Crispin Wright has given an explanation of how a first time warrant can fall short of transmitting across a known entailment. Formal epistemologists have struggled to turn Wright’s informal explanation into cogent Bayesian reasoning. In this paper, I analyse two Bayesian models of Wright’s account respectively proposed by Samir Okasha and Jake Chandler. I argue that both formalizations are unsatisfactory for different reasons, and I lay down a third Bayesian model that appears to me to capture the valid (...) kernel of Wright’s explanation. After this, I consider a recent development in Wright’s account of transmission failure. Wright suggests that his condition sufficient for transmission failure of first time warrant also suffices for transmission failure of supplementary warrant. I propose an interpretation of Wright’s suggestion that shield it from objections. I then lay down a fourth Bayesian framework that provides a simplified model of the unified explanation of transmission failure envisaged by Wright. (shrink)

I offer a concise critique of a recurring line of reasoning advanced by Joseph LaPorte and Samir Okasha that all modern species concepts render the view that biological organisms essentially belong to their species empirically untenable. The argument, I claim, trades on a crucial modal ambiguity that collapses the de re/de dicto distinction. Contra their claim that the continued adherence of such a view on behalf of contemporary metaphysicians stems from the latter’s ignorance of developments in modern biology, (...) the modal ambiguity reveals the need to retrain in modal metaphysics. (shrink)

A platitude that took hold with Kuhn is that there can be several equally good ways of balancing theoretical virtues for theory choice. Okasha recently modelled theory choice using technical apparatus from the domain of social choice: famously, Arrow showed that no method of social choice can jointly satisfy four desiderata, and each of the desiderata in social choice has an analogue in theory choice. Okasha suggested that one can avoid the Arrow analogue for theory choice by employing (...) a strategy used by Sen in social choice, namely, to enhance the information made available to the choice algorithms. I argue here that, despite Okasha’s claims to the contrary, the information-enhancing strategy is not compelling in the domain of theory choice. (shrink)

We propose to simplify the problem of the unified theory of Quantum-Gravity through dealing first with the simple case of non-relativistic equations of Gravity and Quantum Mechanics. We show that unification of the two non-relativistic formalisms can be achieved through the joined classical and Quantum postulate that every natural body is composed of N identical final particles. This includes the current 'elementary' particles of the standard model such as quarks, photons, gluons, etc. Furthermore, we show that this opens a new (...) route toward a Generalized Equation of Quantum-Gravity that takes the effects of both of velocity and acceleration into account. (shrink)

The debate about the levels of selection has been one of the most controversial both in evolutionary biology and in philosophy of science. Okasha’s book makes the sort of contribution that simply will not be able to be ignored by anyone interested in this field for many years to come. However, my interest here is in highlighting some examples of how Okasha goes about discussing his material to suggest that his book is part of an increasingly interesting trend (...) that sees scientists and philosophers coming together to build a broadened concept of “theory” through a combination of standard mathematical treatments and conceptual analyses. Given the often contentious history of the relationship between philosophy and science, such trend cannot but be welcome. (shrink)

قراءة وتعليق لكتاب (فهم الإسلام في اليابان) للأستاذ الدكتور سمير نوح. يقع الكتاب في 256 صفحة من القطع المتوسط، ويتألف من مقدمة ومدخل وستة فصول، تتناول في مجملها طبيعة فهم اليابانيين للأديان بصفة عامة، وللدين الإسلامي بصفة خاصة، وفعاليات العلاقات العربية الإسلامية اليابانية منذ بدايتها وحتى وقتنا الراهن في معية المتغيرات الدولية المؤثرة، وطبيعة حياة المسلمين في اليابان: قضاياهم ومشكلاتهم وطموحاتهم، فضلاً عن أنشطة الجامعات اليابانية ومراكز البحوث والأكاديميين اليابانيين في مجال التعريف بالإسلام وبثقافته وحضارته. وتكمن أهمية الكتاب في كونه (...) يمثل مصدرًا ثريًا للقارئ العربي المهتم بالشأن الياباني مقارنة بالوضع الحضاري للعالم العربي – الإسلامي، بالإضافة إلى ما يحمله بين جنباته من إجابات لتساؤلات تؤرق بالضرورة كل من سمع أو عايش أو قرأ عن التجربة اليابانية. (shrink)

ليس من السهل شرح تعبير «الأصولية الإسلامية»، لأنه – فيما أعتقد – تعبير لا علاقة له بالمسلمين؛ لأننا إن تحدثنا عن إسلام أصولي، فمعنى ذلك أن لدينا إسلامًا غير أصولي. من المؤكد أن بين المسلمين من يؤمنون بالمبادئ الأساسية للإسلام، وأن من بينهم من لا يؤمنون بها. وبنظرة سريعة إلى العالم المسلم – ماضيه وحاضره - يتضح لنا أنه لا يوجد، ولم يوجد، بين المسلمين مجموعة أو فرقة تُسمي نفسها «أصولية». والحق أنني لا أعرف أية مجموعة أو فرقة إسلامية تُطلق (...) هذا الاسم على مجموعة أو فرقة أخرى. لذا فإن ما نراه اليوم لا يخرج عن أن بعض رواد العلمانية من الغربيين والأمريكيين قد نظروا إلى الإسلام أو إلى بعض المجموعات الإسلامية من خلال صورة الأصوليين في مجتمعاتهم. هكذا يبدو أنه ما من أحد في العالم الإسلامي يستحضر اسم «الإسلام» خارج المساجد إلا وسُمى «أصوليًا إسلاميًا»، وكلما وحيثما وُجدت مجموعة إسلامية تُصارع من أجل بقائها أو حقوقها الإنسانية الأساسية أُطلق عليها «أصولية إسلامية». (shrink)

In this dissertation, I present a novel account of the components that have a peculiar epistemic role in our scientific inquiries, since they contribute to establishing a form of coordination. The issue of coordination is a classic epistemic problem concerning how we justify our use of abstract conceptual tools to represent concrete phenomena. For instance, how could we get to represent universal gravitation as a mathematical formula or temperature by means of a numerical scale? This problem is particularly pressing when (...) justification for using these abstract tools comes, in part or entirely, from knowledge which is not independent from them, thus leading to threats of circularity. Achieving coordination between some abstract conceptual tools and the concrete phenomena that they are supposed to represent is usually a complex process, which involves several epistemic components. Some of these components eventually provide stable conditions for applying those abstract representations to concrete phenomena. It is in this sense of providing certain conditions of applicability that different philosophical traditions, as well as some contemporary reappraisals, view these components as constitutive or a priori. In this work, I present a new gradualist, contextualist, and relational approach to understand these constitutive components of scientific inquiry. It is gradualist inasmuch as the degree to which some component is constitutive depends on three quantifiable features: quasi-axiomaticity, generative potential, and empirical shielding. Since the quantification of these three features impinges on the history and practice of using these components in a scientific context, my approach is a contextualist one. Finally, my approach is relational in a double sense: first, it identifies ordinal relationships among epistemic components with respect to their constitutive character; second, these relationships are relative to a scientific framework of inquiry. After introducing my account and a classic example of constitutively a priori principles, i.e., Friedman’s (2001) analysis of Newtonian mechanics, I turn to my own case studies to demonstrate the advantages of my approach. Firstly, I discuss Okasha’s (2018) view of endogenization as a pervasive theoretical strategy in evolutionary biology and suggest that the constitutive character of the core Darwinian principles progressively increases with endogenization. Secondly, I apply a conceptual distinction between two varieties or scopes of coordination – general coordination and coordination in measurement – to Ohm’s work on electrical conductivity. This distinction allows me to pinpoint to what extent components along different dimensions (e.g., instrumentation, measurement, theorising, etc.) were constitutive of the forms of coordination which Ohm relied on. Thirdly, I discuss the epistemic function of the Hardy-Weinberg principle in the history and practice of population genetics. I assess this principle in terms of my account and identify approximation and stability as two components that are highly constitutive, in that they contribute to justifying its use in population genetics. Finally, applying my account to these case studies enables me to identify at least three qualitatively different types of constitutive components: domain-specific theoretical principles, material components, and domain-independent assumptions underlying reasoning abilities. In the light of my results, I draw some general conclusions on epistemic justification and scientific knowledge. (shrink)