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  1. Against Grue Mysteries.Alexandra Zinke - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (4):1023-1033.
    The paper develops an inductive extension of AGM-style belief base revision theory with the aim of formally implementing Freitag’s :254–267, 2015, Dialectica 70:185–200, 2016) solution to Goodman’s paradox. It shows that the paradox dissolves once belief revision takes place on inductively closed belief bases, rather than on belief sets.
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  • Epistemic Justification: Its Subjective and its Objective Ways.Wolfgang Spohn - 2018 - Synthese 195 (9):3837-3856.
    Objective standards for justification or for being a reason would be desirable, but inductive skepticism tells us that they cannot be presupposed. Rather, we have to start from subjective-relative notions of justification and of being a reason. The paper lays out the strategic options we have given this dilemma. The paper explains the requirements for this subject-relative notion and how they may be satisfied. Then it discusses four quite heterogeneous ways of providing more objective standards, which combine without guaranteeing complete (...)
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  • Counterfactuals and the 'Grue-Speaker'.Alfred Schramm - manuscript
    Freitag (2015) and Schramm (2014) have proposed different, although converging, solutions of Goodman’s New Riddle of Induction. Answering their proposals, Dorst (2016 and 2018) has used the fictitious character of a ‘grue-speaker’ as his principal device for criticizing counterfactual-based treatments of the Riddle. In this paper, I argue that Dorst’s arguments fail: On the observation of no other than green emeralds, the ‘grue-speaker’ cannot use the symmetry between the ‘green’- and ‘grue’-languages for claiming ‘grue’- instead of ‘green’-evidence, and the counterfactuals (...)
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  • Bet Accepted: A Reply to Freitag.Christopher Dorst - 2018 - Philosophical Quarterly 68 (270):175-183.
    Wolfgang Freitag claims to have developed a proposal that solves Goodman's famous New Riddle of Induction. His proposal makes use of the notion of ‘derivative defeat’; the claim is that in certain circumstances, the projection of some predicates is derivatively defeated, i.e., it is inductively invalid. Freitag develops the proposal using some compelling examples, and then shows that it likewise applies to the argument at the basis of the New Riddle. There, he alleges, the projection of ‘grue’ is derivatively defeated, (...)
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  • Why Doxastic Dependence Defeats Grue: A Response to Dorst's Reply.Wolfgang Freitag - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (274):156-165.
    In a recent paper on Goodman's paradox, I have argued that ‘grue’ is unprojectible because the grue-evidence is doxastically dependent on the evidence that the samples are examined before t. Christopher Dorst replies that doxastic dependence is unable to yield a language-independent asymmetry with respect to ‘green’ and ‘grue’ and hence cannot resolve Goodman's paradox. In this response I hope to show that Dorst's considerations are flawed: his argument for the language-relativity of doxastic dependence is inconclusive at best—even if his (...)
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  • The Disjunctive Riddle and the Grue‐Paradox.Wolfgang Freitag - 2016 - Dialectica 70 (2):185-200.
    The paper explores the disjunctive riddle for induction: If we know the sample Ks to be P, we also know that they are P or F. Assuming that we also know that the future Ks are non-P, we can conclude that they are F, if only we can inductively infer the evidentially supported P-or-F hypothesis. Yet this is absurd. We cannot predict that future Ks are F based on the knowledge that the samples, and only they, are P. The ensuing (...)
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