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  1. Logic of paradoxes in classical set theories.Boris Čulina - 2013 - Synthese 190 (3):525-547.
    According to Cantor (Mathematische Annalen 21:545–586, 1883 ; Cantor’s letter to Dedekind, 1899 ) a set is any multitude which can be thought of as one (“jedes Viele, welches sich als Eines denken läßt”) without contradiction—a consistent multitude. Other multitudes are inconsistent or paradoxical. Set theoretical paradoxes have common root—lack of understanding why some multitudes are not sets. Why some multitudes of objects of thought cannot themselves be objects of thought? Moreover, it is a logical truth that such multitudes do (...)
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  • (1 other version)Zermelo: definiteness and the universe of definable sets.Heinz-Dieter Ebbinghaus - 2003 - History and Philosophy of Logic 24 (3):197-219.
    Using hitherto unpublished manuscripts from the Zermelo Nachlass, I describe the development of the notion of definiteness and the discussion about it, giving a conclusive picture of Zermelo's thoughts up to the late thirties. As it turns out, Zermelo's considerations about definiteness are intimately related to his concept of a Cantorian universe of categorically definable sets that may be considered an inner model of set theory in an ideationally given universe of classes.
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  • Brouwer and Fraenkel on intuitionism.Dirk van Dalen - 2000 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 6 (3):284-310.
    In the present paper the story is told of the brief and far from tranquil encounter of L.E.J. Brouwer and A. Fraenkel. The relationship which started in perfect harmony, ended in irritation and reproaches.The mutual appreciation at the outset is beyond question. All the more deplorable is the sudden outbreak of an emotional disagreement in 1927. Looking at the Brouwer–Fraenkel episode, one should keep in mind that at that time the so-called Grundlagenstreit was in full swing. An emotional man like (...)
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  • Zermelo and the Skolem paradox.Dirk Van Dalen & Heinz-Dieter Ebbinghaus - 2000 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 6 (2):145-161.
    On October 4, 1937, Zermelo composed a small note entitled “Der Relativismus in der Mengenlehre und der sogenannte Skolemsche Satz” in which he gives a refutation of “Skolem's paradox”, i.e., the fact that Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory—guaranteeing the existence of uncountably many sets—has a countable model. Compared with what he wished to disprove, the argument fails. However, at a second glance, it strongly documents his view of mathematics as based on a world of objects that could only be grasped adequately by (...)
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  • A renaissance of empiricism in the recent philosophy of mathematics.Imre Lakatos - 1976 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 27 (3):201-223.
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  • Developing arithmetic in set theory without infinity: some historical remarks.Charles Parsons - 1987 - History and Philosophy of Logic 8 (2):201-213.
    In this paper some of the history of the development of arithmetic in set theory is traced, particularly with reference to the problem of avoiding the assumption of an infinite set. Although the standard method of singling out a sequence of sets to be the natural numbers goes back to Zermelo, its development was more tortuous than is generally believed. We consider the development in the light of three desiderata for a solution and argue that they can probably not all (...)
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