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  1. Dressing vs. Fixing: On How to Extract and Interpret Gauge-Invariant Content.P. Berghofer & J. François - 2024 - Foundations of Physics 54 (6):1-26.
    There is solid consensus among physicists and philosophers that, in gauge field theory, for a quantity to be physically meaningful or real, it must be gauge-invariant. Yet, every “elementary” field in the Standard Model of particle physics is actually gauge-variant. This has led a number of researchers to insist that new manifestly gauge-invariant approaches must be established. Indeed, in the foundational literature, dissatisfaction with standard methods for reducing gauge symmetries has been expressed: Spontaneous symmetry breaking is deemed conceptually dubious, while (...)
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  • Weyl׳s search for a difference between ‘physical’ and ‘mathematical’ automorphisms.Erhard Scholz - 2018 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 61 (C):57-67.
    During his whole scientific life Hermann Weyl was fascinated by the interrelation of physical and mathematical theories. From the mid 1920s onward he reflected also on the typical difference between the two epistemic fields and tried to identify it by comparing their respective automorphism structures. In a talk given at the end of the 1940s he gave the most detailed and coherent discussion of his thoughts on this topic. This paper presents his arguments in the talk and puts it in (...)
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  • Is there a Bayesian justification of hypothetico‐deductive inference?Samir Okasha & Karim Thébault - 2020 - Noûs 54 (4):774-794.
    Many philosophers have claimed that Bayesianism can provide a simple justification for hypothetico-deductive inference, long regarded as a cornerstone of the scientific method. Following up a remark of van Fraassen, we analyze a problem for the putative Bayesian justification of H-D inference in the case where what we learn from observation is logically stronger than what our theory implies. Firstly, we demonstrate that in such cases the simple Bayesian justification does not necessarily apply. Secondly, we identify a set of sufficient (...)
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  • Artificial versus Substantial Gauge Symmetries: A Criterion and an Application to the Electroweak Model.Jordan François - 2019 - Philosophy of Science 86 (3):472-496.
    To systematically answer the generalized Kretschmann objection, I propose a mean to make operational a criterion widely recognized as allowing one to decide whether the gauge symmetry of a theory is artificial or substantial. My proposition is based on the dressing field method of gauge symmetry reduction, a new simple tool from mathematical physics. This general scheme allows one in particular to straightforwardly argue that the notion of spontaneous symmetry breaking is superfluous to the empirical success of the electroweak theory. (...)
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