We give an example of a theory that strongly maximizes over ZFC and discuss possible consequences of this finding.

In addition to this being the centenary of Kurt Gödel’s birth, January marked 75 years since the publication (1931) of his stunning incompleteness theorems. Though widely known in one form or another by practicing mathematicians, and generally thought to say something fundamental about the limits and potentialities of mathematical knowledge, the actual importance of these results for mathematics is little understood. Nor is this an isolated example among famous results. For example, not long ago, Philip Davis wrote me about what (...) he calls The Paradox of Irrelevance: “There are many math problems that have achieved the cachet of tremendous significance, e.g. Fermat, 4 color, Kepler’s packing, Gödel, etc. Of Fermat, I have read: ‘the most famous math problem of all time.’ Of Gödel, I have read: ‘the most mathematically significant achievement of the 20th century.’ … Yet, these problems have engaged the attention of relatively few research mathematicians—even in pure math.” What accounts for this disconnect between fame and relevance? Before going into the question for Gödel’s theorems, it should be distinguished in one respect from the other examples mentioned, which in any case form quite a mixed bag. Namely, each of the Fermat, 4 color, and Kepler’s packing problems posed a stand-out challenge following extended efforts to settle them; meeting the challenge in each case required new ideas or approaches and intense work, obviously of different degrees. By contrast, Gödel’s theorems were simply unexpected, and their proofs, though requiring novel techniques, were not difficult on the scale of things. Setting that aside, my view of Gödel’s incompleteness theorems is that their relevance to mathematical logic (and its offspring in the theory of computation) is paramount; further, their philosophical relevance is significant, but in just what way is far from settled; and finally, their mathematical relevance outside of logic is very much unsubstantiated but is the object of ongoing, tantalizing efforts.. (shrink)

The article deals with the question of in which sense the notion of explanation can be applied to Kurt Gödel’s philosophy of mathematics. Gödel, as a mathematical realist, claims that in mathematics we are dealing with facts that have an objective character. One of these facts is the solvability of all well-formulated mathematical problems—and this fact requires a clarification. The assumptions on which Gödel’s position is based are: metaphysical realism: there is a mathematical universe, it is objective and independent of (...) us; epistemological optimism: we are equipped with sufficient cognitive power to gain insight into the universe. Gödel’s concept of a solution to a mathematical problem is much broader than of a mathematical proof—it is rather about finding reliable axioms that lead to a solution of the problem. I analyse the problem presented in the article, taking as an example the continuum hypothesis. (shrink)

Maddy's (1990) arguments against Aggregate Theory were undermined by the shift in her position in 1997. The present paper considers Aggregate Theory in the light of this, and the recent search for `New Axioms for Mathematics'. If Set Theory is the part-whole theory of singletons, then identifying singletons with their single members collapses Set Theory into Aggregate Theory. But if singletons are not identical to their single members, then they are not extensional objects and so are not a basis for (...) Science. Either way, the Continuum Hypothesis has no physical interest. (shrink)

Despite some discomfort with this grandly philosophical topic, I do in fact hope to address a venerable pair of philosophical chestnuts: mathematical truth and existence. My plan is to set out three possible stands on these issues, for an exercise in compare and contrast.' A word of warning, though, to philosophical purists (and perhaps of comfort to more mathematical readers): I will explore these philosophical positions with an eye to their interconnections with some concrete issues of set theoretic method.

Leon Horsten has recently claimed that the class of mathematical truths coincides with the class of theorems of ZFC. I argue that the naturalistic character of Horsten’s proposal undermines his contention that this claim constitutes an analogue of a thesis that Daniel Isaacson has advanced for PA. I argue, moreover, that Horsten’s defence of his claim against an obvious objection makes use of a distinction which is not available to him given his naturalistic approach. I suggest a way out of (...) the objection which is in line with the naturalistic spirit of Horsten’s proposal but which further weakens the analogy with Isaacson’s Thesis. I conclude by evaluating the prospects for providing an analogue of Isaacson’s Thesis for ZFC. (shrink)

Can a scientific naturalist be a mathematical realist? I review some arguments, derived largely from the writings of Penelope Maddy, for a negative answer. The rejoinder from the realist side is that the irrealist cannot explain, as well as the realist can, why a naturalist should grant the mathematician the degree of methodological autonomy that the irrealist's own arguments require. Thus a naturalist, as such, has at least as much reason to embrace mathematical realism as to embrace irrealism.