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  1. Phenomenal Knowledge, Imagination, and Hermeneutical Injustice.Martina Fürst - 2024 - In Íngrid Vendrell-Ferran & Christiana Werner (eds.), Imagination and Experience: Philosophical Explorations. New York, NY: Routledge.
    In this paper, I analyze the role of phenomenal knowledge in understanding the experiences of the victims of hermeneutical injustice. In particular, I argue that understanding that is enriched by phenomenal knowledge is a powerful tool to mitigate hermeneutical injustice. I proceed as follows: Firstly, I investigate the requirements for a full understanding of the experiences at the center of hermeneutical injustice and I argue that phenomenal knowledge is key to full understanding. Secondly, I distinguish between direct phenomenal knowledge and (...)
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  • Socially disruptive technologies and epistemic injustice.J. K. G. Hopster - 2024 - Ethics and Information Technology 26 (1):1-8.
    Recent scholarship on technology-induced ‘conceptual disruption’ has spotlighted the notion of a conceptual gap. Conceptual gaps have also been discussed in scholarship on epistemic injustice, yet up until now these bodies of work have remained disconnected. This article shows that ‘gaps’ of interest to both bodies of literature are closely related, and argues that a joint examination of conceptual disruption and epistemic injustice is fruitful for both fields. I argue that hermeneutical marginalization—a skewed division of hermeneutical resources, which serves to (...)
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  • Phänomenale Begriffe.Martina Fürst - 2024 - In Vera Hoffmann-Kolss & Nicole Rathgeb (eds.), Handbuch Philosophie des Geistes. J.B. Metzler. pp. 1-11..
    Viele unserer Bewusstseinszustände sind dadurch charakterisiert, dass es irgendwie für uns ist (Nagel 1974), in diesen Zuständen zu sein. In der Philosophie des Geistes werden derartige Zustände als ‚phänomenale Zustände‘ bezeichnet. ‚Phänomenale Begriffe‘ sind nun spezielle Begriffe, mittels derer wir uns auf phänomenale Zustände beziehen. Paradigmatische Beispiele für phänomenale Zustände, von denen wir einen phänomenalen Begriff besitzen können, sind das bewusste Erlebnis, die Farbe Blau zu sehen, den Klang einer Violine zu hören oder Schmerz zu fühlen. Zentral ist, dass sich (...)
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  • Implicit Bias and Qualiefs.Martina Fürst - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-34.
    In analyzing implicit bias, one key issue is to clarify its metaphysical nature. In this paper, I develop a novel account of implicit bias by highlighting a particular kind of belief-like state that is partly constituted by phenomenal experiences. I call these states ‘qualiefs’ for three reasons: qualiefs draw upon qualitative experiences of what an object seems like to attribute a property to this very object, they share some of the distinctive features of proper beliefs, and they also share some (...)
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  • Simulation, imagination and justification.Christiana Werner - forthcoming - Analysis.
    According to an epistemically optimistic view of empathy – understood as the simulation of another person’s state – agents learn (1) in which state the target is and (2) what it is like for her to be in this state. Assuming the necessity of justification for knowledge, this view faces the challenge of how imagination can justify beliefs. Constraining simulation to match the target’s state seems to be a solution. Because of the abundance of plausible psychological reactions towards a specific (...)
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  • Knowing What It Is Like.Yuri Cath - 2024 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    What kind of knowledge does one have when one knows what it is like to, say, fall in love, eat vegemite™, be a parent, or ride a bike? This Element addresses this question by exploring the tension between two plausible theses about this form of knowledge: (i) that to possess it one must have had the corresponding experience, and (ii) that to possess it one must know an answer to the 'what it is like' question. The Element shows how the (...)
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  • Imagination and Experience.Christiana Werner & Ingrid Vendrell Ferran - 2024 - In Íngrid Vendrell-Ferran & Christiana Werner (eds.), Imagination and Experience: Philosophical Explorations. New York, NY: Routledge.
    This introduction presents an overview of the key issues discussed in the chapters of the book. This volume brings together two philosophical research areas that have been subject to increased attention: work regarding the unique character of having an experience and studies on the nature and powers of imagination. While in recent decades, there has been an increasing interest in examining the epistemic value of experience and the nature of phenomenal knowledge, the philosophy of imagination has emerged simultaneously as a (...)
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