education in digitized societies must not concentrate narrowly on the effective and responsible use of digital technologies. Instead, these practices should also focus on the economic and cultural conditions that are co-responsible for the structural problems of political communication as well as address the democratic deficits that are reflected in inadequate communicative arrangements. (shrink)

Rising powers are fundamentally shifting the relations of power in the global economic and political landscape. International political theory, however, has so far failed to evaluate this nascent multipolarity. This article fills this lacuna by synthesizing empirical and normative modes of inquiry. It examines the transformation of sovereignty exercised by emerging democracies and focuses especially on the case of Brazil. The paper shows that – in stark contrast to emerging democracies’ foreign policy rhetoric – the ‘softening’ of sovereignty, which means (...) that emerging powers gain as well as lose certain aspects of sovereignty, has become the norm. The paper explores this softening of sovereignty from the perspective of global justice by assessing it on the basis of globalist, statist, and internationalist conceptions of global justice. We find that the emergent multipolarity contributes in various ways to the realization of the distinct socioeconomic and political criteria of these three conceptions of global justice. However, we also point out that the transformation of sovereignty generates particular problems for the realization of all three conceptions. (shrink)

This article explores the contribution of Jürgen Habermas’ discourse theory of morality, politics, and law to theorizing educational justice. First, it analyzes Christopher Martin’s discourse-ethical argument that the development of citizens’ discursive agency is required on epistemic grounds. The article criticizes this argument and claims that the moral importance of developing discursive agency should be justified instead on the basis of moral grounds. Second, the article examines Harvey Siegel’s critique of Habermas’ moral epistemology and suggests that Siegel neglects that the (...) epistemic justification of moral claims proceeds differently from the epistemic justification of assertoric claims. Finally, the article presents a discourse-theoretic conception of educational justice that defends the importance of discursively justifying norms of educational justice through properly arranged structures of justification. (shrink)

Axel Honneth’s most recent book, Freedom’s Right: The Social Foundations of Democratic Life, is an ambitious and thought-provoking work of social and political theory. Its main impetus is to provide a Hegelian reading of contemporary Western societies – and thus, so to speak, an actualisation of Hegel’s Philosophy of right. Readers of Honneth’s writings will recognise the hallmark of his previous work. He is committed, more than ever, to a Hegelian lens through which he pursues a methodology that explicitly blends (...) normative argumentation and social theory, a method Honneth refers to as normative reconstruction. Similarly to his approach in The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflict (Honneth, 1996), Honneth (2014: 125) focuses on a single notion – this time it is freedom – through which he develops a theory of justice on the basis of an adaptation of Hegel’s three ‘ethical spheres’ (the family, the market, and the state). (shrink)

Thomas Pogge absolvierte ein Ph.D.-Programm in Philosophie an der Harvard University und wurde dort von John Rawls betreut. Seine Dissertation argumentierte für die Extension Rawls’ Gerechtigkeitstheorie auf globale Verhältnisse. Pogges globale Gerechtigkeitstheorie betrachtet weltweite sozioökonomische Armut als strukturelles Problem für das insbesondere reiche Länder und deren Regierungen verantwortlich sind. In der Ausarbeitung seiner eigenen, politisch-liberalen Theorie internationaler Gerechtigkeit kritisierte Rawls Pogges Auffassung globaler Gerechtigkeit. Pogge wiederum hat in methodologischen Debatten Rawls’ politische Philosophie für deren Fokus auf die Grundstruktur und Grundgüter (...) verteidigt. (shrink)

Rising powers are fundamentally shifting the relations of power in the global economic and political landscape. International political theory, however, has so far failed to evaluate this nascent multipolarity. This article fills this lacuna by synthesizing empirical and normative modes of inquiry. It examines the transformation of sovereignty exercised by emerging democracies and focuses especially on the case of Brazil. The paper shows that – in stark contrast to emerging democracies’ foreign policy rhetoric – the ‘softening’ of sovereignty, which means (...) that emerging powers gain as well as lose certain aspects of sovereignty, has become the norm. The paper explores this softening of sovereignty from the perspective of global justice by assessing it on the basis of globalist, statist, and internationalist conceptions of global justice. We find that the emergent multipolarity contributes in various ways to the realization of the distinct socioeconomic and political criteria of these three conceptions of global justice. However, we also point out that the transformation of sovereignty generates particular problems for the realization of all three conceptions. (shrink)

In this article I argue that G.A. Cohen is mistaken in his belief that the concept of justice needs to be rescued from constructivist theorists of justice. In doing so, I rely on insights of John Rawls’ later work Political Liberalism and Rainer Forst’s discourse theory of justice. Such critical engagement with Cohen’s critique of constructivism is needed, because Cohen bases his critique of constructivism almost exclusively on Rawls’s arguments and positions in A Theory of Justice. He thus neglects - (...) at least by and large - that Rawls had further developed his constructivist method of justification in his later work Political Liberalism, as well as that Forst’s discourse-theoretical works offer elaborate versions of constructivism. These refined versions of constructivism recognize a plurality of reasonable conceptions of ideal justice and draw an important distinction between moral and political constructivism. Because of these features these advanced constructivist theories are not in need of Cohen’s rescue. (shrink)

The practice-independent approach to theorizing justice holds that the social practices to which a particular conception of justice is meant to apply are of no importance for the justification of such a conception. In this paper I argue that this approach to theorizing justice is incompatible with the method of reflective equilibrium because the MRE is antithetical to a clean separation between issues of justification and application. In particular I will be maintaining that this incompatibility renders Simon Caney’s cosmopolitan theory (...) of global justice inconsistent, because Caney claims to endorse both a humanity-centered PIA and the MRE. (shrink)

Global justice is a nearly all-encompassing concept, which not only permits, but makes it mandatory, to reflect upon its importance in the most diverse areas of global politics – trade, migration and tax regulation, for instance. Unsurprisingly, then, most theorists of global justice have analyzed the import of their conception for the practice of development aid/cooperation. Additionally, some also have argued that justice represents the most relevant normative concept for spelling out as to how to understand development. -/- However, there (...) are many lacunae in this field of research. The continuing criticisms that the existing theories of global distributive justice entail a parochial justification of the development practice and an insufficiently democratic understanding of development demand a revisiting of these theories. Moreover, very little scholarly attention has been devoted so far to the fact that the criteria that are employed to allocate official development assistance may lack a sound normative justification. In addition, new research in development economics on the question as to how to best explain global economic inequality promises to shed new light on moral questions regarding the proper kind of ascription of moral responsibilities for reducing this inequality. And finally, on a more practical level, few theorists of global justice made explicit contributions to the ongoing deliberations about the post-2015 development agenda. -/- The special issue of the journal Global Justice: Theory Practice Rhetoric aims to contribute to filling the existing research gaps concerning the various linkages between global justice and the theory and practice of development. (shrink)

The evidence of laboratory experiments of behavioral economists shows that individuals behave reciprocally. These data put into question the pure self-interest thesis of human motivation of the homo oeconomicus model and call for alternative models. Focusing on the explanation of reciprocal behavior in Trust Games, this article proposes two directions that economists and other social scientists might want to consider in order to establish a more solid foundation for economic theory. First, it presents models that economic theorists developed to explain (...) the laboratory evidence of reciprocal behavior. It highlights that all of these models subscribe to the Humean view that desires are at the source of any human motivation and suggests an alternative Kantian model where reasons have the capacity to motivate human action. Second, it emphasizes that a supplementary examination of the social background conditions would illuminate the analysis of the findings because of the connection between the 'local' and society-wide demands of reciprocity. (shrink)

It may seem obvious that recognizing people’s human rights involves freeing them from poverty and thereby allowing them to exercise their agency. On closer inspection, however, it is not at all clear what recognizing people’s human rights, freeing them from poverty, and respecting their agency requires. Diana Meyers’s nice collection of essays carefully examines the meanings and practical normative implications of poverty, agency, and human rights in a way that points out various conceptual connections and potential practical dilemmas. The authors (...) consider, for instance, ways in which fighting poverty can compromise, as well as promote, aspects of women’s agency. They also consider how we can respect migrants’ human rights to take up decent jobs abroad without worsening their children’s experience of poverty back home. One general strand of argument running through the papers is that the narrow focus on individual agency and responsibility for harms is misplaced in our globalizing world. Recognizing this fact may better help us achieve global justice. (shrink)