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  1. Reasons and Causes in Psychiatry: Ideas from Donald Davidson’s Work.Elisabetta Lalumera - 2018 - In Annalisa Coliva, Paolo Leonardi & Sebastiano Moruzzi (eds.), Eva Picardi on Language, Analysis and History. Londra, Regno Unito: Palgrave. pp. 281-296.
    Though the divide between reason-based and causal-explanatory approaches in psychiatry and psychopathology is old and deeply rooted, current trends involving multi-factorial explanatory models and evidence-based approaches to interpersonal psychotherapy, show that it has already been implicitly bridged. These trends require a philosophical reconsideration of how reasons can be causes. This paper contributes to that trajectory by arguing that Donald Davidson’s classic paradigm of 1963 is still a valid option.
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  • Truth values.Yaroslav Shramko - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  • (1 other version)Frege: Two theses, two senses.Carlo Penco - 2003 - History and Philosophy of Logic 24 (2):87-109.
    One particular topic in the literature on Frege’s conception of sense relates to two apparently contradictory theses held by Frege: the isomorphism of thought and language on one hand and the expressibility of a thought by different sentences on the other. I will divide the paper into five sections. In (1) I introduce the problem of the tension in Frege’s thought. In (2) I discuss the main attempts to resolve the conflict between Frege’s two contradictory claims, showing what is wrong (...)
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  • Is Frege a Neo-Kantian Transcendentalist About the Justification for Logical Axioms?Junyeol Kim - forthcoming - Dialogue.
    The neo-Kantian transcendentalist reading of the epistemic status of logical axioms in Frege argues that he is committed to the neo-Kantian idea that we are epistemically justified in accepting logical axioms because accepting them is necessary for achieving epistemically crucial goals. However, I show that Frege hesitates to be fully committed to neo-Kantian transcendentalism because he struggles to accept the idea that such a teleological reason can constitute an epistemic warrant. This interpretation shows some crucial aspects of his philosophy of (...)
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  • Yaroslav Shramko and Heinrich Wansing, Truth and Falsehood - An Inquiry into Generalized Logical Values.Jean-Yves Beziau - 2014 - Studia Logica 102 (5):1079-1085.
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  • Russell’s debt to Lotze.Nikolay Milkov - 2008 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 39 (2):186-193.
    Between 1896 and 1898 Russell’s philosophy was considerably influenced by Hermann Lotze. Lotze’s influence on Russell was especially pronounced in introducing metaphysical—anthropological, in particular—assumptions in Russell’s logic and ontology. Three steps in his work reflect this influence. (i) The first such step can be discerned in the Principle of Differentiation, which Russell accepted in the Essay (finished in October 1986); according to this Principle, the objects of human cognition are segmented complexes which have diverse parts (individuals). (ii) After Russell reread (...)
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  • Frege on logical axioms and non‐evidential epistemic warrants: A paragraph from Grundgesetze.Junyeol Kim - forthcoming - Analytic Philosophy.
    Criticizing psychologism about logic in the Foreword of Grundgesetze, Frege examines an answer to the question of how we can justify our acknowledgment of logical axioms as true—the logical laws that cannot be proved from other laws. The answer he entertains states that we cannot reject logical axioms if we do not want to give up our judgment altogether. Suspending his judgment about this answer, Frege points out that it is still compatible with his anti-psychologist conception of logic. There are (...)
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  • One Heresy and One Orthodoxy: On Dialetheism, Dimathematism, and the Non-normativity of Logic.Heinrich Wansing - 2024 - Erkenntnis 89 (1):181-205.
    In this paper, Graham Priest’s understanding of dialetheism, the view that there exist true contradictions, is discussed, and various kinds of metaphysical dialetheism are distinguished between. An alternative to dialetheism is presented, namely a thesis called ‘dimathematism’. It is pointed out that dimathematism enables one to escape a slippery slope argument for dialetheism that has been put forward by Priest. Moreover, dimathematism is presented as a thesis that is helpful in rejecting the claim that logic is a normative discipline.
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  • Truth and Falsehood: An Inquiry Into Generalized Logical Values.Yaroslav Shramko & Heinrich Wansing - 2011 - Dordrecht, Netherland: Springer.
    The book presents a thoroughly elaborated logical theory of generalized truth-values understood as subsets of some established set of truth values. After elucidating the importance of the very notion of a truth value in logic and philosophy, we examine some possible ways of generalizing this notion. The useful four-valued logic of first-degree entailment by Nuel Belnap and the notion of a bilattice constitute the basis for further generalizations. By doing so we elaborate the idea of a multilattice, and most notably, (...)
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  • What did Frege take Russell to have proved?John Woods - 2019 - Synthese 198 (4):3949-3977.
    In 1902 there arrived in Jena a letter from Russell laying out a proof that shattered Frege’s confidence in logicism, which is widely taken to be the doctrine according to which every truth of arithmetic is re-expressible without relevant loss as a provable truth about a purely logical object. Frege was persuaded that Russell had exposed a pathology in logicism, which faced him with the task of examining its symptoms, diagnosing its cause, assessing its seriousness, arriving at a treatment option, (...)
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  • The epistemology of “On Sense and Reference”.Junyeol Kim - 2023 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):1-17.
    This paper sheds light on an epistemological dimension of Frege’s “On Sense and Reference.” Under my suggested reading of it, one of its aims is to suggest a picture about propositional knowledge and its production. According to this picture, judgment, which produces propositional knowledge, is identification of the truth-value True with the reference of a given sentence. The propositional knowledge that p, produced by the judgment that p, consists in the knowledge of the identity between the True and the reference (...)
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  • (1 other version)Truth as a Mathematical Object.Jean-Yves Béziau - 2010 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 14 (1):31-46.
    Neste artigo, discutimos em que sentido a verdade é considerada como um objeto matemático na lógica proposicional. Depois de esclarecer como este conceito é usado na lógica clássica, através das noções de tabela de verdade, de função de verdade, de bivaloração, examinamos algumas generalizações desse conceito nas lógicas não clássicas: semânticas matriciais multi-valoradas com três ou quatro valores, semântica bivalente não veritativa, semânticas dos mundos possiveis de Kripke. DOI:10.5007/1808-1711.2010v14n1p31.
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