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  1. An Alternative Model for Direct Cognition of Third-Party Elementary Mental States.de Sá Pereira Roberto Horácio - 2021 - Revista de Filosofia Moderna E Contemporânea 9 (1):15-28.
    I aim to develop an alternative theoretical model for the direct cognition of the elementary states of others called the theory of interaction (henceforth TI), also known as the “second person” approach. The model I propose emerges from a critical reformulation of the displaced perception model proposed by FRED DRETSKE (1995) for the introspective knowledge of our own mental states. Moreover, against Dretske, I argue that no meta-representation (second-order representation of a first-order representation as a representation) is involved in the (...)
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  • The problem of representation between extended and enactive approaches to cognition.Marta Caravà - 2018 - Dissertation, University of Bologna
    4Es approaches to cognition draw an unconventional picture of cognitive processes and of the mind. Instead of conceiving of cognition as a process that always takes place within the boundaries of the skull and the skin, these approaches hold that cognition is a situated process that often extends beyond human agents’ physical boundaries. In particular, supporters of the extended mind theory and of the enactive approach claim that embodied action in a perceptually complex environment is constitutive of cognitive processes, and (...)
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  • Enactive Pragmatism and Ecological Psychology.Matthew Crippen - 2020 - Frontiers in Psychology 11:538644.
    A widely cited roadblock to bridging ecological psychology and enactivism is that the former identifies with realism and the latter identifies with constructivism, which critics charge is subjectivist. A pragmatic reading, however, suggests non-mental forms of constructivism that simultaneously fit core tenets of enactivism and ecological realism. After advancing a pragmatic version of enactive constructivism that does not obviate realism, I reinforce the position with an empirical illustration: Physarum polycephalum (a slime mold), a communal unicellular organism that leaves slime trails (...)
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  • Culture in Mind - An Enactivist Account: Not Cognitive Penetration But Cultural Permeation.Inês Hipólito, Daniel D. Hutto & Shaun Gallagher - 2020 - In Laurence J. Kirmayer, Carol M. Worthman, Shinobu Kitayama, Robert Lemelson & Constance Cummings (eds.), Culture, Mind, and Brain: Emerging Concepts, Models, and Applications. Cambridge University Press.
    Advancing a radically enactive account of cognition, we provide arguments in favour of the possibility that cultural factors permeate rather than penetrate cognition, such that cognition extensively and transactionally incorporates cultural factors rather than there being any question of cultural factors having to break into the restricted confines of cognition. The paper reviews the limitations of two classical cognitivist, modularist accounts of cognition and a revisionary, new order variant of cognitivism – a Predictive Processing account of Cognition, or PPC. It (...)
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  • Enactivism and the Perception of Others’ Emotions.Søren Overgaard - 2017 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 41 (1):105-129.
    According to ‘direct social perception’ (DSP) accounts of social cognition, perception may be ‘smart’ enough on its own to inform us about other people’s emotions. Some DSP advocates suggest that ‘smart’ social perception should be conceived along ‘enactive’ lines. In this paper, I suggest that DSP needs social perception to have representational content. This seems in tension with the main versions of enactivism, which deny that perception is representational. I thus present the following challenge to ‘enactive’ versions of DSP: either (...)
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  • The anticipating brain is not a scientist: the free-energy principle from an ecological-enactive perspective.Jelle Bruineberg, Julian Kiverstein & Erik Rietveld - 2018 - Synthese 195 (6).
    In this paper, we argue for a theoretical separation of the free-energy principle from Helmholtzian accounts of the predictive brain. The free-energy principle is a theoretical framework capturing the imperative for biological self-organization in information-theoretic terms. The free-energy principle has typically been connected with a Bayesian theory of predictive coding, and the latter is often taken to support a Helmholtzian theory of perception as unconscious inference. If our interpretation is right, however, a Helmholtzian view of perception is incompatible with Bayesian (...)
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  • Por que somos o nosso cérebro: o enativismo posto em questão.Roberto Horácio de Sá Pereira, Sérgio Farias de Souza Filho & Victor Machado Barcellos - 2023 - Trans/Form/Ação 46 (spe1):517-554.
    In this essay we will argue for the following theses: 1- know-how is not a form of practical knowledge devoid of propositional sense; 2- the relationship between each perception and the body itself is metaphysically contingent. 3- it is up to the brain to configure or to shape a physical body (Körper) into a living body (Leib) and not the other way around; 4- phenomenal externalism of enactivist nature, even in its mild form, is empirically implausible: the correlation between the (...)
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  • Making imagination even more embodied: imagination, constraint and epistemic relevance.Zuzanna Rucińska & Shaun Gallagher - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):8143-8170.
    This paper considers the epistemic role that embodiment plays in imagining. We focus on two aspects of embodied cognition understood in its strong sense: explicit motoric processes related to performance, and neuronal processes rooted in bodily and action processes, and describe their role in imagining. The paper argues that these two aspects of strongly embodied cognition can play distinctive and positive roles in constraining imagining, thereby complementing Amy Kind's argument for the epistemic relevance of imagination "under constraints" and Magdalena Balcerak (...)
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  • Enactive individuation: technics, temporality and affect in digital design and fabrication.Kåre Stokholm Poulsgaard - 2019 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 18 (1):281-298.
    The nature of creative engagement with computers and software presents a number of challenges to 4E cognition and requires the development of analytical frameworks that can encompass cognitive processes as they extend across material and informational realms. Here I argue that an enactive view of mind allows for better understanding of digital practice by advancing a dynamic, transactional, and affective framework for the analysis of computational design. This enactive framework is in part developed through the Material Engagement Theory put forward (...)
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  • (1 other version)Grief’s impact on sensorimotor expectations: an account of non-veridical bereavement experiences.Becky Millar - 2021 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 22 (2):1-22.
    The philosophy of grief has directed little attention to bereavement’s impact on perceptual experience. However, misperceptions, hallucinations and other anomalous experiences are strikingly common following the death of a loved one. Such experiences range from misperceiving a stranger to be the deceased, to phantom sights, sounds and smells, to nebulous quasi-sensory experiences of the loved one’s presence. This paper draws upon the enactive sensorimotor theory of perception to offer a phenomenologically sensitive and empirically informed account of these experiences. It argues (...)
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  • The Enactive Approach to Architectural Experience: A Neurophysiological Perspective on Embodiment, Motivation, and Affordances.Andrea Jelić, Gaetano Tieri, Federico De Matteis, Fabio Babiloni & Giovanni Vecchiato - 2016 - Frontiers in Psychology 7.
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  • Por que não somos só o nosso cérebro: em defesa do enativismo.Giovanni Rolla - 2023 - Trans/Form/Ação 46 (spe1):207-236.
    In the article “Why are we our brain: enactivism put into question” (this volume), Pereira and collaborators raise a battery of criticisms of enactivism, which is a family of approaches in the cognitive sciences that gives centrality to the body and to the autonomous action of organisms in explanations of their cognitive processes. The authors’ attacks target some central concepts of the enactivist proposal, such as practical knowledge, embodiment (or corporeity) and sensory-motor regularities. I argue that the criticisms by Pereira (...)
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  • Leave inference alone : Direct inferential social cognition.Patrizio Lo Presti - forthcoming - Theory and Psychology.
    Direct perception and theory-theory approaches to social cognition are opposed with respect to whether social cognition is inferential. The latter argues that it is inferential, the former that it is not. This paper argues that the opposition in terms of inference is mistaken. A sense of inference is specified on which social cognition can be inferential and directly perceptual. Arguing for inferential social cognition does not commit to a defense of indirect social cognition if inferential access to other minds can (...)
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  • (1 other version)Grief’s impact on sensorimotor expectations: an account of non-veridical bereavement experiences.Becky Millar - 2023 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 22 (2):439-460.
    The philosophy of grief has directed little attention to bereavement’s impact on perceptual experience. However, misperceptions, hallucinations and other anomalous experiences are strikingly common following the death of a loved one. Such experiences range from misperceiving a stranger to be the deceased, to phantom sights, sounds and smells, to nebulous quasi-sensory experiences of the loved one’s presence. This paper draws upon the enactive sensorimotor theory of perception to offer a phenomenologically sensitive and empirically informed account of these experiences. It argues (...)
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  • The new hybrids: Continuing debates on social perception.Shaun Gallagher - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 36:452-465.
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